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Stateful Applied Pi Calculus
Myrto Arapinis, Jia Liu, Eike Ritter, and Mark Ryan
School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham, UK
Abstract. We extend the applied pi calculus with state cells, which are used to
reason about protocols that store persistent information. Examples are protocols
involving databases or hardware modules with internal state. We distinguish be-
tween private state cells, which are not available to the attacker, and public state
cells, which arise when a private state cell is compromised by the attacker. For
processes involving only private state cells we define observational equivalence
and labelled bisimilarity in the same way as in the original applied pi calculus, and
show that they coincide. Our result implies Abadi-Fournet’s theorem – the coinci-
dence of observational equivalence and labelled bisimilarity – in a revised version
of the applied pi calculus. For processes involving public state cells, we can es-
sentially keep the definition of observational equivalence, but need to strengthen
the definition of labelled bisimulation in order to show that observational equiva-
lence and labelled bisimilarity coincide in this case as well.
1 Introduction
Security protocols are small distributed programs that use cryptography in order to
achieve a security goal. The complexity that arises from their distributed nature moti-
vates formal analysis in order to prove logical properties of their behaviour; fortunately,
they are often small enough to make this kind of analysis feasible. Various logical meth-
ods have been used to model security protocols; process calculi have been particularly
successful [3, 5, 32]. For example, the TLS protocol used by billions of users every day
was analysed using ProVerif [11].
More recently, protocol analysis methods have been applied to stateful protocols
– that is, protocols which involve persistent state information that can affect and be
changed by protocol runs. Hardware devices that have some internal memory can be
described by such protocols. For example, Yubikey is a USB device which generates
one-time passwords based on encryptions of a secret ID, a running counter and some
random values using a unique AES-128 key contained in the device. The trusted plat-
form module (TPM) is another hardware chip that has a variety of registers which rep-
resent its state, and protocols for updating them. Radio-frequency identification (RFID)
is a wireless technology for automatic identification and is currently deployed in elec-
tronic passports, tags for consumer goods, livestock and pets tracking, etc. An RFID-tag
has a small area for storing secrets, which may be modified.
A process calculus can be made to work with such stateful protocols either by ex-
tension or by encoding. Extension means adding to the calculus explicit constructs for
working with the stateful aspects, while encoding means using combinations of the
primitives that already exist. Encodings have the advantage that they keep the calculus
simple and elegant, but (as argued in [3]) there may not be encodings for all the aspects
we want, and in cases that encodings exist they may not be suitable for the analysis of
security properties. StatVerif [7] demonstrates this: a natural way of encoding state us-
ing restricted channels prevents ProVerif from proving security. ProVerif also provides
some built-in features, such as tables and phases, which provide only limited ways for
modelling states. In particular, tables are defined as predicates which allow processes to
store data by extending a predicate for the data. Hence there is no notion of the “current”
state, and values cannot be deleted from tables. Phases are used to model the protocols
with several stages. But there can be only finitely many phases, which can only be run
in sequence, whereas a state may have infinitely many arbitrary values. Since our start-
ing point is the applied pi calculus [3], we follow the philosophy adopted by its authors,
which is to design a calculus that has the right primitives built in.
Our Constributions. We present an extension of the applied pi calculus by adding state
cells, which are used to reason about protocols that store persistent information. We dis-
tinguish between private state cells, which are not available to the attacker, and public
state cells, which arise when a private state cell is compromised by the attacker. In our
stateful language, a private state cell is guarded by the scope restriction; its access is lim-
ited to some designated processes. When a private state cell gets compromised, the cell
becomes public and this scenario is modelled by removing the scope restriction of that
cell. We first define observational equivalence and labelled bisimilarity for processes
having only private state cells, and we prove that two notions coincide as expected.
By encoding the private state cells with restricted channels while keeping observational
equivalence, our coincidence result can be seen to imply Abadi-Fournet’s theorem [3,
Theorem 1], in a revised version of applied pi calculus. As far as we can see, the only
available proof for this theorem is [29] which is an unpublished manuscript. Despite
having no published proof, this theorem has been widely used in many publications, for
example [20, 8, 4, 19, 21].
We also discuss an extension of our language with public state cells. The obvious
notion of labelled bisimilarity does not capture observational equivalence on public
state cells. Designing a labelled bisimilarity on public state cells turns out to be un-
expectedly difficult. Public state cells introduce many special language features which
are significantly different from private state cells. Moreover, the addition of public state
cells increases the capabilities of the attacker significantly. Hence we strengthen the
definition of labelled bisimilarity to show that observational equivalence and labelled
bisimulation coincide.
As an illustration, we analyse the OSK protocol [27] for RFID tags. We model its
untraceability by private state cells and model its forward privacy by public state cells.
Related Work. StatVerif [7] is an extension of ProVerif process language [13] with
private state cells. The main contribution there is to extend the ProVerif compiler to
a compiler for StatVerif. The security property of interest there is secrecy which is
modelled by reachability on the traces. This paper is a fundamental generalisation of the
previous StatVerif work. The focus in this paper is to build a stateful language based
on applied pi calculus, explore its language features and discuss indistinguishability,
which is modelled by observational equivalence and analysed by labelled bisimilarity.
There are other languages that have been used to model protocols involving per-
sistent state, but they are lower-level languages that are further away than our process
language from the protocol design. Strand spaces have been generalised to work with
the global state required by a trusted party charged with enforcing fair exchange [26].
The verifier Tamarin [34] uses multi-set rewriting (in which antecedents of applied rules
are withdrawn from the knowledge set in order to represent state changes); it has been
used to analyse hardware password tokens [28]. Multi-set rewriting is also used in [31],
where state changes are important to represent revocation of cryptographic keys. Horn
clauses rather than multiset rewriting are used in [23], in order to represent state changes
made to registers of the TPM hardware module.
Reasoning about programming languages involving states has been extensively stud-
ied (e.g. [35, 24]). There are very strong interactions between programing language
features and state, hence the reasoning principles are very specific to the precise com-
bination of features. In this work we build on the work on reasoning principles for
process calculi using bisimulation and show how to extend these principles to handle
global state.
Outline. The next section defines syntax and semantics for the stateful applied pi cal-
culus. Section 3 discusses the process equivalences and encoding for private state cells,
and derives Abadi-Fournet’s theorem. Section 4 extends our stateful language with pub-
lic state cells. The paper concludes in Section 5.
2 Stateful Applied Pi Calculus
In this section, we extend the applied pi calculus [3] with constructs for states, and
define its operational semantics. In fact, we do not directly build the stateful language
on top of applied pi calculus, because we want to avoid working with the structural
equivalence relation. More precisely, reasoning about the equivalent classes induced
by structural equivalence turns out to be difficult and normally results in long tedious
proofs [22, 19, 30, 18]. Our language inherits constructs for scope restriction, com-
munication and active substitutions from applied pi calculus while having multisets of
processes and active substitutions makes it possible to specify an operational semantics
which does not involve any structural equivalence.
2.1 Syntax
We assume two disjoint, infinite sets N and V of names and variables, respectively.
We rely on a sort system including a universal base sort, a cell sort and a channel sort.
The sort system splits N into channel names Nch, base names Nb and cell names Ns;
similarly, V is split into channel variables Vch and base variables Vb. Unless otherwise
stated, we use a, b, c as channel names, s, t as cell names, and x, y, z as variables. Meta
variables u, v, w are used to range over both names and variables.
A signature Σ consists of a finite set of function symbols, each with an arity. A
function symbol with arity 0 is a constant. Function symbols are required to take argu-
ments and produce results of the base sort only. Terms, ranged over by M,N , are built
up from variables and names by function application:
M,N ::= terms
a, b, c, k,m, n, s names
x, y, z variables
f(M1, . . . ,M`) function application
We write var(M) and name(M) for the variables and names inM , respectively. Tuples
such as u1 · · ·u` and M1 · · ·M` will be denoted by u˜ and M˜ , respectively. Terms are
equipped with an equational theory =Σ that is an equivalence relation closed under
substitutions of terms for variables, one-to-one renamings and function applications.
The grammar for the plain process is given below. The operators for nil process 0,
parallel composition |, replication !, scope restriction νn, conditional if - then - else ,
input u(x) and output u〈M〉 are the same as the ones in applied pi calculus [3]. A state
cell is a special process of the form [s 7→ M ] where s is the cell name and M is the
current value of s. The process lock s.P locks the cell s for the subsequent process
P . When the cell s is locked, another process that intends to access the cell has to wait
until the cell is unlocked by a primitive unlock s. The process read s as x.P reads
the value in the cell and stores it in x in P . The process s :=M.P assigns the value M
to the cell and continues as P .
P,Q,R ::= plain process
0 nil process
P | Q parallel composition
!P replication
νn.P name restriction
ifM = N then P else Q conditional
u(x).P input
u〈M〉.P output
[s 7→M ] cell s, containing term M
s :=M.P writing a cell
read s as x.P reading a cell
lock s.P locking a cell
unlock s.P unlocking a cell
subject to the following requirements:
– x,M,N are not of cell sort; u ∈ Nch ∪Vch and s ∈ Ns; additionally, M is of base
sort in both [s 7→M ] and s :=M.P ;
– for every lock s. P , the part P of the process must not include parallel or replica-
tion unless it is after an unlock s.
– for a given cell name s, the replication operator ! must not occur between νs and
[s 7→M ].
These side conditions rule out some nonsense processes, such as lock s. !P , lock s. (P |
Q), νs.![s 7→M ] and νs.([s 7→M ] | [s 7→ N ]), while keep some reasonable processes,
such as lock s.unlock s. !P , lock s.unlock s. (P | Q) and !νs.[s 7→M ].
An extended process, ranged over byA,B,C, is an expression of the form νn˜. (σ, S,P)
where
– νn˜ is a set of name restrictions;
– σ is a substitution {M1/x1, . . . ,Mn/xn} which replaces variables of base sort
with terms of base sort; the domain dom(σ) of σ is {x1, . . . , xn}; the domain
dom(νn˜.(σ, S,P)) of the extended process νn˜.(σ, S,P) is also dom(σ); we re-
quire that dom(σ) ∩ fv(M1, . . . ,Mn,P, S) = ∅;
– S = {s1 7→M1, . . . , sm 7→Mm} is a set of state cells such that s1, . . . , sm are
pairwise-distinct cell names and terms M1, . . . ,Mm are of base sort; we write
dom(S) for {s1, . . . , sm} and S(si) for Mi (1 ≤ i ≤ m);
– [s 7→ M ] can only occur at most once for a given cell name s, and if a cell name s
is not restricted by any νs, a state cell s 7→M can only occur in S;
– P = {(P1, L1), . . . , (Pk, Lk)} is a multiset of pairs where Pi is a plain process and
Li is a set of cell names; Li ∩ Lj = ∅ for any 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k and i 6= j; for each
s ∈ Li, the part of the process Pi must not include parallel or replication unless it
is after a unlock s; we write locks(P) for the set L1 ∪ · · · ∪Lk, namely the locked
cells in P .
In an extended process νn˜.(σ, S,P), the substitution σ is similar to the active sub-
stitutions in applied pi calculus [3] which denote the static knowledge that the process
exposes to the environment. A minor difference with [3] is that substitutions here are
only defined on terms of base sort which will be explained later. State cells are mutable
and the value of a cell may be changed during the running of processes. If a process
P locks a cell s, then this status information will be kept as (P, {s} ∪ L) in P . At any
time, the cell s can be locked at most once in P .
The variable x in “u(x)” and “read s as x” are bound, as well as the name n
in νn. This leads to the usual notions of bound and free names and variables. We
shall use fn(A) for free names, use fs(A) for free cell names, use fv(A) for free
variables, use bn(A) for bound names, and use bv(A) for bound variables of A. Let
fnv(A) = fn(A)∪ fv(A) and bnv(A) = bn(A)∪ bv(A). Following the conventions in
[33], we shall identify processes which are α-convertible. We write “=” for both syntac-
tical equality and equivalence under α-conversion. Captures of bound names and bound
variables are avoided by implicit α-conversion.
An extended process νn˜.(σ, S,P) is called closed if each variable is either defined
by σ or bound, each cell name s is defined by exactly one “s 7→ M” (either in S or
in P), and locks(P) ⊆ dom(S). We may write (σ, S,P) for ν∅.(σ, S,P), and write
νn˜, m˜.(σ, S,P) for ν(n˜ ∪ m˜).(σ, S,P).
When we write σ = σ1 ∪ σ2 for some substitution σ or S = S1 ∪ S2 for some state
cells S, we assume that dom(σ1)∩ dom(σ2) = ∅ as well as dom(S1)∩ dom(S2) = ∅.
For variables x˜, we define σ\ex to be the substitution { zσ/z | z ∈ dom(σ) and z /∈ x˜ }.
If A = νn˜.(σ, S,P), we write A\ex for νn˜.(σ\ex, S,P).
An evaluation context νn˜.(σ-, S-,P-) is an extended process with holes “-” for
substitution, state cells and plain processes. Let C = νn˜.(σ-, S-,P-) be an evalua-
tion context and A = νm˜.(σa, Sa,Pa) be a closed extended process with m˜ ∩ (n˜ ∪
fn(σ, S,P)) = dom(σ)∩dom(σa) = dom(S)∩dom(Sa) = ∅. The result of applying
C to A is an extended process defined by:
C[A] = νn˜, m˜.(σσa ∪ σa, Sσa ∪ Sa,Pσa ∪ Pa)
An evaluation context C closes A when C[A] is a closed extended process.
νen. (σ, S,P ∪ {( !P, ∅)}) τ−−→ νen. (σ, S,P ∪ {( !P, ∅), (P, ∅)})
νen.(σ, S,P ∪ {(P | Q, ∅)}) τ−−→ νen.(σ, S,P ∪ {(P, ∅), (Q, ∅)})
νen.(σ, S,P ∪ {(νm.P, L)}) τ−−→ νen,m.(σ, S,P ∪ {(P,L)}) if m /∈ fn(en, σ, S,P, L)
νen.(σ, S,P ∪ {([s 7→M ], ∅)}) τ−−→ νen.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,P) if s ∈ en and s /∈ dom(S)
νen.(σ, S,P ∪ {(a(x).P, L1)} ∪ {(a〈M〉.Q, L2)}) τ−−→ νen.(σ, S,P ∪ {(P {M/x} , L1), (Q,L2)}))
νen.(σ, S,P ∪ {(ifM = N then P else Q,L)}) τ−−→ νen.(σ, S,P ∪ {(P,L)}) if M =Σ N
νen.(σ, S,P ∪ {(ifM = N then P else Q,L)}) τ−−→ νen.(σ, S,P ∪ {(Q,L)}) if M 6=Σ N and var(M,N) = ∅
νen.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,P ∪ {(read s as x.P, L)}) τ−−→ νen.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,P ∪ {(P {M/x} , L)})
if s ∈ en ∪ L and s 6∈ locks(P)
νen.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,P ∪ {(s := N.P,L)}) τ−−→ νen.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→ N} ,P ∪ {(P,L)})
if s ∈ en ∪ L and s 6∈ locks(P)
νen.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,P ∪ {(lock s.P, L)}) τ−−→ νen.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,P ∪ {(P,L ∪ {s})})
if s ∈ en and s 6∈ L ∪ locks(P)
νen.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,P ∪ {(unlock s.P, L)}) τ−−→ νen.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,P ∪ {(P,L \ {s})}) if s ∈ en ∩ L
νen.(σ, S,P ∪ {(a(x).P, L)}) a(M)−−−−→ νen.(σ, S,P ∪ {(P {Mσ/x} , L)}) if name(a,M) ∩ en = ∅
νen.(σ, S,P ∪ {(a〈c〉.P, L)}) a〈c〉−−−→ νen.(σ, S,P ∪ {(P,L)}) if a, c 6∈ en
νen, c.(σ, S,P ∪ {(a〈c〉.P, L)}) νc.a〈c〉−−−−→ νen.(σ, S,P ∪ {(P,L)}) if a, c 6∈ en and a 6= c
νen.(σ, S,P ∪ {(a〈M〉.P, L)}) νx.a〈x〉−−−−−→ νen.(σ ∪ {M/x} , S,P ∪ {(P,L)})
if a 6∈ en and M is of base sort and x is fresh
Fig. 1. Operational Semantics
2.2 Operational Semantics
The transition relation A α−→ A′ is the smallest relation on extended processes defined
by the rules in Figure 1. The action α is either an internal action τ , an input a(x), an
output of channel name a〈c〉, an output of bound channel name νc.a〈c〉, or an output
of terms of base sort νx.a〈x〉. The transitions for conditional branch, communication,
sending and receiving channel names and complex messages are typical and essentially
the same as the ones in applied pi calculus. In particular, the output νx.a〈x〉 for term
M generates an “alias” x for M which is kept in the substitution part of the extended
process. As mentioned before, state cells are used to model the hardware or the database
to which the access is usually mutually-exclusive. When a state cell is locked, the other
process that intends to access the cell must wait until the cell is released.
3 Private State Cells
3.1 Equivalences for Private State Cells
We first discuss observational equivalence and labelled bisimilarity on the extended pro-
cesses with only private state cells, that is, each cell name s occurring in the processes
is within the scope of a restriction νs. We will discuss an extension of the language with
public state cells in Section 4.
Observational equivalence [3] has been widely used to model properties of security
protocols. It captures the intuition of indistinguishability from the attacker’s point of
view. Security properties such as anonymity [4], privacy [21, 6] and strong secrecy [12]
are usually formalised by observational equivalence.
We write =⇒ for the reflexive and transitive closure of τ−→; we define α=⇒ to be
=⇒ α−→=⇒; we write bα=⇒ for α=⇒ if α is not τ and =⇒ otherwise. We write A ⇓a when
A =⇒ νn˜.(σ, S,P ∪ {(a〈M〉.P, L)}) with a /∈ n˜.
Definition 1. Observational equivalence (≈) is the largest symmetric relation R on
pairs of closed extended processes with only private state cells, such thatA R B implies
(i) dom(A) = dom(B);
(ii) if A ⇓a then B ⇓a;
(iii) if A =⇒ A′ then B =⇒ B′ and A′ R B′ for some B′;
(iv) for all closing evaluation contexts C with only private cells, C[A] R C[B].
Observational equivalence is a contextual equivalence where the contexts model the
active attackers who can intercept and forge messages. In the following examples, we
illustrate the use of observational equivalence in the stateful language by analysing the
untraceability of the RFID tags.
Example 1. We start by analysing a naive protocol for RFID tag identification. The tag
simply reads its id and sends it to the reader. We assume the attacker can eavesdrop on
the radio frequency signals between the tag and the reader. In other words, all the com-
munications between the tag and the reader are visible to the attacker. The operations
on the tag can be modelled by: P (s) = read s as x. a〈x〉. One security concern for
RFID tags is to avoid third-party attacker tracking. The attacker is not supposed to trace
the tag according to its outputs. Using the definition in [6], the untraceability can be
modelled by observational equivalence:
(∅, ∅, {( ! νs, id .([s 7→ id ] | P (s)), ∅)}) ≈ (∅, ∅, {( ! νs, id .([s 7→ id ] | !P (s)), ∅)})
In the left process, each tag s can be used at most once. In the right process, each tag
s can be used an unbounded number of times. The above equivalence does not hold,
which means this protocol is traceable. By eavesdropping on channel a of the right
process, the attacker can get a data sequence: “id , id , id · · · ”, while a particular id can
occur at most once in the first process.
Example 2. The OSK protocol [27] is a simple identification protocol for RFID tags
which aims to satisfy third-party untraceability. The tag can perform two independent
one-way functions g and h. An initial secret is stored in the tag and is known to the
back-end database. On each run of the protocol, the tag computes the hash g of its
current value and sends the result to the reader. The reader forwards the message to the
back-end database for identification. The tag then updates its value with the hash h of
its current value. The operations related to a tag s can be modelled by:
T (s) = lock s. read s as x. a〈g(x)〉. s := h(x). unlock s
Let RD be process modelling the reader and back-end database. Similar to Example 1,
the untraceability can be represented by
(∅, ∅, {( ! νs, k.([s 7→ k] | T (s) | RD), ∅)})
≈ (∅, ∅, {( ! νs, k.([s 7→ k] | !T (s) | RD), ∅)})
In the second process, for a particular tag s which contains value k, the data sequence
observed by the attacker on channel a is “g(k), g(h(k)), g(h(h(k))) · · · ”. Without know-
ing the secret k, these appear just random data to the attacker and so the attacker cannot
link these data to the same tag. The observational equivalence between these two pro-
cesses means the attacker cannot identify the multiple runnings of a particular tag. The
“lock s · · · unlock s” ensures exclusive access to the tag. After the reader reads the
tag, the tag must be renewed before the next access to the tag; otherwise the tag would
be traceable.
The universal quantifier over the contexts makes it difficult to prove observational
equivalence. Hence labelled bisimilarity is introduced in [3] to capture observational
equivalence. Labelled bisimilarity consists of static equivalence and behavioural equiv-
alence.
Definition 2. Two processes A and B are statically equivalent, written as A ≈s B,
if dom(A) = dom(B), and for any terms M and N with var(M,N) ⊆ dom(A),
Mσ1 =Σ Nσ1 iffMσ2 =Σ Nσ2 whereA = νn˜1.(σ1, S1,P1) andB = νn˜2.(σ2, S2,P2)
for some n˜1, n˜2 such that (n˜1 ∪ n˜2) ∩ name(M,N) = ∅.
Our definition of static equivalence is essentially the same as the one in [3], as
the definition in [3] is invariant under structural equivalence already. Although static
equivalence is in general undecidable, there are well established ways, including tools,
for verifying static equivalence [2, 16, 17, 9, 15]. Static equivalence defines the indis-
tinguishability between the environmental knowledge exposed by two processes. The
environmental knowledge is modelled by the substitutions in the extended processes.
For example, let A = νk,m.({k/x,m/y} , ∅, ∅) and B = νk.({k/x, h(k)/y} , ∅, ∅).
The test h(x) = y fails under the application of A’s substitution {k/x,m/y}, while
succeeds under the application of B’s substitution {k/x, h(k)/y}. Hence A 6≈s B.
Definition 3. Labelled bisimilarity (≈l) is the largest symmetric relation R between
pairs of closed extended processes with only private state cells such thatA R B implies
1. A ≈s B;
2. if A α−→ A′ and fv(α) ⊆ dom(A) and bn(α) ∩ fn(B) = ∅, then B bα=⇒ B′ such
that A′ R B′ for some B′.
Instead of using arbitrary contexts, labelled bisimilarity relies on the direct compar-
ison of the transitions. The following theorem states that labelled bisimilarity can fully
capture observational equivalence:
Theorem 1. On closed extended processes with only private state cells, it holds that
≈=≈l.
b0cS = 0 bP | QcS = bP cS | bQcS bνn.P cS = νn. bP cS if n /∈ Ns
b!P cS = ! bP cS bu(x).P cS = u(x). bP cS bu〈M〉.P cS = u〈M〉. bP cS
bifM = N then P else QcS = ifM = N then bP cS else bQcS
bs 7→McS = cs〈M〉 bνs.P cS = νcs. bP cS if s ∈ Ns
block s.P cS =

cs(x). bP cS∪{s 7→x} if s /∈ dom(S) and x is fresh
0 otherwise
bunlock s.P cS =

cs〈M〉 | bP cT if S = T ∪ {s 7→M}
0 otherwise
bread s as x.P cS =
 bP {M/x}cS if S = T ∪ {s 7→M}
cs(x).(cs〈x〉 | bP cS) otherwise
bs :=M.P cS =
 bP cT∪{s 7→M} if S = T ∪ {s 7→ N}
cs(x).(cs〈M〉 | bP cS) otherwise select fresh variable x
Fig. 2. Encoding private state cells with restricted channels
3.2 Encoding Private State Cells with Restricted Channels
Private state cells can be encoded by restricted channels. This is an important obser-
vation; moreover, we will use this to prove Abadi-Fournet’s theorem in the following
Section 3.3. However, when modelling security protocols, the drawback of represent-
ing private state cells by restricted channels is that it may introduce false attacks when
using the automatic tool ProVerif as argued in [7]. The reason is that some features of
restricted channels are abstracted away when ProVerif translates process calculus into
Horn clauses [14]. To solve this problem, we introduce the primitives for lock, read,
write and unlock which will help us design better translations for stateful protocols in
ProVerif. This has been demonstrated by the verification of reachability [7], and will be
useful in future for verifying observational equivalence.
We encode the extended processes with only private state cells into a subset of the
extended processes which do not contain any cell name. Since the target language of the
encoding does not have any cell name, we abbreviate extended processes νn˜.(σ, ∅, {(Pi, ∅)}i∈I)
with no cell name to νn˜.(σ, {Pi}i∈I).
First we define encoding bP cS in Figure 2 for the plain process P under a given set
of state cells S = {s1 7→M1, . . . , sn 7→Mn}. For each cell s, we select a fresh channel
name cs. The encoding in Figure 2 only affects the part related to cell names, leaving
other parts like input and output unchanged. The state cell s 7→ M and unlock s are
both encoded by an output cs〈M〉 on the restricted channel cs. The lock s is repre-
sented by an input cs(x) on the same channel cs. To read the cell read s as x, we
use the input cs(x) to get the value from the cell and then put the value back cs〈x〉,
which enables the other operations on cell s in future. To write a new value into the
cell s := N , we need to first consume the existing cs〈M〉 by an input cs(x) and then
generate a new output cs〈N〉. Our encoding ensures that there is only one output cs〈M〉
available on a specified restricted channel cs at each moment. When the cell is locked,
namely cs〈M〉 is consumed by some cs(x), the other processes that intend to access the
cell have to wait until an output cs〈N〉 is available.
LetA = νs˜, n˜.
(
σ, {si 7→Mi}i∈I , {(Pj , Lj)}j∈J
)
be an extended process 1 where
s˜ ⊂ Ns and n˜ ∩Ns = ∅. We define the encoding bAc as:
bAc = νc˜s, n˜.
(
σ, {csi〈Mi〉}i∈U ∪
{
bPjcSj
}
j∈J
)
where U = { i | si /∈
⋃
j∈J Lj and i ∈ I } and Sj = { si 7→Mi | si ∈ Lj and i ∈ I }.
Intuitively, U is the indices of the unlocked state cells in {si 7→Mi}i∈I , and Sj is the
set of state cells locked by Lj .
Example 3. Let A = νs.(∅, {s 7→ 0} , {(T (s), ∅)}) where T (s) is defined in Exam-
ple 2. Then bAc = νcs.(∅,
{
cs〈0〉, bT (s)c∅
}
) with bT (s)c∅ = cs(z).a〈g(z)〉.cs〈h(z)〉
obtained by:
bT (s)c∅ = block s.read s as x.a〈g(x)〉.s := h(x).unlock sc∅
= cs(z). bread s as x.a〈g(x)〉.s := h(x).unlock sc{s7→z}
= cs(z). ba〈g(z)〉.s := h(z).unlock sc{s7→z}
= cs(z).a〈g(z)〉. bs := h(z).unlock sc{s7→z}
= cs(z).a〈g(z)〉. bunlock sc{s7→h(z)}
= cs(z).a〈g(z)〉.cs〈h(z)〉
Theorem 2. For two closed extended processes A,B with only private state cells, we
have A ≈ B iff bAc ≈e bBc where ≈e is an equivalence defined exactly the same as
Definition 1 except the context C does not contain any cell names.
3.3 Overview of the Proof of Abadi-Fournet’s Theorem
We shall use our Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 to derive Abadi-Fournet’s theorem, namely
Theorem 1 in [3]. We revise the original applied pi calculus [3] slightly: active sub-
stitutions are only defined on terms of base sort; otherwise Theorem 1 in [3] does not
hold [10].2 Since the active substitutions in applied pi calculus float everywhere in the
extended processes, in order to prove Abadi-Fournet’s theorem, we need to normalise
the extended processes first. We can transform the extended processes in the applied pi
calculus – denoted by Ar, Br, Cr to avoid confusion – into the extended processes in
stateful applied pi calculus by function T (assume bound names are pairwise-distinct
1 We abbreviate the set { si 7→Mi | i ∈ I } as {si 7→Mi}i∈I .
2 Here is a counter example: let Ar = νc.(c.a | {c/x}) and Br = νc.(0 | {c/x}). Ob-
viously Ar and Br are labelled bisimilar since their frames are the same and both have no
transitions. However, they are not observationally equivalent. Consider the context x(y), then
Ar | x(y) ⇓a but Br | x(y) 6⇓a.
and different from free names): 3
T (0) = (∅, ∅) T ({M/x}) = ({M/x} , ∅) T (νn.Ar) = νn.T (Ar)
T (νx.Ar) = νn˜.(σ,P) if T (Ar) = νn˜.(σ ∪ {M/x} ,P)
T (A1r | A2r) = νn˜1, n˜2.((σ1 ∪ σ2)∗, (P1 ∪ P2)(σ1 ∪ σ2)∗)
if T (Air) = νn˜i.(σi,Pi) for i = 1, 2
T (Ar) = (∅, {Ar}) in all other cases of Ar
Intuitively, T pulls out name restrictions, applies active substitutions and sepa-
rates them from the plain processes, and eliminates variable restrictions. For instance,
T (a〈x〉.νn.a〈n〉 | νk. {k/x}) = νk.({k/x} , {a〈k〉.νn.a〈n〉}). This normalisation T
preserves both observational equivalence and labelled bisimilarity:
Theorem 3. For two closed extended processes Ar and Br in applied pi calculus,
1. Ar and Br are labelled bisimilar in applied pi iff T (Ar) ≈l T (Br);
2. Ar and Br are observationally equivalent in applied pi iff T (Ar) ≈e T (Br);
With all the theorems ready, now we can prove Abadi-Fournet’s theorem:
Corollary 1. Observational equivalence coincides with labelled bisimilarity in applied
pi calculus.
4 Extending the Language with Public State Cells
4.1 Public State Cells
Hardware modules like TPMs and smart cards are intended to be secure, but an at-
tacker might succeed in finding ways of compromising their tamper-resistant features.
Similarly, attackers can potentially hack into databases [1]. We model these attacks by
considering that the attacker compromises the private state cells, after which they are
public. Protocols may provide some security properties that hold even under such com-
promises of the hardware or database. A typical example is forward privacy [25] which
requires the past events remain secure even if the attacker compromises the device. This
will be further discussed in the following Example 8 and Example 9. A cell s not in the
scope of νs is public, which enables the attacker to lock the cell, read its contents or
overwrite it.
We now give the details of the syntactic additions for public cells and the definition
of observational equivalence. To let a private state cell become public, we extend the
plain processes in Section 2 with a new primitive open s.P Extended processes are
defined as before. We extend the transitions in Fig. 1 by a new transition relation
τ(s)−−→
defined in Fig. 3 for reasoning about public state cells. These internal transitions specify
on which public state cell the operations are performed. The label τ(s) is necessary
when we later define labelled bisimilarity. Note that when a public state cell is locked,
we still use the rule τ−−→ defined in Fig. 1 for reading and writing on that cell.
3 We write σ∗ for the result of composing the substitution σ with itself repeatedly until an
idempotent substitution is reached.
νen.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,P ∪ {(read s as x.P, L)}) τ(s)−−→ νen.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,P ∪ {(P {M/x} , L)})
if s 6∈ en ∪ L ∪ locks(P)
νen.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,P ∪ {(s := N.P,L)}) τ(s)−−→ νen.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→ N} ,P ∪ {(P,L)})
if s 6∈ en ∪ L ∪ locks(P)
νen.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,P ∪ {(lock s.P, L)}) τ(s)−−→ νen.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,P ∪ {(P,L ∪ {s})})
if s 6∈ en ∪ L ∪ locks(P)
νen.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,P ∪ {(unlock s.P, L)}) τ(s)−−→ νen.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,P ∪ {(P,L \ {s})})
if s 6∈ en ∪ locks(P) and s ∈ L
νen, s.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,P ∪ {(open s.P, L)}) τ(s)−−→ νen.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,P ∪ {(P,L)}) if s /∈ en
Fig. 3. Internal transitions for public state cells.
LetA = νn˜.(σ, S,P) and we write locks(A) for the set locks(P)\ n˜. We write =⇒
for the reflexive and transitive closure of τ−−→ and τ(s)−−→ for any cell s. We write A ⇓a
when A =⇒ νn˜.(σ, S,P ∪ {(a〈M〉.P, L)}) with a /∈ n˜.
Definition 4. Observational equivalence (≈) is the largest symmetric relation R on
pairs of closed extended processes (which may contain public state cells) such that
A R B implies
(i) locks(A) = locks(B), fs(A) = fs(B) and dom(A) = dom(B);
(ii) if A ⇓a then B ⇓a;
(iii) if A =⇒ A′ then B =⇒ B′ and A′ R B′ for some B′;
(iv) for all closing evaluation contexts C, C[A] R C[B].
We stick to the original definition of observational equivalence [3] as much as pos-
sible in order to capture the intuition of indistinguishability from the attacker’s point of
view. The definition of observational equivalence on public state cells is similar to the
one for private state cells, but the language features of public state cells are significantly
different from private state cells. Moreover, the addition of public state cells increases
the power of the attacker significantly, as without the name restriction νs for a state cell
s, when s is unlocked, the attacker can lock the cell, read its content and overwrite it.
To illustrate this point, we start by analysing several examples.
Example 4. The attacker can lock the unlocked public state cells. Assume
A = (∅, {s 7→ 0} , {(c〈b〉, ∅)})
B = (∅, {s 7→ 0} , {(read s as x. c〈b〉, ∅)})
A and B are not observationally equivalent. Let C = (-, -, {(0, {s})} -). The context C
does nothing but holds the lock on cell s and it will never release the lock. So we have
C[A] ⇓c but C[B] 6⇓c because reading cell s in B is blocked forever by context C.
Example 5. The attacker can read an unlocked public state cell. Assume
A = (∅, {s 7→ 0} , {( ! s := 0, ∅), ( ! s := 1, ∅)})
B = (∅, {s 7→ 1} , {( ! s := 0, ∅), ( ! s := 1, ∅)})
Cell s is unlocked in bothA andB. BothA andB can write 0 or 1 to the cell s arbitrary
number of times. The only difference between A and B is the initial values in cell s. A
and B are not observationally equivalent because the context
C = (-, -, {(read s as x. if x = 0 then c〈b〉, {s})} -)
can distinguish them. The context C holds the lock of cell s, thus no one can change the
value in s when C reads the value. We have C[A] ⇓c but C[B] 6⇓c.
In comparison, the following processes are observationally equivalent:
A′ = (∅, {s 7→ 0} , {( ! s := 0, ∅), ( ! s := 1, ∅), (unlock s, {s})})
B′ = (∅, {s 7→ 1} , {( ! s := 0, ∅), ( ! s := 1, ∅), (unlock s, {s})})
Cell s is locked in both A′ and B′. When a cell is locked, the attacker cannot see its
value until it is unlocked. Both A′ and B′ can adjust the value of cell s after unlock s.
Assume
A′
τ(s)−−→ (∅, {s 7→ 0} , {( ! s := 0, ∅), ( ! s := 1, ∅), (0, ∅)})
Then B′ can match this transition by first unlocking the cell s and then doing a writing
s := 0 and evolving to exactly the same process:
B′
τ(s)−−→ (∅, {s 7→ 1} , {( ! s := 0, ∅), ( ! s := 1, ∅), (0, ∅)})
τ(s)
=⇒ (∅, {s 7→ 0} , {( ! s := 0, ∅), ( ! s := 1, ∅), (0, ∅)})
Intuitively, the locked or unlocked status of a public state cell is observable by the
environment. Therefore, we require locks(A) = locks(B) and fs(A) = fs(B) in the
definition of observational equivalence. Furthermore, without this condition, this defi-
nition would not yield an equivalence relation, as transitivity does not hold in general.
For example, consider the following extended processes,
A = (∅, {s 7→ 0} , {( ! s := 0, ∅), ( ! s := 1, ∅), ( ! lock s.unlock s, ∅)})
B = (∅, {s 7→ 1} , {( ! s := 0, ∅), ( ! s := 1, ∅), ( ! lock s.unlock s, ∅), (unlock s, {s})})
C = (∅, {s 7→ 1} , {( ! s := 0, ∅), ( ! s := 1, ∅), ( ! lock s.unlock s, ∅)})
Without the condition, then A and B would be equivalent, as well as B and C, because
the value in s can always be adjusted to be exactly the same after unlock s. But A and
C are not equivalent as analysed in Example 5.
Example 6. The value in an unlocked public state cell is a part of the attacker’s knowl-
edge. Assume
A = νk.(∅, {s 7→ k} , {(s := 0.a(x).if x = k then c〈b〉, ∅)})
B = νk.(∅, {s 7→ k} , {(s := 0.a(x), ∅)})
A and B are not observationally equivalent. Let C = (-, -, {(read s as y. a〈y〉, ∅)} -).
Then C[A] ⇓c but C[B] 6⇓c because
C[A] τ(s)−−→ νk. (∅, {s 7→ k} , {(a〈k〉, ∅), (s := 0.a(x).if x = k then c〈b〉, ∅)})
τ(s)−−→ νk. (∅, {s 7→ 0} , {(a〈k〉, ∅), (a(x).if x = k then c〈b〉, ∅)})
=⇒ νk. (∅, {s 7→ 0} , {(c〈b〉, ∅)})
But there is no output on channel c in C[B]. Hence A 6 ≈ B.
Example 7. The attacker can write an arbitrary value into an unlocked public cell. As-
sume two extended processes
A = (∅, {s 7→ 0} , {(s := 0. s := 0, ∅)})
B = (∅, {s 7→ 0} , {(s := 0, ∅)})
A and B are not observationally equivalent. Applying C = (-, -, {(s := 1.s := 1, ∅)} -)
to bothA andB, the interleaving of s := 0 and s := 1 can generate a sequence of values
0, 1, 0, 1, 0 in cell s in C[A], while the closest sequence generated by C[B] should be
0, 1, 0, 1, 1. So when the attacker keeps on reading the value in cell s, he would be able
to notice the difference.
Instead of using the primitive open s, an alternative way for making a private
state cell become public is to send cell name s on a free channel c〈s〉.P . The reason
we choose the primitive open s.P here is because sending and receiving cell names
through channels is too powerful, and will lead to soundness problems when we define
labelled bisimilarity later. For example, let
A = (∅, ∅, {(c(x).read x as z.a〈z〉, ∅)})
B = (∅, ∅, {(c(x), ∅)})
In the presence of input and output for cell names, A and B are not observationally
equivalent. Let C = (-, {t 7→ 0} -, {(c〈t〉, ∅)} -). The context C brings his own state cell
t 7→ 0 and we have C[A] ⇓a but C[B] 6⇓a. That is to say, in order to define a sound
labelled bisimilarity, we have to allow a process like (∅, ∅, {(read t as z. a〈z〉, ∅)}) to
perform the reading even without a state cell t 7→ 0. This requires a rather complex
definition of labelled bisimilarity, while what we want is to simply free a cell which can
be achieved by open s.P .
Now we give examples of the use of public state cells for modelling protocols and
security properties. Another security concern for RFID tags is forward privacy [27].
In the following Example 8 and Example 9, we shall illustrate how to model forward
privacy by public state cells. Forward privacy requires that even the attacker breaks the
tag, the past events should still be untraceable. Public state cells enable us to model the
compromised tags.
Example 8. We consider an improved version of the naive protocol in Example 1. In-
stead of simply outputting the tag’s id, the tag generates a random number r, hashes its
id concatenated with r and then sends both r and h(id, r) to the reader for identification.
This can be modelled by:
Q(s) = read s as x. νr. a〈(r, h(x, r))〉
Upon receiving the value, the reader identifies the tag by performing a brute-force
search of its known ids. By observing on channel a, the attacker can get the data
pairs from a particular tag s: (r1, h(id , r1)), (r2, h(id , r2)), (r3, h(id , r3)) · · · . Since
the hash function is not invertible, without knowing the value of id, these data appear as
just random data to the attacker. Hence this improved version satisfies the untraceabil-
ity defined in Example 1. But it does not have the forward privacy. Let RD be process
modelling the reader and back-end database. The forward privacy can be characterised
by the observational equivalence
(∅, ∅, {( ! νs, id .([s 7→ id ] | Q(s) | open s. !Q(s) | RD), ∅)})
≈ (∅, ∅, {( ! νs, id .([s 7→ id ] | !Q(s) | open s | RD), ∅)})
The primitive open s makes the private state cell s become public. Before the cell s is
broken, the attacker cannot decide how the system runs. In other words, whether the tag
s is used for only once, namely Q(s), or is used for arbitrary number of times, namely
!Q(s), it is out of the control of the attacker. But after the tag is broken, the attacker
fully controls the tag, so he knows when and where the tag is used. Despite knowing the
events that happen after the tag is broken, the attacker should still not be able to trace
the past events. Therefore, in the first process, we add !Q(s) after open s to model this
scenario. Intuitively, only the events before the tag is broken may be different while
the events after the tag is broken are exactly the same. Hence the above observational
equivalence can capture forward privacy.
However the above equivalence does not hold which means there is no forward pri-
vacy in this protocol. The attacker can obtain the id from the broken tag and then ver-
ify whether the previously gathered data (r1, h(id , r1)) and (r2, h(id , r2)) refer to the
same tag id by hashing id with r1 (or r2) and then comparing the result with h(id , r1)
(or h(id , r2)).
Example 9. Continuing with the OSK protocol in Example 2, we model the forward
privacy by the observational equivalence:
(∅, ∅, {( ! νs, k.([s 7→ k] | T (s) | open s. !T (s) | RD), ∅)})
≈ (∅, ∅, {( ! νs, k.([s 7→ k] | !T (s) | open s | RD), ∅)})
Before the tag is broken, the attacker can obtain the data sequence g(k), g(h(k)), g(h(h(k))) · · ·
by eavesdropping on channel a. Right after each reading, the value in the tag will be
updated to the hash of previous value: h(k), h(h(k)), h(h(h(k))) · · · . When the tag is
broken, the attacker will get from the tag a value hi(k) for some integer i. This value is
not helpful for the attacker to infer whether the data g(k), g(h(k)), · · · , g(hi−1(k)) are
from the same tag. Hence the OSK protocol can ensure the forward privacy.
In order to ease the verification of observational equivalence which is defined us-
ing the universal quantifier over contexts, we shall define labelled bisimilarity which
replaces quantification over contexts by suitably labelled transitions. The traditional
definition for labelled bisimilarity is neither sound nor complete w.r.t. observational
equivalence in the presence of public state cells. We propose a novel definition for la-
belled bisimilarity and show how it solves all the problems caused by public state cells.
For a given cell s, we define
τ(s)
=⇒ to be the reflexive and transitive closure of τ−−→
and
τ(s)−−→. We still use α to range over τ, a(M), a〈c〉, νc.a〈c〉 and νx.a〈x〉, and use =⇒
for the reflexive and transitive closure of τ−−→, and use bα=⇒ for α=⇒ if α is not τ and =⇒
otherwise.
To define labelled bisimilarity, we need an auxiliary transition relation s:=N−−−→ for
setting the values of public state cells:
νn˜.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,P) s:=N−−−→ νn˜.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→ Nσ} ,P)
if s 6∈ n˜ ∪ locks(P) and name(N) ∩ n˜ = ∅
νn˜.(σ, S,P) s:=N−−−→ νn˜.(σ, S,P) if s ∈ n˜ ∪ locks(P)
The first rule of s:=N−−−→ represents the attacker’s ability to overwrite the public state cells.
The second rule does not change the value of the cell s and is just for compatibility with
unlock s and open s in Definition 5. We write A s:=N−−−→τ(s)=⇒ A′ for the combination of
transitions A s:=N−−−→ B and B τ(s)=⇒ A′ for some B.
Definition 5. Labelled bisimilarity (≈l) is the largest symmetric relation R between
pairs of closed extended processes Ai = νn˜i.(σi, Si,Pi) with i = 1, 2 such that
A1RA2 implies
1. locks(A1) = locks(A2), fs(A1) = fs(A2) and dom(A1) = dom(A2);
2. Let U be the set of unlocked public state cells whose value is not already given in
the substitutions of A1 and A2, that is
U = { s | s ∈ fs(A1)\locks(A1),@x ∈ dom(σ1) s.t. S1(s) = xσ1 and S2(s) = xσ2 }
Select a fresh base variable xs for each s ∈ U . Let
Aei = νn˜i.(σi ∪ {Si(s)/xs}s∈U , Si,Pi) for i = 1, 2
Then
(a) Ae1 ≈s Ae2;
(b) if Ae1
s:=N−−−→ τ(s)−−→ B1 with var(N) ⊆ dom(Ae1), then there exists B2 such that
Ae2
s:=N−−−→τ(s)=⇒ B2 and B1RB2;
(c) if Ae1
α−−→ B1 and fv(α) ⊆ dom(Ae1) and bnv(α) ∩ fnv(Ae2) = ∅, then there
exists B2 such that Ae2
bα=⇒ B2 and B1 R B2.
The static equivalence Ae1 ≈s Ae2 in Definition 5 is exactly the same as the one
defined in Definition 2. Before we compare the static equivalence and the transitions in
labelled bisimilarity, we extend Ai to Aei with values from unlocked public state cells.
This is to reflect the fact that attacker’s ability to read values from these cells.
Example 10. Consider the extended processes A and B in Example 5. As we have al-
ready shown, A and B are not observationally equivalent. Hence they are not supposed
to be labelled bisimilar. We first extend A and B to Ae and Be respectively:
Ae = ({0/z} , {s 7→ 0} , {( ! s := 0, ∅), ( ! s := 1, ∅)})
Be = ({1/z} , {s 7→ 1} , {( ! s := 0, ∅), ( ! s := 1, ∅)})
Clearly the static equivalence between Ae and Be does not hold, namely Ae 6≈s Be,
because the test z = 0 can distinguish them. Thus we have A 6 ≈l B.
The extension is not only for comparing the static equivalence, but also for compar-
ing the transitions. In labelled bisimilarity, we compare the transitions starting from the
extensions Ae and Be, rather than the original processes A and B. The reason is that
we need to keep a copy of the cell values, otherwise we would lose the values when
someone overwrites the cells.
Example 11. Consider the extended processes A and B in Example 6. The extension
Ae of A can perform the following transition:
Ae = νk.({k/z} , {s 7→ k} , {(s := 0.a(x).if x = k then c〈b〉, ∅)})
τ(s)−−→ νk.({k/z} , {s 7→ 0} , {(a(x).if x = k then c〈b〉, ∅)})
a(z)
=⇒ νk.({k/z} , {s 7→ 0} , {(c〈b〉, ∅)})
c〈b〉−−→ νk.({k/z} , {s 7→ 0} , {(0, ∅)})
But it is impossible forB’s extensionBe = νk.({k/z} , {s 7→ k} , {(s := 0. a(x), ∅)})
to perform an output on channel c. Hence A 6 ≈l B.
We use s:=N−−−→ τ(s)−−→ rather than τ(s)−−→ in labelled bisimilarity because the attacker
can set any unlocked public state cell to an arbitrary value. We shall illustrate this point
by the following two examples.
Example 12. Assume
A = ({0/y, 1/z} , {s 7→ 0} , {(read s as x. if x = 1 then c〈0〉, ∅)})
B = ({0/y, 1/z} , {s 7→ 0} , ∅)
A and B are not observationally equivalent. Applying context C = (∅, ∅, {(s := 1, ∅)})
to A and B, we can see that C[A] ⇓c but C[B] 6⇓c.
Now we shall distinguish them in labelled bisimilarity. Since the current value in
cell s is 0 which has already been stored in variable y, we don’t need to extend A and
B. Then A can perform the following transition
A
s:=1−−−→ τ(s)−−→ ({0/y, 1/z} , {s 7→ 1} , {(if 1 = 1 then c〈a〉, ∅)})
c〈a〉−−→ ({0/y, 1/z} , {s 7→ 1} , {0, ∅})
But there is no way for B to perform an output action. Hence A 6 ≈l B.
Example 13. As illustrated in Example 7, A and B are not observationally equivalent.
In labelled bisimilarity, we extend A and perform the transitions s:=1−−−→ τ(s)−−→ twice, then
we will reach a processA′ = ({0/x, 0/z} , {s 7→ 0} , {(0, ∅)}), while the bestB can do
to match A is to reach a process B′ = ({0/x, 1/z} , {s 7→ 0} , {(0, ∅)}) and A′ 6≈s B′.
Due to the space limitation, detailed analysis can be found in Appendix A.
Note that the transition s:=N−−−→ is not included in α−→. We only need to use s:=N−−−→ to
change the value of the unlocked public state cell s when the processes perform some
actions related to s. Comparing the combination of two transitions together ( s:=N−−−→ τ(s)−−→)
in Definition 5 optimises the definition to be better suited as an assisted tool for analysing
observational equivalence. Otherwise, if we follow the traditional way to define la-
belled bisimilarity, i.e. comparing Ae1
s:=N−−−→ Be1 and Ae1
τ(s)−−→ Be1 separately, the ac-
tion s:=N−−−→ would generate infinitely many unnecessary branches. For example, letA =
(∅, {s 7→ 0} , ∅). Even there is no action,A could keep on performing s:=N−−−→ and would
never stop: A s:=1−−−→ (∅, {s 7→ 1} , ∅) s:=2−−−→ (∅, {s 7→ 2} , ∅) s:=3−−−→ (∅, {s 7→ 3} , ∅) · · ·
We require Ae1
s:=N−−−→ τ(s)−−→ B1 to be matched by Ae2 s:=N−−−→
τ(s)
=⇒ B2 with the same
s in the action in labelled bisimilarity. In other words, Ae2 can only match the transition
of Ae1 by at most operating on the same cell s. This is equal to say the attacker holds the
locks of all the unlocked public cell except cell s in Ae1. If A
e
1 does not do act on cell s,
then Ae2 are not allowed to match A
e
1 by operating on s.
Example 14. Extend A and B in Example 4 to Ae = ({0/z} , {s 7→ 0} , {(c〈b〉, ∅)})
and Be = ({0/z} , {s 7→ 0} , {(read s as x. c〈b〉, ∅)}). We can see that Ae c〈b〉−−→
(∅, {s 7→ 0} , {(0, ∅)}), but there is no way for Be to do the same output action c〈b〉
without going through the reading on cell s. Hence A 6≈l B.
In the presence of public state cells, labelled bisimilarity is both sound and complete
with respect to observational equivalence.
Theorem 4. In the presence of public state cells, ≈l=≈.
5 Conclusion
We present a stateful language which is a general extension of applied pi calculus with
state cells. We stick to the original definition of observational equivalence [3] as much
as possible to capture the intuition of indistinguishability from the attacker’s point of
view, while design the labelled bisimilarity to furthest abstract observational equiva-
lence. When all the state cells are private, we prove that observational equivalence co-
incides with labelled bisimilarity, which implies Abadi-Fournet’s theorem in a revised
version of applied pi calculus. In the presence of public state cells, we devise a labelled
bisimilarity which is proved to coincide with observational equivalence. In future, we
plan to develop a compiler for bi-processes with state cells to automatically verify the
observational equivalence, extending the techniques of ProVerif.
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A Examples for public state cells
Example 13. As illustrated in Example 7, A and B are not observationally equivalent. In labelled bisimilarity, we first
extend A and B to Ae1 and B
e
1:
Ae1 = ({0/x} , {s 7→ 0} , {(s := 0.s := 0, ∅)})
Be1 = ({0/x} , {s 7→ 0} , {(s := 0, ∅)})
Then let Ae1 perform actions
s:=1−−−→ τ(s)−−→,
Ae1
s:=1−−−→ τ(s)−−→ Ae2 = ({0/x} , {s 7→ 0} , {(s := 0, ∅)})
Note that action s:=1−−−→ sets the value of cell s to 1. Hence, Be1 can only match the above transition by resetting the value of
cell s to 0:
Be1
s:=1−−−→ τ(s)−−→ Be2 = ({0/x} , {s 7→ 0} , {(0, ∅)})
Since the values of cell s in Ae2 and B
e
2 are still 0 which have already been stored in variable x, we don’t need to extend
them again. Then let Ae2 perform the actions
s:=1−−−→ τ(s)−−→:
Ae2
s:=1−−−→ τ(s)−−→ Ae3 = ({0/x} , {s 7→ 0} , {(0, ∅)})
But now what Be2 can do is just
Be2
s:=1−−−→=⇒ Be3 = ({0/x} , {s 7→ 1} , {(0, ∅)})
Extending Ae2 and B
e
2 to the following A
′ and B′:
A′ = ({0/x, 0/z} , {s 7→ 0} , {(0, ∅)})
B′ = ({0/x, 1/z} , {s 7→ 1} , {(0, ∅)})
We can see that A′ 6≈s B′ because the test z = 0 can distinguish them. Thus A and B are not labelled bisimilar, i.e.
A 6 ≈l B.
Example 15. In comparison with Example 4, the following extended processes A,B are observationally equivalent:
A = (∅, {s 7→ 0} , {(read s as x. c〈b〉, ∅)})
B = (∅, {s 7→ 0} , {(read s as x. read s as y. c〈b〉, ∅)})
When A performs the reading, B can match it by performing its two reading together. When B performs one reading, A
can match it by doing nothing.
B Proof of Theorem 1
Notations 1 1. If σ = σ′ ∪
{
M˜/x˜
}
, we write σ\ex for σ′. Let A = νn˜.(σ, S,P). We write A\ex for νn˜.(σ′, S,P). For an
evaluation context C, we write C[A]\ex for the process (C[A])\ex.
2. We write
∏
i∈I Pi for the parallel composition P1 | P2 | · · · | P|I|.
Lemma 1. LetA be a closed extended process with only private state cells and C = νn˜.(σ-, S-,P-) be a closing evaluation
context with only private state cells and x˜ ⊆ dom(A).
1. If A
c(Mσ)−−−−→ B with name(c,M) ∩ n˜ = ∅ and var(M) ⊆ dom(C[A]\ex), then C[A]\ex c(M)−−−→ C[B]\ex;
2. If A α−−→ B with name(α) ∩ n˜ = ∅ and var(α) ∩ x˜ = ∅, then C[A]\ex α−−→ C[B]\ex when α is not an input.
Proof. 1. AssumeA = νn˜a.(σa, Sa,Pa∪{(c(z).P, L)}) c(Mσ)−−−−→ B = νn˜a.(σa, Sa,Pa∪{(P {(Mσ)σa/z} , L)})where
n˜ ∩ n˜a = ∅. Then
C[A]\ex = νn˜, n˜a.(σσa ∪ σa\ex, Sσa ∪ Sa,Pσa ∪ Pa ∪ {(c(z).P, L)})
c(M)−−−→ νn˜, n˜a.(σσa ∪ σa\ex, Sσa ∪ Sa,Pσa ∪ Pa ∪ {(P {M(σσa ∪ σa\ex)/z} , L)})
= νn˜, n˜a.(σσa ∪ σa\ex, Sσa ∪ Sa,Pσa ∪ Pa ∪ {(P {(Mσ)σa/z} , L)}) = C[B]\ex
since var(M) ⊆ dom(C[A]\ex) and (Mσ)σa =M(σσa ∪ σa\ex)
2. When α is not an input, we take lock s and channel output b〈c〉 as examples. The other cases are quite similar.
(a) Assume A = νn˜a.(σa, Sa ∪ {s 7→M} ,Pa ∪ {(lock s.P, L)}) τ−−→ B = νn˜a.(σa, Sa ∪ {s 7→M} ,Pa ∪
{(P,L ∪ {s})}) where s ∈ n˜a, s 6∈ L ∪ locks(Pa) and n˜ ∩ n˜a = ∅.
C[A]\ex = νn˜, n˜a.(σσa ∪ σa\ex, Sσa ∪ Sa ∪ {s 7→M} ,Pσa ∪ Pa ∪ {(lock s.P, L)})
τ−→ νn˜, n˜a.(σσa ∪ σa\ex, Sσa ∪ Sa ∪ {s 7→M} ,Pσa ∪ Pa ∪ {(P,L ∪ {s})}) = C[B]\ex
since s ∈ n˜a and s /∈ locks(P,Pa) ∪ L
(b) Assume A = νn˜a.(σa, Sa,Pa ∪
{
(b〈c〉.P, L)}) b〈c〉−−→ B = νn˜a.(σa, Sa,Pa ∪ {(P,L)}) where b, c /∈ n˜a ∪ n˜ and
n˜ ∩ n˜a = ∅.
C[A]\ex = νn˜, n˜a.(σσa ∪ σa\ex, Sσa ∪ Sa,Pσa ∪ Pa ∪ {(b〈c〉.P, L)})
b〈c〉−−→ νn˜, n˜a.(σσa ∪ σa\ex, Sσa ∪ Sa,Pσa ∪ Pa ∪ {(P,L)}) = C[B]\ex
Corollary 2. Let A be a closed extended process with only private state cells and C = νn˜.(σ-, S-,P-) be a closing
evaluation context with only private state cells and x˜ ⊆ dom(A).
1. If A
c(Mσ)
=⇒ B with name(c,M) ∩ n˜ = ∅ and var(M) ⊆ dom(C[A]\ex), then C[A]\ex c(M)=⇒ C[B]\ex;
2. If A α=⇒ B with name(α) ∩ n˜ = ∅ and var(α) ∩ x˜ = ∅, then C[A]\ex α=⇒ C[B]\ex when α is not an input.
Proof. Using Lemma 1 several times.
Proposition 1. On closed extended processes with only private state cells, the labelled bisimilarity ≈l is a congruence.
Proof. We prove that ≈l is a congurence by constructing the following set
R = { (C[A1]\ex, C[A2]\ex) | A1 ≈l A2, C is a closing evaluation context with only private state cells and x˜ ⊆ dom(A1) }
and prove thatR ⊆≈l.
Assume (C[A1]\ex, C[A2]\ex) ∈ R because of A1 ≈l A2 where Ai = νn˜i.(σi, Si,Pi) with i = 1, 2 and C =
νn˜.(σ-, S-,P-) and variables x˜ ⊆ dom(Ai). Then C[Ai]\ex = νn˜, n˜i.(σσi ∪ σi\ex, Sσi ∪ Si,Pσi ∪ Pi). Now we show
C[A1]\ex ≈s C[A2]\ex, and if C[A1]\ex α−→ B1 for someB1 then there existsB2 such that C[A2]\ex bα=⇒ B2 and (B1, B2) ∈ R.
First we check the static equivalence C[A1]\ex ≈s C[A2]\ex. Let ϕi = σσi ∪ σi\ex with i = 1, 2. From dom(σ1) =
dom(σ2), we have dom(ϕ1) = dom(ϕ2). Note that for any term M with var(M) ⊆ dom(ϕi), we have Mϕi = (Mσ)σi
and var(Mσ) ⊆ dom(σi) since dom(σ) ∩ dom(σi) = ∅ and C is a closing evaluation context to Ai. Assume terms
M,N with var(M,N) ⊆ dom(ϕi) and Mϕ1 =Σ Nϕ1. We shall prove that Mϕ2 =Σ Nϕ2. From the above analysis,
we have (Mσ)σ1 = Mϕ1, (Nσ)σ1 = Nϕ1, (Mσ)σ1 =Σ (Nσ)σ1 and var(Mσ,Nσ) ⊆ dom(σi). Since A1 ≈s A2,
we have (Mσ)σ2 =Σ (Nσ)σ2. From (Mσ)σ2 = Mϕ2 and (Nσ)σ2 = Nϕ2, we have Mϕ2 =Σ Nϕ2. Hence we have
C[A1]\ex ≈s C[A2]\ex.
For the behavioural equivalence, we discuss by the different cases of α.
1. Assume a transition is about reading a cell s and
C[A1]\ex = νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex, Sσ1 ∪ S1,Pσ1 ∪ P1) τ−→ B1
The “read s as z” comes either from the context C or from the process A1.
(a) Assume read s as z is from the context C. SinceA1, A2 only contain private state cells, the context C cannot access
any private state cells in A1, A2. Thus s is defined in S in context C. Assume C = νn˜.(σ-, S′ ∪ {s 7→M} -,P ′ ∪
{(read s as z.Pσ1, L)} -),
C[A1]\ex = νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex, S′σ1 ∪ {s 7→Mσ1} ∪ S1,P ′σ1 ∪ {(read s as z.Pσ1, L)} ∪ P1)
τ−→ B1 = νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex, S′σ1 ∪ {s 7→Mσ1} ∪ S1,P ′σ1 ∪ {((Pσ1) {Mσ1/z} , L)} ∪ P1)
= νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex, S′σ1 ∪ {s 7→Mσ1} ∪ S1,P ′σ1 ∪ {((P {M/z})σ1, L)} ∪ P1)
We can have the following transitions from C[A2]\ex:
C[A2]\ex = νn˜, n˜2.(σσ2 ∪ σ2\ex, S′σ2 ∪ {s 7→Mσ2} ∪ S2,Pσ2 ∪ P2)
= νn˜, n˜2.(σσ2 ∪ σ2\ex, S′σ2 ∪ {s 7→Mσ2} ∪ S2,P ′σ2 ∪ {(read s as z.Pσ2, L)} ∪ P2)
τ−→ B2 = νn˜, n˜2.(σσ2 ∪ σ2\ex, S′σ2 ∪ {s 7→Mσ2} ∪ S2,P ′σ2 ∪ {((Pσ2) {Mσ2/z} , L)} ∪ P2)
= νn˜, n˜2.(σσ2 ∪ σ2\ex, S′σ2 ∪ {s 7→Mσ2} ∪ S2,P ′σ2 ∪ {((P {M/z})σ2, L)} ∪ P2)
Let C′ = νn˜.(σ-, S-,P ′2∪{(P {M/z} , L)} -). Then we can verify that C′[Ai] = Bi for i = 1, 2. Since A1 ≈l A2,
we have (B1, B2) ∈ R.
(b) Assume read s as z is from the process and A1 = νn˜1.(σ1, S′1 ∪ {s 7→M} , {(read s as z.P, L)} ∪ P ′1).
C[A1]\ex = νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex, Sσ1 ∪ S′1 ∪ {s 7→M} ,Pσ1 ∪ {(read s as z.P, L)} ∪ P ′1)
τ−→ B1 = νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex, Sσ1 ∪ S′1 ∪ {s 7→M} ,Pσ1 ∪ {(P {M/z} , L)} ∪ P ′1)
Then A1 can perform the read action and
A1 = νn˜1.(σ1, S1 ∪ S′1 ∪ {s 7→M} ,P ′1 ∪ {(read s as z.P, L)})
τ−→ A′1 = νn˜1.(σ1, S1 ∪ S′1 ∪ {s 7→M} ,P ′1 ∪ {(P {M/z} , L)})
and C[A′1]\ex = B1. From A1 ≈l A2, there exists A′2 such that A2 =⇒ A′2 ≈l A′1. Using Corollary 2 we obtain
C[A2]\ex =⇒ C[A′2]\ex. Let B2 = C[A′2]\ex. Hence (B1, B2) ∈ R.
2. Assume a transition is about locking a cell s and
C[A1]\ex = νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex, Sσ1 ∪ S1,Pσ1 ∪ P1) τ−→ B1
and s ∈ n˜ ∪ n˜1 and s /∈ locks(P1,P). The lock s comes either from P in the context part or from P1 in the process
part.
(a) Assume lock s is from the context part and P = P ′ ∪ {(lock s.P, L)}.
C[A1]\ex = νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex, Sσ1 ∪ S1,P ′σ1 ∪ {(lock s.Pσ1, L)} ∪ P1)
τ−→ B1 = νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex, Sσ1 ∪ S1,P ′σ1 ∪ {(Pσ1, L ∪ {s})} ∪ P1)
Since A1, A2 only contain private state cells, the context C cannot access any private state cells in A1, A2. Thus s
is a state cell from context C. We can have the following transitions from C[A2]\ex:
C[A2]\ex = νn˜, n˜2.(σσ2 ∪ σ2\ex, Sσ2 ∪ S2,Pσ2 ∪ P2)
= νn˜, n˜2.(σσ2 ∪ σ2\ex, Sσ2 ∪ S2,P ′σ2 ∪ {(lock s.Pσ2, L)} ∪ P2)
τ−→ B2 = νn˜, n˜2.(σσ2 ∪ σ2\ex, Sσ2 ∪ S2,P ′σ2 ∪ {(Pσ2, L ∪ {s})} ∪ P2)
Let C′ = νn˜.(σ-, S-,P ′ ∪ {(P,L ∪ {s})} -). Then we can verify that C′[Ai] = Bi for i = 1, 2. Since A1 ≈l A2,
we have (B1, B2) ∈ R.
(b) Assume P1 = P ′1 ∪ {(lock s.P, L)} and
C[A1]\ex = νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex, Sσ1 ∪ S1,Pσ1 ∪ {(lock s.P, L)} ∪ P ′1)
τ−→ B1 = νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex, Sσ1 ∪ S1,Pσ1 ∪ {(P,L ∪ {s})} ∪ P ′1)
Then A1 can perform the lock action and
A1 = νn˜1.(σ1, S1,P ′1 ∪ {(lock s.P, L)}) τ−→ A′1 = νn˜1.(σ1, S1,P ′1 ∪ {(P,L ∪ {s})})
and C[A′1]\ex = B1. From A1 ≈l A2, there exists A′2 such that A2 =⇒ A′2 ≈l A′1. Using Corollary 2 we obtain
C[A2]\ex =⇒ C[A′2]\ex. Let B2 = C[A′2]\ex. We know that (B1, B2) ∈ R.
3. The analysis for cases when the transition is caused by writing or unlocking is similar.
4. Assume
C[A1]\ex = νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex, Sσ1 ∪ S1,Pσ1 ∪ P1) a〈c〉−−→ B1
The output comes either from P in the context part or from P1 in the process part.
(a) Assume the output is from the context part and P = P ′ ∪ {(a〈c〉.P, L)}.
C[A1]\ex = νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex, Sσ1 ∪ S1,P ′σ1 ∪ {(a〈c〉.Pσ1, L)} ∪ P1)
a〈c〉−−→ B1 = νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex, Sσ1 ∪ S1,P ′σ1 ∪ {(Pσ1, L)} ∪ P1)
Since the output comes from context, we can have the following transitions from C[A2]\ex:
C[A2]\ex = νn˜, n˜2.(σσ2 ∪ σ2\ex, Sσ2 ∪ S2,Pσ2 ∪ P2)
= νn˜, n˜2.(σσ2 ∪ σ2\ex, Sσ2 ∪ S2,P ′σ2 ∪ {(a〈c〉.Pσ2, L)} ∪ P2)
a〈c〉−−→ B2 = νn˜, n˜2.(σσ2 ∪ σ2\ex, Sσ2 ∪ S2,P ′σ2 ∪ {(Pσ2, L)} ∪ P2)
Let C′ = νn˜.(σ-, S-,P ′2 ∪ {(P,L)} -). Then we can verify that C′[Ai] = Bi for i = 1, 2. Since A1 ≈l A2, we
have (B1, B2) ∈ R.
(b) Assume P1 = P ′1 ∪ {(a〈c〉.P, L)} and
C[A1]\ex = νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex, Sσ1 ∪ S1,Pσ1 ∪ {(a〈c〉.P, L)} ∪ P ′1)
a〈c〉−−→ B1 = νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex, Sσ1 ∪ S1,Pσ1 ∪ {(P,L)} ∪ P ′1)
Then A1 can perform the output action and
A1 = νn˜1.(σ1, S1,P ′1 ∪ {(a〈c〉.P, L)})
a〈c〉−−→ A′1 = νn˜1.(σ1, S1,P ′1 ∪ {(P,L)})
and C[A′1]\ex = B1. From A1 ≈l A2, there exists A′2 such that A2 a〈c〉=⇒ A′2 ≈l A′1. Using Corollary 2 we obtain
C[A2]\ex a〈c〉=⇒ C[A′2]\ex. Let B2 = C[A′2]\ex. We know that (B1, B2) ∈ R.
5. Assume
C[A1]\ex = νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex, Sσ1 ∪ S1,Pσ1 ∪ P1) a(M)−−−→ B1
where name(a,M)∩(n˜∪ n˜1) = ∅ and fv(M) ⊆ dom(σ, σ1\ex). Strictly speaking, there might be some name conflicts
among the names in M and n˜. To deal with this rigorously, as what have been done in [30], we need to define an one-
to-one renaming ρ which replaces names n˜ with fresh names l˜. Using α-conversion, we can get C[Ai]\ex = C0[A0i ]\ex
where C0 = νl˜.(σρ-, Sρ-,Pρ-) and A0i = νn˜i.(σiρ, Siρ,Piρ). Then we work under a new evaluation context C0 and
new equivalence A01 ≈ A02. This will make the proof awkward and difficult to be read. So here we safely assume that
name conflictions have been avoided by α-conversion.
The input comes either from P in the context part or from P1 in the process part.
(a) Assume the input is from the context part and P = P ′ ∪ {(a(z).P, L)} with z /∈ fv(A1, A2, C).
C[A1]\ex = νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex, Sσ1 ∪ S1,P ′σ1 ∪ {(a(z).Pσ1, L)} ∪ P1)
a(M)−−−→ B1 = νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex, Sσ1 ∪ S1,P ′σ1 ∪ {(Pσ1 {M(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex)/z} , L)} ∪ P1)
= νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex, Sσ1 ∪ S1,P ′σ1 ∪ {((P {Mσ/z})σ1, L)} ∪ P1)
We construct a new evaluation context C′ = νn˜.(σ, S,P ′∪{(P {Mσ/z} , L)}). We can easily verify that C′[A1] =
B1 and C[A2] a(M)−−−→ C′[A2]. Since (A1, A2) ∈ R, we have (C′[A1], C′[A2]) ∈ R.
(b) Assume the input is from the process part and P1 = P ′1 ∪ {(a(z).P, L)} and
C[A1]\ex = νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex, Sσ1 ∪ S1,Pσ1 ∪ {(a(z).P, L)} ∪ P ′1)
a(M)−−−→ B1 = νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex, Sσ1 ∪ S1,Pσ1 ∪ {(P {M(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex)/z} , L)} ∪ P ′1)
Then let A1 input Mσ on channel a and we get
A1 = νn˜1.(σ1, S1,P ′1 ∪ {(a(z).P, L)})
a(Mσ)−−−−→ A′1 = νn˜1.(σ1, S1,P ′1 ∪ {(P {(Mσ)σ1/z} , L)})
Since fv(M) ⊆ dom(σ, σ1\ex) and dom(σ)∩ dom(σ1) = ∅, we have (Mσ)σ1 =M(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex). We can further
verify that C[A′1]\ex = B1. From A1 ≈l A2, we know that A2 a(Mσ)=⇒ A′2 ≈l A′1. Using Corollary 2 we obtain
C[A2]\ex a(M)=⇒ C[A′2]\ex. Let B2 = C[A′2]\ex. We know that (B1, B2) ∈ R.
6. Assume
C[A1]\ex = νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex, Sσ1 ∪ S1,Pσ1 ∪ P1) νz.a〈z〉−−−−−→ B1
The output comes either from P in the context part or from P1 in the process part.
(a) Assume the output is from the context part and P = P ′ ∪ {(a〈M〉.P, L)}.
C[A1]\ex = νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex, Sσ1 ∪ S1,P ′σ1 ∪ {(a〈Mσ1〉.Pσ1, L)} ∪ P1)
νz.a〈z〉−−−−−→ B1 = νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex ∪ {Mσ1/z} , Sσ1 ∪ S1,P ′σ1 ∪ {(Pσ1, L)} ∪ P1)
Since the output comes from context, we can have the following transitions from C[A2]\ex:
C[A2]\ex = νn˜, n˜2.(σσ2 ∪ σ2\ex, Sσ2 ∪ S2,Pσ2 ∪ P2)
= νn˜, n˜2.(σσ2 ∪ σ2\ex, Sσ2 ∪ S2,P ′σ2 ∪ {(a〈Mσ2〉.Pσ2, L)} ∪ P2)
νz.a〈z〉−−−−−→ B2 = νn˜, n˜2.(σσ2 ∪ σ2\ex ∪ {Mσ2/z} , Sσ2 ∪ S2,P ′σ2 ∪ {(Pσ2, L)} ∪ P2)
Let C′ = νn˜.(σ∪{M/z} -, S-,P ′2∪{(P,L)} -). Then we can verify that C′[Ai] = Bi for i = 1, 2. SinceA1 ≈l A2,
we have (B1, B2) ∈ R.
(b) Assume P1 = P ′1 ∪ {(a〈M〉.P, L)} and
C[A1]\ex = νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex, Sσ1 ∪ S1,Pσ1 ∪ {(a〈M〉.P, L)} ∪ P ′1)
νz.a〈z〉−−−−−→ B1 = νn˜, n˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex ∪ {M/z} , Sσ1 ∪ S1,Pσ1 ∪ {(P,L)} ∪ P ′1)
Then A1 can perform the output action and
A1 = νn˜1.(σ1, S1,P ′1 ∪ {(a〈M〉.P, L)})
νz.a〈z〉−−−−−→ A′1 = νn˜1.(σ1 ∪ {M/z} , S1,P ′1 ∪ {(P,L)})
and C[A′1]\ex = B1. From A1 ≈l A2, there exists A′2 such that A2 νz.a〈z〉=⇒ A′2 ≈l A′1. Using Corollary 2 we obtain
C[A2]\ex νz.a〈z〉=⇒ C[A′2]\ex. Let B2 = C[A′2]\ex. Hence (B1, B2) ∈ R.
7. The other cases are similar.
Proposition 2. On closed extended processes with only private state cells, observational equivalence ≈ implies labelled
bisimilarity ≈l.
Proof. To show ≈ ⊆ ≈l, we construct the following setR and prove thatR ⊆≈l.
R = { (A1, A2) | ∃ a˜, b˜, c˜, y˜ s.t. C[A1]\ey ≈ C[A2]\ey }
where C = νc˜.(-, -, {(ai〈yi〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J -) with
– a˜, b˜, c˜ are pairwise-distinct channel names;
– (a˜ ∪ b˜) ∩ fn(A1, A2, c˜) = ∅;
– a˜ = {ai}i∈I and b˜ = {bj}j∈J and c˜ = {cj}j∈J ;
– y˜ ⊆ dom(A1) and y˜ = {yi}i∈I .
We will prove R ⊆≈l. Assume (A1, A2) ∈ R because of C[A1]\ey ≈ C[A2]\ey where C, y˜ are stated as above. We shall
prove the static equivalence A1 ≈s A2, and if A1 α−→ A′1 for some A′1 then there exists A′2 such that A2 bα=⇒ A′2 and
(A′1, A
′
2) ∈ R.
1. First we prove that A1 and A2 are statically equivalent, namely A1 ≈s A2. According to the definition of static
equivalence, consider two terms N1, N2 with var(N1, N2) ⊆ dom(A1) and let Ak = νn˜k.(σk, Sk,Pk) with k = 1, 2
for some n˜1, n˜2 which do not occur inN1, N2. AssumeN1σ1 =Σ N2σ1, we shall prove thatN1σ2 =Σ N2σ2. Selecting
a fresh channel name d, we construct the following plain process Pc:
Pc = a1(x1).a2(x2). · · · .a|I|(x|I|).if N1 {xi/yi}i∈I = N2 {xi/yi}i∈I then d
We apply the evaluation context C′ = (-, -, {(Pc, ∅)} -) to C[A1]\ey and have
C′[C[A1]\ey] = νc˜, n˜1.(σ1\ey, S1,P1 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ1〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪ {(bj〈cj〉, ∅)}j∈J ∪ {(Pcσ1\ey, ∅)})
=⇒ νc˜, n˜1.(σ1\ey, S1,P1 ∪ {(bj〈cj〉, ∅)}j∈J ∪ {(if (N1σ1\ey) {yiσ1/yi}i∈I = (N2σ1\ey) {yiσ1/yi}i∈I then d, ∅)})
It is clear that (N1σ1\ey) {yiσ1/yi}i∈I = N1σ1 =Σ N2σ1 = (N2σ1\ey) {yiσ1/yi}i∈I , thus the conditional branch
jumps to then and we can see that C′[C[A1]\ey] ⇓d. Since C[A1]\ey ≈ C[A2]\ey and the equivalence should be closed
under any closing evaluation context, it should hold that C′[C[A2]\ey] ⇓d and that means
C′[C[A2]\ey] = νc˜, n˜2.(σ2\ey, S2,P2 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ2〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪ {(bj〈cj〉, ∅)}j∈J ∪ {(Pcσ2\ey, ∅)})
=⇒ νc˜, n˜2, m˜′.(σ2\ey, S′2,P ′2 ∪ {(bj〈cj〉, ∅)}j∈J ∪ {(if (N1σ2\ey) {yiσ2/yi}i∈I = (N2σ2\ey) {yiσ2/yi}i∈I then d, ∅)})
=⇒ νc˜, n˜2, m˜′′.(σ2\ey, S′′2 ,P ′′2 ∪ {(bj〈cj〉, ∅)}j∈J ∪ {(d, ∅)})
This requires (N1σ2\ey) {yiσ2/yi}i∈I =Σ (N2σ2\ey) {yiσ2/yi}i∈I . From Nkσ2 = (Nkσ2\ey) {yiσ2/yi}i∈I for k =
1, 2, we have N1σ2 =Σ N2σ2. Hence A1 ≈s A2.
2. Now we proceed to show the behaviour equivalence between A1 and A2.
(a) Assume A1 = νn˜1.(σ1, S1,P1) τ−−→ A′1 = νn˜′1.(σ1, S′1,P ′1) for some n˜′1, S′1,P ′1. Using Corollary 2, we have
C[A1]\ey = νc˜, n˜1.(σ1\ey, S1,P1 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ1〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪ {(bj〈cj〉, ∅)}j∈J) τ−−→ C[A′1]\ey = νc˜, n˜′1.(σ1\ey, S′1,P ′1 ∪
{(ai〈yiσ1〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J). Since C[A1]\ey ≈ C[A2]\ey , there exists B such that C[A2]\ey =⇒ B ≈
C[A′1]\ey . Since C[A′1]\ey ⇓ai,bj , it has to beB ⇓ai,bj . Since ai, bj do not occur inA1, A2, these outputs ai〈yi〉, bj〈cj〉
are not involved in the transitions C[A2]\ey =⇒ B. Thus the only possibility forB is thatB = νc˜, n˜′2.(σ2\ey, S′2,P ′2∪
{(ai〈yiσ2〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J) for some n˜
′
2, S
′
2,P ′2. Let A′2 = νn˜2, n˜′2.(σ2, S′2,P ′2), then A2 =⇒ A′2 and
C[A′2]\ey = B. From C[A′1]\ey ≈ C[A′2]\ey , we have (A′1, A′2) ∈ R.
(b) Assume A1 = νn˜1.(σ1, S1,P ′1 ∪ {(a〈e〉.P, L)})
a〈e〉−−−→ A′1 = νn˜1.(σ1, S1,P ′1 ∪ {(P,L)}) when a, e 6∈ n˜. The
proof is divided into four cases, according to whether a, e occur in c˜. If a, e are free names, they can be used
directly. But if a, e are bounded by c˜, we cannot directly refer to them. Instead, we need to use an additional input
action in the context to get them first.
i. We start by analysing the simplest case when a, e /∈ c˜. In this case, we can directly use a, e in the context. Let
C′ = (-, -,{(d, ∅)}∪{(a(x).if x = e then d , ∅)} -), where d is fresh. Applying C′ to C[A1]\ey , we can see that
C′[C[A1]\ey] = νc˜, n˜1.(σ1, S1,P ′1 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ1〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪ {(bj〈cj〉, ∅)}j∈J ∪ {(a〈e〉.P, L), (d, ∅), (a(x).if x = e then d , ∅)})
τ−→ νc˜, n˜1.(σ1, S1,P ′1 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ1〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J ∪
{
(P,L), (d, ∅), (if e = e then d , ∅)})
=⇒ B1 = νc˜, n˜1.(σ1, S1,P ′1 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ1〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J ∪ {(P,L)}
Since C[A1]\ey ≈ C[A2]\ey and ≈ is closed under evaluation contexts, we have C′[C[A1]\ey] ≈ C′[C[A2]\ey].
Then there exists B2 such that
C′[C[A2]\ey] =⇒ B2 ≈ B1
For i ∈ I, j ∈ J , we know that B1 ⇓ai,bj and B1 6⇓d. Thus it should be B2 ⇓ai,bj and B2 6⇓d. Since a is
different from ai, bj and ai, bj do not occur in A1, A2, the only possibility for the transitions C′[C[A2]\ey] =⇒
B2 is that
C′[C[A2]\ey] = νc˜, n˜2.(σ2, S2,P2 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ2〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪ {(bj〈cj〉, ∅)}j∈J ∪ {(d, ∅), (a(x).if x = e then d, ∅)})
=⇒ νc˜, n˜2, m˜.
(
σ2, S
′
2,P ′2 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ2〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J ∪
{
(d, ∅), (a(x).if x = e then d, ∅)})
τ−−→ νc˜, n˜2, m˜.
(
σ2, S
′
2,P ′′2 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ2〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J ∪
{
(d, ∅), (if e = e then d, ∅)})
=⇒ νc˜, n˜2, m˜′.
(
σ2, S
′′
2 ,P ′′′2 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ2〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J ∪
{
(d, ∅), (if e = e then d, ∅)})
τ−−→ νc˜, n˜2, m˜′.
(
σ2, S
′′
2 ,P ′′′2 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ2〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J ∪
{
(d, ∅), (d, ∅)})
=⇒ νc˜, n˜2, m˜′′.
(
σ2, S
′′′
2 ,P(4)2 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ2〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J ∪
{
(d, ∅), (d, ∅)})
τ−−→ νc˜, n˜2, m˜′′.
(
σ2, S
′′′
2 ,P(4)2 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ2〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
)
=⇒ B2 = νc˜, n˜2, m˜′′′.
(
σ2, S
(4)
2 ,P(5)2 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ2〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
)
Let A′2 = νn˜2, m˜
′′′.(σ2, S
(4)
2 ,P(5)2 ). We can easily verify that C[A′2]\ey = B2. Since the outputs ai〈yi〉, bj〈cj〉
are not involved in the transitions, we have
A2 =⇒ νn˜2, m˜.(σ2, S′2,P ′2)
a〈e〉−−→ νn˜2, m˜.(σ2, S′2,P ′′2 )
=⇒ νn˜2, m˜′.(σ2, S′′2 ,P(3)2 ) =⇒ νn˜2, m˜′′.(σ2, S(3)2 ,P(4)2 ) =⇒ A′2 = νn˜2, m˜′′′.(σ2, S(4)2 ,P(5)2 )
In brief, we have A1
a〈e〉−−→ A′1, A2
a〈e〉
=⇒ A′2 and C[A′1]\ey ≈ C[A′2]\ey . Hence (A′1, A′2) ∈ R.
ii. If a = ck for some k ∈ J and e /∈ c˜, let C′ = (-, -,
{
(d, ∅), (bk(u).u(x).if x = e then d.bk〈u〉, ∅)
}
-) where
d is fresh. Note that each time we consume a bj〈u〉, we need to generate a new one since we require each name
in c˜ has an output action.
C′[C[A1]\ey] = νc˜, n˜1.
(
σ1, S1,
P ′1 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ1〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(a〈e〉.P, L), (d, ∅), (bk(u).u(x).if x = e then d.bk〈u〉, ∅)}
)
τ−−→ νc˜, n˜1.
(
σ1, S1,
P ′1 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ1〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J\k
∪ {(a〈e〉.P, L), (d, ∅), (a(x).if x = e then d.bk〈a〉, ∅)}
)
=⇒ B1 = νc˜, n˜1.(σ1, S1,P ′1 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ1〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J ∪ {(P,L)})
We can easily verify that B1 = C[A′1]\ey . Since C′[C[A1]\ey] ≈ C′[C[A2]\ey], there exists B2 such that
C′[C[A2]\ey] =⇒ B2 ≈ B1
From B1 ⇓ai,bj and B1 6⇓d, we should also have B2 ⇓ai,bj and B2 6⇓d. Thus the only possibility for the
transitions C′[C[A2]\ey] =⇒ B2 are:
C′[C[A2]\ey] = νc˜, n˜2.
(
σ2, S2,
P2 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ2〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(d, ∅), (bk(u).u(x).if x = e then d.bk〈u〉, ∅)}
)
=⇒ νc˜, n˜2, m˜.
(
σ2, S
′
2,
P ′2 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ2〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(d, ∅), (bk(u).u(x).if x = e then d.bk〈u〉, ∅)}
)
τ−−→ νc˜, n˜2, m˜.
(
σ2, S
′
2,
P ′2 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ2〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J\k
∪ {(d, ∅), (a(x).if x = e then d.bk〈a〉, ∅)}
)
=⇒ νc˜, n˜2, m˜′.
(
σ2, S
′′
2 ,
P ′′2 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ2〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J\k
∪ {(d, ∅), (a(x).if x = e then d.bk〈a〉, ∅)}
)
τ−−→ νc˜, n˜2, m˜′.
(
σ2, S
′′
2 ,
P ′′′2 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ2〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J\k
∪ {(d, ∅), (if e = e then (d | bk〈a〉), ∅)}
)
=⇒ νc˜, n˜2, m˜′′.
(
σ2, S
′′′
2 ,
P(4)2 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ2〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J\k
∪ {(d, ∅), (if e = e then d.bk〈a〉, ∅)}
)
τ−−→ νc˜, n˜2, m˜′′.
(
σ2, S
′′′
2 ,P(4)2 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ2〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J\k ∪
{
(d, ∅), (d.bk〈a〉, ∅)
})
=⇒ νc˜, n˜2, m˜′′′.
(
σ2, S
(4)
2 ,P(5)2 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ2〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J\k ∪
{
(d, ∅), (d.bk〈a〉, ∅)
})
τ−−→ νc˜, n˜2, m˜′′′.
(
σ2, S
(4)
2 ,P(5)2 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ2〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
)
=⇒ B2 = νc˜, n˜2, m˜(4).
(
σ2, S
(5)
2 ,P(6)2 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ2〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
)
Let A′2 = νn˜2, m˜
(4).(σ2, S
(5)
2 ,P(6)2 ). We can easily verify that C[A′2]\ey = B2. And we have the following
transitions from A2 to A′2:
A2 =⇒ νn˜2, m˜.(σ2, S′2,P ′2) =⇒ νn˜2, m˜′.(σ2, S′′2 ,P ′′2 )
a〈e〉−−→ νn˜2, m˜′.(σ2, S′′2 ,P ′′′2 ) =⇒ νn˜2, m˜′′.(σ2, S′′′2 ,P(4)2 )
=⇒ νn˜2, m˜′′′.(σ2, S(4)2 ,P(5)2 ) =⇒ A′2 = νn˜2, m˜(4).(σ2, S(5)2 ,P(6)2 )
In brief, we have A1
a〈e〉−−→ A′1, A2
a〈e〉
=⇒ A′2 and C[A′1]\ey ≈ C[A′2]\ey . Thus (A′1, A′2) ∈ R.
iii. If e = ck with k ∈ J and a /∈ c˜, let C′ = (-, -,
{
(d, ∅), (bk(v).a(x).if x = v then d.bk〈v〉, ∅)
}
-) where d is
fresh.
iv. If a = e = ck with k ∈ J , let C′ = (-, -,
{
(d, ∅), (bk(u).u(x).if x = u then d.bk〈u〉, ∅)
}
-) where d is fresh.
v. If a = cj and e = ck with j 6= k and j, k ∈ J , let C′ = (-, -,
{
(d, ∅), (bj(u).bk(v).u(x).if x = v then (d.bj〈u〉 | bk〈v〉), ∅)
}
-)
where d is fresh.
(c) α is a base input a(M). Assume A1 = νn˜1.(σ1, S1,P ′1 ∪ {(a(x).P, L)})
a(M)−−−−→ A′1 = νn˜1.(σ1, S1,P ′1 ∪
{(P {Mσ1/x} , L)}) and fv(M) ⊆ dom(σ1).
i. If a /∈ c˜, consider the evaluation context
C′ =
(
-, -,
{(∏
i∈I
di, ∅
)
,
(
a1(x1).a2(x2). · · · .a|I|(x|I|).a〈M {xi/yi}i∈I〉.
(∏
i∈I
di.ai〈xi〉
)
, ∅
)}
-
)
where {di}i∈I are fresh. Note that the use of di is to make sure (
∏
i∈I di.ai〈xi〉, ∅)will be split into {(ai〈xi〉, ∅)}i∈I
Applying C′ to C[A1]\ey , we can see that
C′[C[A1]\ey] =⇒ B1 := νc˜, n˜1.(σ1, S1,P ′1 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ1〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪ {(bj〈cj〉, ∅)}j∈J ∪ {(P {Mσ1/x} , L)}
We can verify that C[A′1]\ey = B1. Similarly we have C′[C[A1]\ey] ≈ C′[C[A2]\ey]. Then there exists B2 such
that
C′[C[A2]\ey] =⇒ B2 ≈ B1
Since C′[C[A1]\ey] ⇓ai,bj ,di and B1 ⇓ai,bj but B1 6⇓d, it should be that B2 ⇓ai,bj but B2 6⇓d. Hence the only
possibility of C′[C[A2]\ey] =⇒ B2 is that
C′[C[A2]\ey] = νc˜, n˜2.
σ2, S2,
P2 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ2〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪
{
(
∏
i∈I
di, ∅), (a1(x1).a2(x2). · · · .a|I|(x|I|).a〈M {xi/yi}i∈I〉.
∏
i∈I
di.ai〈xi〉, ∅)
}
=⇒ B2 := νc˜, n˜′2.
(
σ2, S
′
2,P ′2 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ2〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
)
Let A′2 = νn˜
′
2.(σ2, S
′
2,P ′2). We can easily verify that C[A′2]\ey = B2. And we have
A2 = νn˜2.(σ2, S2,P2) =⇒ A′2 = νn˜′2.(σ2, S′2,P ′2)
Since C[A′1]\ey ≈ C[A′2]\ey , we have (A′1, A′2) ∈ R.
ii. If a = cj for some j ∈ J , let
C′ =
(
-, -,
{
(
∏
i∈I
di, ∅), (a1(x1). · · · .a|I|(x|I|).bj(u).u〈M {xi/yi}i∈I〉.(bj〈u〉 |
∏
i∈I
di.ai〈xi〉), ∅)
}
-
)
where {di}i∈I are fresh channel names.
(d) α is an input a(e) of channel name e. We require that ai, bj /∈ fn(n˜1, n˜2, c˜, A1, A2). The arbitrary input value emay
be one of ai, bj and thus may violate this condition in the subsequent processes. In that case, we can choose a fresh
name d to replace e in C and obtain a new equivalence C {d/e} [A1]\ey ≈ C {d/e} [A2]\ey . Hence, for simplicity,
we can safely assume that no conflict is introduced by e. Assume A1 = νn˜1.(σ1, S1,P ′1 ∪ {(a(x).P, L)})
a(e)−−−→
A′1 = νn˜1.(σ1, S1,P ′1 ∪ {(P {e/x} , L)}). Similarly,
i. If a, e /∈ c˜, consider the evaluation context C′ = (-, -,{(d, ∅), (a〈e〉.d, ∅)} -) where d is fresh;
ii. If a = cj for some j ∈ J and e /∈ c˜, consider the evaluation context C′ = (-, -,
{
(d, ∅), (bj(u).u〈e〉.d.bj〈u〉, ∅)
}
-)
where d is fresh;
iii. If a = e = ck for some k ∈ J , let C′ = (-, -,
{
(d, ∅), (bk(u).u〈u〉.d.bk〈u〉, ∅)
}
-) where d is fresh.
iv. If a = cj and e = ck for some j, k ∈ J with j 6= k, let C′ = (-, -,
{
(d, ∅), (bj(u).bk(v).u〈v〉.(d.bj〈u〉 | bk〈v〉), ∅)
}
-)
where d is fresh.
(e) AssumeA1 = νn˜′1, e.(σ1, S1,P ′1∪{(a〈e〉.P, L)})
νe.a〈e〉−−−−→ A′1 = νn˜′1.(σ1, S1,P ′1∪{(P,L)}) with e /∈ n˜′1. In ob-
servational equivalence, internal transitions can never make the channel name e free. Thus, we need to construct an
evaluation context that are able to provide the information for the names that was output previously. For notational
convenience, we write if x ∈ V then 0 else P , where V = {u1, u2, · · · , uk}, for
if x = u1 then 0
else if x = u2 then 0
· · · · · ·
else if x = uk then 0 else P
i. If a /∈ c˜, consider the evaluation context C′ = (-, -,{(d, ∅), (a(x).if x ∈ fn(A1, A2) then 0 else d.bl〈x〉, ∅)} -)
with bl, d are fresh, then
C′[C[A1]\ey] = νc˜, n˜′1, e.
(
σ1\ey, S1,P
′
1 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ1〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(a〈e〉.P, L), (d, ∅), (a(x).if x ∈ fn(A1, A2) then 0 else d.bl〈x〉, ∅)}
)
=⇒ B1 = νc˜, n˜′1, e.(σ1\ey, S1,P ′1 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ1〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪ {(bj〈cj〉, ∅)}j∈J ∪ {(P,L), (bl〈e〉, ∅)})
The output bl〈e〉 enables e to be accessed by environment through bl in future. Similar as above analysis, we
have C′[C[A2]\ey] =⇒ B2 = νc˜, n˜′2, e, m˜.(σ2\ey, S′2,P ′2∪{(ai〈yiσ2〉, ∅)}i∈I∪{(bj〈cj〉, ∅)}j∈J∪{(bl〈e〉, ∅)})
and B1 ≈ B2. And also A2 νe.a〈e〉=⇒ A′2 = νn˜′2, m˜.(σ2, S′2,P ′2). We construct a new evaluation context
C′′ = νc˜, e.(-, -, {(ai〈yi〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪
{
(bl〈e〉, ∅)
}∪{(bj〈cj〉, ∅)}j∈J -). Then we can verify thatBk = C′′[A′k]\ey
with k = 1, 2. Hence we know that (A′1, A
′
2) ∈ R.
ii. if a = cj , j ∈ J , let C′ = (-, -,
{
(d, ∅), (bj(u).u(x).(d.bl〈x〉 | bj〈u〉), ∅)
}
-) with bl, d are fresh.
(f) Assume A1 = νn˜1.(σ1, S1,P ′1 ∪ {(a〈M1〉.P, L)})
νx.a〈x〉−−−−−→ A′1 = νn˜1.(σ1 ∪ {M1/x} , S1,P ′1 ∪ {(P,L)})
with x /∈ fv(A1). In observational equivalence, internal transitions can never make term M1 free or generate an
substitution for M1. Thus, we need to construct an evaluation context that are able to provide the information for
the terms that already being output previously.
i. if a /∈ c˜, consider the evaluation context C′ = (-, -,{(d, ∅), (a(x).d.al〈x〉, ∅)} -) with al, d are fresh, then
C′[C[A1]\ey] = νc˜, n˜1.(σ1\ey, S1,P ′1 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ1〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪ {(bj〈cj〉, ∅)}j∈J ∪ {(a〈M1〉.P, L), (d, ∅), (a(x).d.al〈x〉, ∅)})
=⇒ B1 = νc˜, n˜1.(σ1\ey, S1,P ′1 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ1〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪ {(bj〈cj〉, ∅)}j∈J ∪ {(P,L), (al〈M1〉, ∅)})
The output al〈M〉 makes M to be accessed by environment through al in future. Similar as above anal-
ysis, we have C′[C[A2]\ey] =⇒ B2 = νc˜, n˜2, m˜.(σ2\ey, S′2,P ′2 ∪ {(ai〈yiσ2〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪ {(bj〈cj〉, ∅)}j∈J ∪
{(al〈M2〉, ∅)}) and B1 ≈ B2. We can see that A2 νx.a〈x〉=⇒ A′2 = νn˜2, m˜.(σ2 ∪ {M2/x} , S′2,P ′2). Let
C′′ = νc˜.(-, -, {(ai〈yi〉, ∅)}i∈I ∪{(al〈x〉, ∅)}∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J -). Then we can verify that Bk = C′′[A′k]\ey,x
with k = 1, 2. Hence we know that (A′1, A
′
2) ∈ R.
ii. if a = cj , j ∈ J , let C′ = (-, -,
{
(d, ∅), (bj(u).u(x).(d.al〈x〉 | bj〈u〉), ∅)
}
-) with al, d are fresh.
Theorem 1. On closed extended processes with only private state cells, it holds that ≈=≈l.
Proof. This is a direct corollary of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2.
C Proofs for Encoding
As stated in Section 3.2, we encode an extended process νm˜.(σ, S, {(Pi, Li)}i∈I) into an extended process νn˜.(σ, ∅, {(Pj , ∅)}j∈J)
which does not contain any cell name. We abbreviate νn˜.(σ, ∅, {(Pj , ∅)}j∈J) to νn˜.(σ, {Pj}j∈J). We call the process
νn˜.(σ, {Pj}j∈J) which does not contain any cell name a pure extended process. The operational semantics for pure ex-
tended process is still defined by Figure 1. On closed pure extended processes, the labelled bisimilarity are defined exactly
the same as in Definition 3, while the observational equivalence ≈e is defined exactly the same as in Definition 1 except
that the evaluation context does not contain any cell name.
Before we start to prove anything related to encoding, we need to first define another equivalence' on the pure extended
process.
Definition 6. Let ' be the smallest equivalence relation on pure extended processes closed under α-conversion such that
I. νn˜,m.(σ,P) ' νn˜.(σ,P) if m /∈ fn(n˜, σ,P)
II. νn˜.(σ,P ∪ {νm.P}) ' νn˜,m.(σ,P ∪ {P}) if m /∈ fn(n˜, σ,P)
III. νn˜.(σ,P ∪ {P | Q}) ' νn˜.(σ,P ∪ {P} ∪ {Q})
IV. νn˜.(σ {M/x} ,P {M/x}) ' νn˜.(σ {N/x} ,P {N/x}) if M =Σ N
In the following discussion, when we consider the derivation sequence A '1 A1 '1 A2 · · · '1 An '1 B for
the closed pure extended processes A and B, we can safely assume that A1, A2, · · · , An are all closed pure extended
processes. Otherwise, we can use an injective renaming % to substitute these redundant variables with fresh names and get
a new closed derivation sequence A '1 %(A1) '1 %(A2) · · · '1 %(An) '1 B. These redundant variables introduced by '
are all dummy varialbes which are actually useless.
Lemma 2. Let A,B be two closed pure extended processes. If B '1 A α−−→ A′ with fv(α) ⊆ dom(A) then there exists a
closed pure extended process B′ such that either B bα=⇒ A′ or B α−−→ B′ '1 A′.
Proof. We discuss the eight different cases for B '1 A.
1. Assume B = νn˜,m.(σ,P) ' νn˜.(σ,P) = A or B = νn˜.(σ,P) ' νn˜,m.(σ,P) = A with m /∈ fn(n˜, σ,P). Since m
is a redundant name, it will not affect any actions from P . Hence B α−→ A′.
2. Assume B = νn˜.(σ,P ∪ {νm.P}) ' νn˜,m.(σ,P ∪ {P}) = A with m /∈ fn(n˜, σ,P). Then we have B τ−→ A α−→ A′.
3. Assume B = νn˜,m.(σ,P ∪ {P}) ' νn˜.(σ,P ∪ {νm.P}) = A with m /∈ fn(n˜, σ,P). If A α−→ A′ is about pulling
out name m, then B = A′. For the other cases of A α−→ A′, we can easily see that A cannot perform any action from
νm.P and action α is from P , thus there exists B′ such that B α−→ B′ '1 A′.
4. Assume B = νn˜.(σ,P ∪ {P | Q}) ' νn˜.(σ,P ∪ {P} ∪ {Q}) = A. Then we have B τ−→ A α−→ A′.
5. Assume B = νn˜.(σ,P ∪{P}∪ {Q}) ' νn˜.(σ,P ∪{P | Q}) = A. If A α−→ A′ is about splitting P | Q, then B = A′.
For the other cases of A α−→ A′, we can easily see that A cannot perform any action from P | Q and action α is from
P , thus there exists B′ such that B α−→ B′ '1 A′.
6. When the B '1 A replaces some terms, we take conditional branch as an example, the other cases are trivial.
Assume B = νn˜.(σ {M ′/z} ,P {M ′/z} ∪ {ifM {M ′/z} = N {M ′/z} then P {M ′/z} else Q {M ′/z}}) '
νn˜.(σ {N ′/z} ,P {N ′/z} ∪ {ifM {N ′/z} = N {N ′/z} then P {N ′/z} else Q {N ′/z}}) = A and M ′ =Σ N ′.
SinceM {M ′/z} =Σ M {N ′/z} andN {M ′/z} =Σ N {N ′/z}, we haveM {M ′/z} =Σ N {M ′/z} iffM {N ′/z} =Σ
N {N ′/z}. That is to say B and A will jump to the same branch. We take then branch as an example here. Then
A′ = νn˜.(σ {N ′/z} ,P {N ′/z} ∪ P {N ′/z}). Let B′ = νn˜.(σ {M ′/z} ,P {M ′/z} ∪ P {M ′/z}). Clearly we have
B
τ−→ B′ '1 A′.
Corollary 3. Let A,B be two closed pure extended processes. If B ' A α−−→ A′ with fv(α) ⊆ dom(A) then B bα=⇒ B′ '
A′ for some closed pure extended process B′.
Proof. Using Lemma 2 several times.
Corollary 4. Assume two closed pure extended processes A,B and fv(α) ⊆ dom(A). IfB ' A α=⇒ A′ thenB bα=⇒ B′ '
A′ for some closed pure extended process B′.
Proof. By repeated applications of Corollary 3.
C.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Now we start to prove that encoding preserves observational equivalence. Given a set of cells S = {s1 7→M1, · · · , sn 7→Mn}
and a set of locks L, we define the projection S|L of S under L to be the set { t 7→ N | {t 7→ N} ⊆ S and t ∈ L }.
Lemma 3. Let A be a closed extended process and fv(α) ⊆ dom(A). If A α−→ B then bAc bα=⇒ bBc.
Proof. We only detail the proof for the transitions related to cell name here. The other cases are trivial. The function T
only gathers together the name restrictions of the top level.
1. Assume A = νn˜.(σ, S,P ∪ {(s 7→M, ∅)}) τ−−→ B = νn˜.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,P). Since A is closed, we have that
s /∈ locks(P). We can easily see that bAc = bBc from the definition of encoding in Section 3.2.
2. AssumeA = νn˜.(σ, S∪{s 7→M} ,P∪{(read s as x.P, L)}) τ−−→ B = νn˜.(σ, S∪{s 7→M} ,P∪{(P {M/x} , L)}).
Since this transition only affect cell s, we assume the encoding for the unlocked cells in S is Q1 and the encoding for
P isQ2. We also assume the encoding for names n˜ is n˜′. The encoding for {s 7→M} and read s as x.P are different
regarding s is locked or not.
(a) if s ∈ L, let T = S|L ∪ {s 7→M}, then we can see that bAc = νn˜′. (σ,Q1 ∪Q2 ∪ {bP {M/x}cT }) and
bBc = νn˜′. (σ,Q1 ∪Q2 ∪ {bP {M/x}cT }). Thus we have bAc =⇒ bBc.
(b) if s /∈ L, then we can see that bAc = νn˜′.
(
σ,Q1 ∪Q2 ∪
{
cs〈M〉, cs(x).(cs〈x〉 | bP cS|L)
})
and bBc =
νn˜′.
(
σ,Q1 ∪Q2 ∪
{
cs〈M〉, bP {M/x}cS|L
})
. Thus bAc τ−→ νn˜′.
(
σ,Q1 ∪Q2 ∪
{
cs〈M〉 | bP {M/x}cS|L
})
τ−→
bBc.
3. Assume A = νn˜.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,P ∪ {(s := N.P,L)}) τ−−→ B = νn˜.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→ N} ,P ∪ {(P,L)}). Similar
to the read case, we assume the encoding for n˜, S,P are n˜′,Q1,Q2 respectively.
(a) if s ∈ L, then bAc = νn˜′.(σ,Q1 ∪Q2 ∪
{
bP cS|L∪{s7→N}
}
) and bBc = νn˜′.(σ,Q1 ∪Q2 ∪
{
bP cS|L∪{s7→N}
}
).
This gives us bAc =⇒ bBc.
(b) if s /∈ L, then bAc = νn˜′.
(
σ,Q1 ∪Q2 ∪
{
cs〈M〉, cs(x).(cs〈N〉 | bP cS|L)
})
where x is a fresh base sort vari-
able and bBc = νn˜′.
(
σ,Q1 ∪Q2 ∪
{
cs〈N〉, bP cS|L
})
. Thus bAc τ−−→ νn˜′.
(
σ,Q1 ∪Q2 ∪
{
cs〈N〉 | bP cS|L
})
τ−−→
bBc.
4. assume A = νn˜. (σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,P ∪ {(lock s.P, L)}) τ−−→ νn˜. (σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,P ∪ {(P,L ∪ {s})}) and s 6∈
L ∪ locks(P). Similar to the read case, we assume the encoding for unlocked cells in S is Q1 and encoding for n˜,P
are n˜′,Q2 respectively. Then bAc = νn˜′.(σ,Q1 ∪ Q2 ∪
{
cs〈M〉, cs(x). bP cS|L∪{s7→x}
}
) and bBc = νn˜′.(σ,Q1 ∪
Q2 ∪
{
bP cS|L∪{s 7→M}
}
). Since x /∈ fv(P ), bP cS|L∪{s 7→x} {M/x} = bP cS|L∪{s7→M}. Thus we have bAc
τ−−→ bBc.
5. assume A = νn˜. (σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,P ∪ {(unlock s.P, L)}) τ−−→ B = νn˜. (σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,P ∪ {(P,L \ {s})})
and s ∈ L. We assume the encoding for n˜, S,P are n˜′,Q1,Q2 respectively. Then bAc = νn˜′.
(
σ,Q1 ∪Q2 ∪
{
cs〈M〉 | bP cS|L
})
and bBc = νn˜′.
(
σ,Q1 ∪Q2 ∪
{
cs〈M〉, bP cS|L
})
. Thus bAc τ−−→ bBc.
Corollary 5. Let A be a closed extended process and fv(α) ⊆ dom(A). If A α=⇒ B then bAc bα=⇒ bBc.
Proof. If A α−→ A′ and A is closed, we can verify that A′ is also closed. This enables us to use Lemma 3 several times and
get the conclusion.
Lemma 4. Let A be a closed extended process and fv(α) ⊆ dom(A). If bAc α−→ B then A bα=⇒ A′ and bA′c ' B for
some A′.
Proof. We only detail the proof for the communication on channel cs which is obtained by encoding the cell name s. The
other cases are trivial. Assume bAc = νn˜.(σ,P ∪{cs〈M〉, cs(x).P}) τ−−→ B = νn˜.(σ,P ∪{P {M/x}}). The input cs(x)
may be encoded from lock s, read s as x or s := N where s is not locked, and the output may come from {s 7→M} in
plain process or in set of cells. We only detail the proof for the case when {s 7→M} is already in cells part. The other case
is similar.
1. Assume A = νk˜.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,Q∪ {(lock s.Q, L)}) with s /∈ L. We have that the encoding of k˜ is n˜ while the
encoding of Q and S under locks locks(Q) ∪ L is P . And the encoding block s.QcS|L = cs(x). bQcS|L∪{s7→x} =
cs(x).P . Thus we have bQcS|L∪{s7→x} = P . Substitute x with M , we get bQcS|L∪{s7→M} = P {M/x} since x /∈
fv(Q). Consider the transition A τ−→ A′ := νk˜.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,Q ∪ {(Q,L ∪ {s})}). Thus we have bA′c =
νn˜.
(
σ,P ∪
{
bQcS|L∪{s7→M}
})
= νn˜. (σ,P ∪ {P {M/x}}) = B.
2. Assume A = νk˜.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,Q ∪ {(read s as x.Q,L)}) with s /∈ L ∪ locks(Q). We have that the encoding
of k˜ is n˜ while the encoding of Q and S under locks locks(Q) ∪ L is P . And the encoding bread s as x.QcS|L =
cs(x).(cs〈x〉 | bQcS|L) = cs(x).P . Thus we get cs〈x〉 | bQcS|L = P . Consider the transition A
τ−→ A′ = νk˜.(σ, S ∪
{s 7→M} ,Q ∪ {(Q {M/x} , L)}). Substituting x with M , we get (cs〈M〉 | bQ {M/x}cS|L) = P {M/x} since x /∈
fv(S|L). Thus we have bA′c = νn˜.(σ,P ∪
{
cs〈M〉, bQ {M/x}cS|L
}
) ' νn˜.(σ,P ∪
{
cs〈M〉 | bQ {M/x}cS|L
}
) =
B.
3. Assume A = νk˜.(σ, S ∪ {s 7→M} ,Q ∪ {(s := N.Q,L)}) with s /∈ L ∪ locks(Q). We have that the encoding of
k˜ is n˜ while the encoding of Q and S under locked cells locks(Q) ∪ L is P . And the encoding bs := N.QcS|L =
cs(x).(cs〈N〉 | bQcS|L) = cs(x).P . Thus we get cs〈N〉 | bQcS|L = P . Consider the transition A
τ−→ A′ =
νk˜.(σ, S∪{s 7→M} ,Q∪{(Q,L)}).proofappliedpi Thus we have bA′c = νn˜.(σ,P∪
{
cs〈N〉, bQcS|L
}
) ' νn˜.(σ,P∪{
cs〈N〉 | bQcS|L
}
) = B.
Corollary 6. Let A be a closed extended process and fv(α) ⊆ dom(A). If bAc α=⇒ B then A bα=⇒ A′ and bA′c ' B for
some A′.
Proof. Using Lemma 4 and Corollary 4 several times.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. For two closed extended processes A,B which only have private state cells, it holds A ≈ B iff bAc ≈e bBc
where ≈e is an equivalence defined exactly the same as Definition 1 except the evaluation context C does not contain any
cell names.
Proof. 1. We construct the following setR on pairs of closed extended processes:
R = { (A,B) | bAc ' D1 ≈e D2 ' bBc }
and prove thatR ⊆ ≈.
If A ⇓c, by Corollary 5, we have bAc ⇓c. Using Corollary 4 we have D1 ⇓c. Since D1 ≈e D2, we have D2 ⇓c. Using
Corollary 4, we have bBc ⇓c. By Corollary 6 we know that B ⇓c.
If A =⇒ A′, by Corollary 5, we have bAc =⇒ bA′c. From Corollary 4, there exists D′1 such that D1 =⇒ D′1 '
bA′c. Since D1 ≈e D2, there exists D′2 such that D2 =⇒ D′2 ≈e D′1. By Corollary 4, there exists D′′2 such that
bBc =⇒ D′′2 ' D′2. By Corollary 6, there exists B′ such that B =⇒ B′ and bB′c ' D′′2 ' D′2. From A =⇒ A′ and
bA′c ' D′1 ≈e D′2, we know that (A′, B′) ∈ R.
For any evaluation context C = νn˜.(σ-, S-,P-), we need to prove that (C[A], C[B]) ∈ R. We can use the same encoding
to encode away all the cell names in the context C and get a new evaluation context bCc = νl˜.(σ-,Q-). Assume
A = νn˜1.(σ1, S1,P1) and bAc = νm˜1.(σ1,Q1). Then we can see that C[A] = νn˜, m˜.(σσ1∪σ1, Sσ1∪S1,Pσ1∪P1)
and bCc [bAc] = νl˜, m˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1,Qσ1 ∪ Q1). Note that C and A do not share any cell name. Applying encoding
to C[A] we get bC[A]c = νl˜, m˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1,Qσ1 ∪ Q1) = bCc [bAc]. Similarly we have bC[B]c = bCc [bBc]. From
bAc ' D1 and D2 ' bBc, we can see that bCc [bAc] ' bCc [D1] and bCc [D2] ' bCc [bBc]. From D1 ≈e D2,
applying context bCc, we can see that bCc [D1] ≈e bCc [D2]. In brief, we have bC[A]c = bCc [bAc] ' bCc [D1] ≈e
bCc [D2] ' bCc [bBc] = bC[B]c. Thus we know (C[A], C[B]) ∈ R.
2. We construct the following set S on pairs of closed extended processes:
S = { (D1, D2) | D1 ' bAc , A ≈ B, bBc ' D2 }
and prove that S ⊆ ≈e.
If D1 ⇓c, by Corollary 4, we have bAc ⇓c. Using Corollary 6 we have A ⇓c. Since A ≈ B, we have B ⇓c. By
Corollary 5 we know that bBc ⇓c. Using Corollary 4, we have D2 ⇓c.
If D1 =⇒ D′1, by Corollary 4, we have bAc =⇒ A1. From Corollary 6, there exists A′ such that A =⇒ A′ and
bA′c ' A1. Since A ≈ B, there exists B′ such that B =⇒ B′ ≈ A′. By Corollary 5, we have bBc =⇒ bB′c. By
Corollary 4, there exists D′2 such that D2 =⇒ D′2 and bB′c ' D′2. From D1 =⇒ D′1 and D′1 ' bA′c, we know that
(D′1, D
′
2) ∈ R.
For any pure evaluation context C, we can easily see that C[D1] = C[bAc] = bC[A]c and C[D2] ' C[bBc] = bC[B]c
and C[A] ≈ C[B], thus we have (C[D1], C[D2]) ∈ S.
C.2 Proofs of Theorem 3 and Corollary 1 in Section 3.3
In this section, we discuss the relation between applied pi calculus and stateful applied pi calculus.
To fix the flaw mentioned in Section 3.1, we revise the original applied pi calculus [3] slightly that the active substitu-
tions are only defined on terms of base sort. Since the communication rule in [3] relies on the active substitutions, we need
to replace it with the new rule COMM a〈M〉.Pr | a(x).Qr τ−→ Pr | Qr {M/x} accordingly.
To avoid confusion, we use Ar, Br, Cr to refer to the extended processes and use Cr to refer to the evaluation context
in applied pi calculus.
An Alternative Semantics for Applied Pi Calculus To ease the proof, we use an alternative semantics in Figure 4 of the
revised applied pi calculus mentioned above. This semantics has been proved in Appendix A in [30] to yield exactly the
same set of observational equivalence (resp. labelled bisimilarity) as the one in [3]. For convenience of reading, we copy
the proof in [30] here.
The operational semantics of the applied pi calculus relies heavily on structural equivalence. This is because the analysis
of complex data and “alias” mechanism introduced in the calculus depends on structural equivalence rules such as SUBST
and REWRITE. Unfortunately such a structural equivalence makes the formal reasoning very difficult. Thus, as a first
step, we need to preprocess the original semantics in [3] and rewrite it to a more convenient form while preserving the
observational equivalence.
Here in Figure 4 we replace the two-directional rule !Pr ≡ Pr |!Pr in structural equivalence in [3] with the one-
directional !Pr
τ−→ Pr |!Pr in the internal reduction, as well as replacing the THEN in internal reduction in [3] with
if M = N then Pr else Qr
τ−→ Pr if M =Σ N .
Ar ≡ Ar | 0
Ar | Br ≡ Br | Ar
Ar | (Br | Cr) ≡ (Ar | Br) | Cr
νx. {M/x} ≡ 0 νn.0 ≡ 0
{M/x} ≡ {N/x} whenM =Σ N νu.νv.Ar ≡ νv.νu.Ar
{M/x} | Ar ≡ {M/x} | Ar {M/x} Ar | νu.Br ≡ νu.(Ar | Br) when u /∈ fnv(Ar)
COMM a〈M〉.Pr | a(x).Qr τ−→ Pr | Qr {M/x}
THEN if M = N then Pr else Qr
τ−→ Pr if M =Σ N
ELSE if M = N then Pr else Qr
τ−→ Qr if var(M,N) = ∅ and M 6=Σ N
REP !Pr
τ−→ Pr |!Pr IN a(x).Pr a(M)−−−→ Pr {M/x}
OUTCH a〈c〉.Pr a〈c〉−−→ Pr OUTT a〈M〉.Pr νx.a〈x〉−−−−−→ Pr | {M/x}
where x ∈ Vb and x /∈ fv(a〈M〉.Pr)
OPENCH
Ar
a〈c〉−−→ Br a 6= c
νc.Ar
νc.a〈c〉−−−−→ Br
SCOPE
Ar
α−→ Br u does not occur in α
νu.Ar
α−→ νu.Br
PAR
Ar
α−→ A′r, bnv(α) ∩ fnv(Br) = ∅
Ar | Br α−→ A′r | Br
STRUCT
Ar ≡ Cr α−→ Dr ≡ Br
Ar
α−→ Br
Fig. 4. Operational Semantics of Applied Pi
We shall show that the notions of the observational equivalence and the labelled bisimilarity generated by the two
sets of rules are exactly the same (Theorem 5 andTheorem 6). In other words, it is adequate to handle replications with
!Pr
τ−→ Pr |!Pr only.
The observational equivalence and labelled bisimilarity in applied pi calculus are defined by:
Definition 7. Observational equivalence (≈) is the largest symmetric relation R between closed extended processes with
the same domain such that ArRBr implies:
1. if Ar ⇓a then Br ⇓a;
2. if Ar =⇒ A′r, then Br =⇒ B′r and A′r R B′r for some B′r;
3. Cr[Ar]RCr[Br] for all closing evaluation contexts Cr.
Definition 8. Two terms M and N are equal in the frame φ, written (M = N)φ, iff φ ≡ νn˜.σ, {n˜} ∩ name(M,N) = ∅,
and Mσ =Σ Nσ, for some names n˜ and substitution σ.
Two closed frames φ1 and φ2 are statically equivalent, written φ1 ≈s φ2, if dom(φ1) = dom(φ2), and for all terms M
and N such that var(M,N) ⊆ dom(φ1) we have (M = N)φ1 iff (M = N)φ2. Two closed extended processes Ar and
Br are statically equivalent, written Ar ≈s Br, if their frames are.
Definition 9. Labeled bisimilarity (≈l) is the largest symmetric relationR on closed extended processes such thatArRBr
implies:
1. Ar ≈s Br
2. if Ar
α−→ A′r and fv(α) ⊆ dom(Ar) and bn(α) ∩ fn(Br) = ∅ then Br bα=⇒ B′r and A′rRB′r for some B′r.
In order to avoid confusion, in the following discussions we shall use ≡o, τ−→o, τ=⇒o, ⇓oa, ≈o and ≈l,o to refer to
original structural equivalence, (strong and weak) transitions, etc defined in [3]; and use ≡, τ−→, =⇒, ⇓a, ≈ and ≈l for
the corresponding ones generated here. To prove that ≈o(resp. ≈l,o) coincides with ≈(resp. ≈l). We need to explore the
relationship between α−→o and α−→. Their relations are mainly formalised in the following Lemma 6 and Lemma 7.
We writeAr 1 Br ifAr can be transformed toBr by applying to a subterm (which is not under a replication, an input,
a conditional, or an output) of Ar an axiom of structural equivalence ≡o, except that !Pr ≡o Pr |!Pr can only be used from
left to right; we write  for the reflexive and transitive closure of 1. We say a sequence A1r 1 A2r 1 · · · 1 A`r is a
linear proof sequence of A1r  A`r.
Since the use of evaluation context before the use of structural equivalence can be swapped. Two applications of struc-
tural equivalence as well as evaluation contexts can be condensed to one, we can always obtain a derivation for any transition
in which the use of structural equivalence occurs only once and at the last step. We shall call such a derivation a normalised
derivation.
For n ≥ 1, an n-hole evaluation context Cr is an extended process with n holes which are not under a replication, an
input, an output or a conditional. We write Cr[A1r, A2r, · · · , Anr ] for the extended process obtained by filling the holes with
processes.
Lemma 5. Assume Ar  Br and Ar = Cr[!Pr] with Cr an evaluation context. Then there exist an evaluation context C′r
and a plain process Qr such that Br = C′r[!Qr] and Cr[Pr |!Pr]  C′r[Qr |!Qr].
Proof. By induction on the length of the linear proof sequence for . If the length is 0, the result holds immediately. Now
assume Ar 1 A1r 1 A2r · · · 1 A`r 1 A`+1r = Br. By the induction hypothesis there exist a plain process Rr and an
evaluation context C′′r such that
A`r = C′′r [!Rr] Cr[Pr |!Pr]  C′′r [Rr |!Rr] (1)
We argue by case analysis on the axiom used in deriving A`r 1 A`+1r . We give the details only for two cases when 1
is REWRITE and SUBST. The other cases are similar.
1. A`o = C′′′r [{M/x}] 1 C′′′r [{N/x}] = A`+1r with M =Σ N . Since there is no way that active substitution {M/x}
can occur inside replications, it is easy to see that there exists a two-hole evaluation context D such that A`r =
D[!Rr, {M/x}],D[!Rr, ·] = C′′′r andD[·, {M/x}] = C′′r . Using the REWRITE axiom, we know thatD[Rr |!Rr, {M/x}] 1
D[Rr |!Rr, {N/x}]. Let C′r = D[·, {N/x}] and Qr = Rr. Clearly A`+1r = C′r[!Qr]. Hence Cr[Pr |!Pr]  C′′r [Rr |
!Rr] 1 C′r[Qr |!Qr] and the result holds.
2. (a) A`r = C′′′r [Er | {M/x}] 1 C′′′r [Er {M/x} | {M/x}] = A`+1r . Since the hole in any evaluation context has no
chance to occur under any replication, !Rr in (1) should occur in either Er or C′′′r . The analysis for the latter case
is similar as the above case. Now we consider the former case. Here there exists an evaluation context D such that
Er = D[!Rr] and C′′′r [D[·] | {M/x}] = C′′r . The substitution {M/x} will apply to D and Rr while rewriting A`r
to A`+1r . Let D
′ = D {M/x} and Qr = Rr {M/x}. We can easily see that A`+1r = C′′′r [D′[!Qr] | {M/x}] and
C′′′r [D[Rr |!Rr] | {M/x}] 1 C′′′r [D′[Qr |!Qr] | {M/x}]. Let C′r = C′′′r [D′[·] | {M/x}]. Then A`+1r = C′r[!Qr]
and C[Pr |!Pr]  C′′r [Rr |!Rr]  C′r[Qr |!Qr].
(b) A`r = C′′′r [Er {M/x} | {M/x}] 1 C′′′r [Er | {M/x}] = A`+1r . When !Rr in (1) occurs in Er {M/x}, clearly
there exist an evaluation context D and a plain process Qr such that Er = D[!Qr] and Qr {M/x} = Rr. The rest
is similar to the above case.
3. A`r = C′′′r [!P ′r] 1 C′′′r [P ′r |!P ′r] = A`+1r . When !P ′r is !Rr in (1), the result holds trivially; otherwise !Rr in (1) should
occur in C′′′r and the remaining analysis is similar.
Lemma 6. Assume Ar
α−→o A′r where Ar, A′r are closed and α is not a〈x〉 and fv(α) ⊆ dom(Ar). Then there exist closed
Br, B
′
r such that Ar  Br α−→ B′r ≡o A′r.
Proof. Consider the normalized derivation of transition Ar
α−→o A′r.
1. α is a(M). ThenAr ≡o Cr[a(x).Qr] a(M)−−−→o Cr[Qr {M/x}] ≡o A′r with Cr an evaluation context and Cr[a(x).Qr]
a(M)−−−→o
Cr[Qr {M/x}] derived by the rules in [3] without using ≡o.
We may assume Cr[a(x).Qr] and Cr[Qr {M/x}] are both closed; for otherwise we can let fv(Cr[a(x).Qr])−dom(Cr[a(x).Qr]) =
{x1, · · · , xn} and choose n fresh names c1, · · · , cn and let σ = {c1/x1, · · · , cn/xn}. From the hypothesis, we know
that Mσ = M,x /∈ var(σ), and dom(Ar) = dom(Cr[a(x).Pr]) = dom(A′r). It is easy to see that Ar = Arσ ≡o
Crσ[a(x).Qrσ] a(M)−−−→o Crσ[(Qrσ) {M/x}] = Crσ[(Qrσ) {Mσ/x}] ≡o A′rσ = A′r.
Since Cr[a(x).Qr] a(M)−−−→o Cr[Qr {M/x}] can be derived without using ≡o, Cr[a(x).Qr] a(M)−−−→ Cr[Qr {M/x}] can
also be derived by rules in Fig. 4 without using ≡. Thus Ar ≡o Cr[a(x).Qr] a(M)−−−→ Cr[Qr {M/x}] ≡o A′r. Now we
proceed to construct the required Br and B′r as stated in the lemma. The rest of the proof goes by induction on the
number of applications of !Pr ≡o Pr |!Pr from right to left in deriving Ar ≡o Cr[a(x).Qr]. If the number is 0, the
result is immediate. So suppose the number is nonzero and consider the last application of !Pr ≡o Pr |!Pr from right
to left (we write ≡1o for the application of an axiom of structural equivalence ≡o):
Ar ≡o C′r[Pr |!Pr] ≡1o C′r[!Pr]  Cr[a(x).Qr]
where C′r is also an evaluation context. From Lemma A.1, we know there existsD′ such that C′r[Pr |!Pr]  D′[Rr |!Rr]
and D′[!Rr] = Cr[a(x).Qr]. Then there exists a two hole evaluation context D such that D[!Rr, ·] = Cr since a(x).Qr
cannot occur inside the replication. Moreover D[Rr |!Rr, a(x).Qr] a(M)−−−→ D[Rr |!Rr, Qr {M/x}] can be derived by
the rules in Fig. 4, and
Ar ≡o C′r[Pr |!Pr]  D[Rr |!Rr, a(x).Qr]
a(M)−−−→ D[Rr |!Rr, Qr {M/x}] ≡o Cr[Qr {M/x}] ≡o A′r.
Replacing !Rr with Rr |!Rr does not introduce fresh variables. In other words D[Rr |!Rr, a(x).Qr] and D[Rr |
!Rr, Qr {M/x}] are also closed. By induction hypothesis, there exist closed Br, B′r such that Ar  Br
a(M)−−−→ B′r ≡o
A′r.
2. α is a〈c〉. Then Ar ≡o Cr[a〈c〉.Qr] a〈c〉−−→o Cr[Qr] ≡o A′r with Cr an evaluation context. Clearly Cr[a〈c〉.Qr]
a〈c〉−−→
Cr[Qr]. The rest of the proof is similar to the above case.
3. α is νc.a〈c〉. Then Ar ≡o νc.Cr[a〈c〉.Qr] νc.a〈c〉−−−−→o Cr[Qr] ≡o A′r with Cr an evaluation context. Then we have
νc.Cr[a〈c〉.Qr] νc.a〈c〉−−−−→ Cr[Qr]. The rest of the proof is similar.
4. α is νx.a〈x〉. Then Ar ≡o νx.Cr[a〈x〉.Qr] νx.a〈x〉−−−−−→o Cr[Qr] ≡o A′r with Cr an evaluation context. By the side-
condition on extended process in Section 2.1, there is exactly one {M/x} in Cr for the restricted variable x. Thus there
exists a two-hole evaluation context D such that Cr = D[{M/x} , ·]. Since the side-condition for rule OUTT in Fig. 4
requires x be fresh, we choose a fresh variable y and let % = {y/x}. By α-conversion, and structural equivalence ≡,
we can deduce that
νx.Cr[a〈x〉.Qr] = νx.D[{M/x} , a〈x〉.Qr] = νy.%(D)[{M/y} , a〈y〉.%(Qr)]
νx.a〈x〉−−−−−→ νy.%(D)[{M/y} , %(Qr) | {y/x}]
≡ νy.D[{M/y} , Qr | {y/x}] ≡ νy.D[{M/y} | {y/x} , Qr]
≡ νy.D[{M/y} | {M/x} , Qr] ≡ D[νy. {M/y} | {M/x} , Qr]
≡ D[{M/x} , Qr] = Cr[Qr] ≡o A′r
5. α is τ . There are three cases:
(a) Ar ≡o Cr[ if M = M then Pr else Qr ] τ−→o Cr [Pr ] ≡o A′r with Cr an evaluation context.
(b) Ar ≡o Cr[ if M = N then Pr else Qr ] τ−→o Cr [Qr ] ≡o A′r with M 6=Σ N , M,N are ground terms and Cr an
evaluation context.
(c) Ar ≡o Cr[a〈M〉.Pr | a(x).Qr] τ−→o Cr[Pr | Qr {M/x}] ≡o A′r with Cr an evaluation context.
The rest of the proof is similar.
Lemma 7. Assume α is not a〈x〉 and Ar, A′r are closed.
1. If Ar
α−→o A′r then there is a closed A′′r such that Ar α=⇒ A′′r ≡o A′r.
2. If Ar
α−→ A′r then either Ar ≡o A′r(only possible when α is τ ) or Ar α−→o A′r.
Proof. 1. Assume Ar
α−→o A′r. By Lemma 6, there exist closed Br and B′r such that Ar  Br α−→ B′r ≡o A′r. Replacing
every left to right application of the rule !Pr ≡o Pr |!Pr in Ar  Br with !Pr τ−→ Pr |!Pr, we obtain Ar ⇒ Br α−→
B′r ≡o A′r. Letting A′′r = B′r gives the conclusion.
2. Assume Ar
α−→ A′r and apply transition induction.
(a) α is a(M). Then Ar ≡ Cr[a(x).P ] a(M)−−−→ Cr[P {M/x}] ≡ A′r where Cr is an evaluation context. Clearly we have
Ar ≡ Cr[a(x).P ] a(M)−−−→o Cr[P {M/x}] ≡ A′r. Since ≡ is included in ≡o, we have Ar
a(M)−−−→o A′r.
(b) The cases for α is τ are similar. For replications, assume Ar ≡ Cr[!Pr] τ−→ Cr[Pr |!Pr] ≡ A′r, then we have
Ar ≡o A′r.
(c) α is νx.a〈x〉. We haveAr ≡ Cr[a〈M〉.P ] νx.a〈x〉−−−−−→ Cr[P | {M/x}] ≡ A′r. Then we know thatAr ≡ νx.Cr[a〈x〉.P |
{M/x}] νx.a〈x〉−−−−−→o Cr[P | {M/x}] ≡ A′r.
(d) α is a〈c〉. We have Ar ≡ Cr[a〈c〉.P ] a〈c〉−−→ Cr[P ] ≡ A′r. Then we know that Ar
a〈c〉−−→o A′r.
(e) α is νc.a〈c〉. We have Ar ≡ νc.Cr[a〈c〉.P ] νc.a〈c〉−−−−→ Cr[P ] ≡ A′r. Then we know that Ar
νc.a〈c〉−−−−→o A′r.
Corollary 7. Assume α is not a〈x〉 and Ar, A′r are closed.
1. If Ar
α=⇒o A′r then there is a closed A′′r such that Ar α=⇒ A′′r ≡o A′r.
2. If Ar
α=⇒ A′r then either Ar ≡o A′r(only possible when α is τ ) or Ar α=⇒o A′r.
Proof. Using Lemma 7 several times.
Theorem 5. ≈o coincides with ≈.
Proof. 1. (=⇒) We construct a set S of pairs of closed extended processes such that
S = { (Ar, Br) | Ar ≡o≈o≡o Br }
and show S ⊆≈. Assume (Ar, Br) ∈ S because of Ar ≡o D1,r ≈o D2,r ≡o Br for some closed extended processes
D1,r and D2,r.
(a) Assume Ar =⇒ A′r. Using Corollary 7, we have Ar =⇒o A′r or Ar ≡o A′r. When Ar =⇒o A′r, we have
D1,r =⇒o A′r. By the definition of ≈o, there exists D′2,r such that D2,r =⇒o D′2,r ≈o A′r. Using Corollary 7
again gives a B′r such that Br =⇒ B′r ≡o D′2,r. Hence (A′r, B′r) ∈ S. When Ar ≡o A′r, let B′r = Br. Then
Br =⇒ B′r and A′r ≡o Ar ≡o≈o≡o Br = B′r. Hence (A′r, B′r) ∈ S.
(b) If Ar ⇓a, then by Corollary 7, we have Ar ⇓oa. From D1,r ≡o Ar, we have D1,r ⇓oa. From D1,r ≈o D2,r, we have
D2,r ⇓oa. From D2,r ≡o Br, we have Br ⇓oa. Using Corollary 7 again, we have Br ⇓a.
(c) Since ≡o and ≈o are both closed by evaluation contexts, we have Cr[Ar] ≡o Cr[D1,r] ≈o Cr[D2,r] ≡o Cr[Br],
namely (Cr[Ar], Cr[Br]) ∈ S for any evaluation context Cr.
2. (⇐=) We construct a set R of pairs of closed extended processes such that
R = { (Ar, Br) | Ar ≡o≈≡o Br }
and show that R ⊆≈o. Assume (Ar, Br) ∈ S because of Ar ≡o D1,r ≈ D2,r ≡o Br for some closed extended
processes D1,r and D2,r.
(a) Assume Ar
τ=⇒o A′r. Then we have D1,r =⇒o A′r. Using Corollary 7, there exists D′1,r such that D1,r =⇒
D′1,r ≡o A′r. By the definition of ≈, there exists D′2,r such that D2,r =⇒ D′2,r ≈ D′1,r. Using Corollary 7, it gives
D2,r =⇒o D′2,r or D2,r ≡o D′2,r. Since Br ≡o D2,r, we have Br =⇒o D′2,r or Br ≡o D′2,r. In the former case,
let B′r = D
′
2,r and in the latter case let B
′
r = Br. We have (A
′
r, B
′
r) ∈ R.
(b) If Ar ⇓oa, then D1,r ⇓oa. Then by Corollary 7, we have D1,r ⇓a. From D1,r ≈ D2,r, we have D2,r ⇓a. Using
Corollary 7 again, we have D2,r ⇓oa. From D2,r ≡o Br, we have Br ⇓oa.
(c) Since ≡o and ≈ are both closed by evaluation contexts, we have Cr[Ar] ≡o Cr[D1,r] ≈ Cr[D2,r] ≡o Cr[Br],
namely (Cr[Ar], Cr[Br]) ∈ R for any evaluation context Cr.
Theorem 6. ≈l,o coincides with ≈l.
Proof. 1. (=⇒) We construct the set S of pairs of closed extended processes such that
S = { (Ar, Br) | Ar ≡o≈l,o≡o Br }
and show S ⊆≈l. Assume (Ar, Br) ∈ S because of Ar ≡o Cr ≈l,o Dr ≡o Br for some closed extended processes
Cr and Dr. For the static equivalence part, although ≡o has the rule REPL while ≡ does not, the rewriting C[!Pr] ≡o
C[Pr |!Pr] does not change the frames of processes, i.e. φ(C[!Pr]) = φ(C[Pr |!Pr]). Thus φ(Cr) ≡o νn˜.σ implies
φ(Ar) ≡ νn˜.σ, and similarly φ(Dr) ≡o νm˜.σ′ implies φ(Br) ≡ νm˜.σ′. Hence Ar ∼ Br holds by the definition of
∼.
Now assume Ar
α−→ A′r with fv(α) ⊆ dom(Ar) and bn(α) ∩ fn(Br) = ∅. By Lemma 7, we have Ar α−→o A′r or
Ar ≡o A′r.
When Ar
α−→o A′r, we have Cr α−→o A′r. By the definition of ≈l,o, there exists D′r such that Dr bα=⇒o D′r ≈l,o A′r. By
Corollary 7, there exists B′r such that Br
bα=⇒ B′r ≡o D′r. Hence (A′r, B′r) ∈ S.
When Ar ≡o A′r, from the proof of Lemma 7, we can know that this could happen only when α is τ . In this case, let
B′r = Br. Then Br =⇒ B′r and A′r ≡o Ar ≡o≈l,o≡o Br = B′r. Hence (A′r, B′r) ∈ S.
2. (⇐=) We construct the set R of pairs of closed extended processes such that
R = { (Ar, Br) | ∃ {z˜} ⊆ dom(Ar) : Ar | {z˜/y˜} ≡o≈l≡o Br | {z˜/y˜}
for any pairwise-distinct y˜ s.t. {y˜} ∩ dom(Ar) = ∅ and | y˜ | = | z˜ | }
and show that R ⊆≈l,r. Note that when Ar ≈l Br, {z˜} is chosen to be empty. Assume (Ar, Br) ∈ R. Then there
exist closed extended processes Cr, Dr and variables z˜ such that Ar | {z˜/y˜} ≡o Cr ≈l Dr ≡o Br | {z˜/y˜} for any
pairwise-distinct y˜.
(a) For the static equivalence part, assume (M = N)φ(Ar) with var(M,N) ⊆ dom(Ar). As argued in 1, φ(Cr) ≡
φ(Ar | {z˜/y˜}) = φ(Ar) | {z˜/y˜} and φ(Dr) ≡ φ(Br | {z˜/y˜}) = φ(Br) | {z˜/y˜}. Since {y˜} ∩ var(M,N) = ∅,
we have (M = N)φ(Cr). From φ(Cr) ∼ φ(Dr), we obtain (M = N)φ(Dr). Now we show (M = N)φ(Br). To
this end, assume φ(Dr) ≡ νn˜.σ and Mσ =Σ Nσ. Then φ(Br) | {z˜/y˜} ≡ νn˜.σ ≡ νn˜.σ∗ and Mσ∗ =Σ Nσ∗(=Σ
is preserved by application of σ). Let σ′ = σ∗|dom(Br). Since {y˜} ∩ fv(Br) = ∅ and {z˜} ⊆ dom(Br), we have
φ(Br) ≡ νy˜.(φ(Br) | {z˜/y˜}) ≡ νy˜.νn˜.σ∗ ≡ νn˜.σ′. Furthermore, since Mσ′ = Mσ∗, Nσ∗ = Nσ′ and
Mσ∗ =Σ Nσ∗, we have Mσ′ =Σ Nσ′. Thus (M = N)φ(Br) holds, hence Ar ∼o Br.
(b) Assume Ar
α−→o A′r. We need to show that there exists B′r such that Br α=⇒o B′r and (A′r, B′r) ∈ R. Consider the
normalized derivation of transition of Ar
α−→o A′r. We distinguish two cases depending on whether α is a〈x〉 or
not.
i. α is not a〈x〉. We can safely assume {y˜} ∩ bv(α) = ∅ since y˜ are arbitrary. From Ar α−→o A′r, by PAR in
[3], we know that Cr ≡o Ar | {z˜/y˜} α−→o A′r | {z˜/y˜} = C ′′r . Using Corollary 7, there exists C ′r such that
Cr
α=⇒ C ′r ≡o C ′′r . By hypothesis Cr ≈l Dr, there exists D′r such that Dr bα=⇒ D′r and C ′r ≈l D′r. Using
Corollary 7, we have Dr
bα=⇒o D′r or Dr ≡o D′r.
We first check the case Dr
bα=⇒o D′r. From C ′r ≡o C ′′r , we have (z˜ = y˜)φ(C ′r), hence also (z˜ = y˜)φ(D′r). In
other words, there exists B′r such that D
′
r ≡o B′r | {z˜/y˜} with {y˜}∩ fv(B′r) = ∅ (otherwise we can substitute
them with the corresponding variables in z˜). Adding restrictions νy˜ to Br | {z˜/y˜} ≡o Dr bα=⇒o D′r ≡o B′r |
{z˜/y˜}, we have Br bα=⇒o B′r. From A′r | {z˜/y˜} ≡o C ′r ≈l D′r ≡o B′r | {z˜/y˜}, we know that (A′r, B′r) ∈ R.
For the case when Dr ≡o D′r, from the proof of Lemma 7, we can know that Dr ≡o D′r could happen only
when α is τ . Let B′r = Br. Then we have Br =⇒o B′r and A′r | {z˜/y˜} ≡o C ′r ≈l D′r ≡o Dr ≡o B′r | {z˜/y˜}.
Thus (A′r, B
′
r) ∈ R.
ii. α is a〈x〉. In this case Ar ≡o C[a〈x〉.Pr] a〈x〉−−−→o C[Pr] ≡o A′r with x /∈ bv(C). Choose a fresh y′, then we
have Cr ≡o νy′.C[a〈y′〉.Pr | {x/y′}] | {z˜/y˜} νy
′.a〈y′〉−−−−−−→o C[Pr | {x/y′}] | {z˜/y˜} ≡o C[Pr] | {z˜, x/y˜, y′} ≡o
A′r | {z˜, x/y˜, y′} since x is a free variable. From Lemma 7, there exists a closed C ′r such that Cr
νy′.a〈y′〉
=⇒
C ′r ≡o A′r | {z˜, x/y˜, y′}. By Cr ≈l Dr, there exists D′r such that Dr
νy′.a〈y′〉
=⇒ D′r ≈l C ′r.
Assume φ(Ar) ≡o νm˜.σ. Then φ(Cr) ≡o νm˜.σ | {z˜, x/y˜, y′} ≡o νm˜.(σ ∪ {z˜σ, xσ/y˜, y′}). Hence (z˜, x =
y˜, y′)φ(C ′r).
4 Since φ(C ′r) ∼ φ(D′r), we obtain (z˜, x = y˜, y′)φ(D′r). Thus there exists B′r such that D′r ≡o
B′r | {z˜, x/y˜, y′} with fv(B′r) ∩ {y˜, y′} = ∅. Moreover Br ≡o νy˜.(Br | {z˜/y˜}) ≡ νy˜.Dr
νy′.a〈y′〉
=⇒ νy˜.D′r ≡o
B′r | {x/y′}. Hence Br ⇒ νy′.C′[a〈y′〉.Qr]
νy′.a〈y′〉−−−−−−→ C′[Qr] ⇒ B′r | {x/y′} for some evaluation context
C′. Since static equivalence is closed under reduction (Lemma 1 in [3]), C′[Qr] ∼ B′r | {x/y′}. Moreover,
since Qr is a plain process which does not contain any active substitution, that is to say C′ can rewrite y′ with
x. Hence we have C′[a〈x〉.Qr] ≡o C′[a〈y′〉.Qr] which implies νy′.C′[a〈x〉.Qr] ≡o νy′.C′[a〈y′〉.Qr]. Hence
4 (ez = ey)φ(C′r) abbreviates (z1 = y1)φ(Cr), · · · (zn = yn)φ(C′r)
Br ≡o νy′.C′[a〈x〉.Qr] a〈x〉=⇒o νy′.C′[Qr] ⇒ νy′.(B′r | {x/y′}) ≡o B′r. Since A′r | {z˜, x/y˜, y′} ≡o C ′r ≈l
D′r ≡o B′r | {z˜, x/y˜, y′}, and y˜ and y′ are arbitrary, we have that (A′r, B′r) ∈ R.
Proofs of Theorem 3 and Corollary 1 In the previous Section 3.3, we define function T to transform an extended process
in applied pi to a pure extended process, namely a extended process with no cell name, in stateful applied pi. In this
section, we shall prove that this transformation function T keeps both observational equivalence and labelled bisimilarity,
i.e. Theorem 3 in Section 3.3. For the sake of reader, we recall the definition for T here:
T (0) = (∅, ∅) T (νx.Ar) = νn˜.(σ,P)
if T (Ar) = νn˜.(σ ∪ {M/x} ,P)
T ({M/x}) = ({M/x} , ∅) T (νn.Ar) = νn.T (Ar)
T (A1r | A2r) = νn˜1, n˜2.((σ1 ∪ σ2)∗, (P1 ∪ P2)(σ1 ∪ σ2)∗)
if T (Air) = νn˜i.(σi,Pi) for i = 1, 2
T (Ar) = (∅, {Ar}) in all other cases of Ar
Lemma 8. If Ar ≡ Br then T (Ar) ' T (Br).
Proof. Considering the normalised derivation of Ar ≡ Br. The proof goes by induction on the number of derivation.
Assume Ar ≡ C[D1r ] ≡1 C[D2r ] = Br. By induction hypothesis, we have T (Ar) ' T (C[D1r ]). We can easily check the
structural equivalence D1r ≡1 D2r defined in Figure 4 satisfies T (D1r) ' T (D2r). Thus we have T (C[D1r ]) ' T (C[D2r ]).
Finally we have T (Ar) ' T (Br).
Lemma 9. Let Cr be an evaluation context in which bound names and bound variables are pairwise-distinct and different
from the free ones in Cr. Let x˜ be a tuple of pairwise-distinct variables such that the hole is in the scope of an occurrence
of νx in Cr. Then T (Cr) = νn˜.(σc\ex-,Pc-) for some n˜, σc,Pc.
For any extended process Ar such that Cr[Ar] is an extended process, if T (Ar) = νm˜.(σa,Pa) for some of names m˜
with {m˜} ∩ (n˜ ∪ fn(Cr)) = ∅ and some Pa, then
T (Cr[Ar]) = νn˜, m˜.((σc ∪ σa)∗\ex, (Pc ∪ Pa)(σc ∪ σa)∗)
As a corollary, when Ar is closed, we have T (Cr) = νn˜.(σc-,Pc-) for some n˜, σc,Pc and.
T (Cr[Ar]) = νn˜, m˜.(σcσa ∪ σa\ex,Pcσa ∪ Pa).
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the structure of Cr.
1. In the base case Cr = -, we have n˜ = ∅, σ1 = ∅ and P1 = ∅. The conclusion holds trivially.
2. Assume Cr = νl.C′r, by induction hypothesis, we have
(a) T (C′r) = νn˜1.(σ1\ex-,P1-) for some n˜1, σ1,P1;
(b) for any Ar with T (Ar) = νm˜.(σa,Pa), we have T (C′r[Ar]) = νn˜1, m˜.((σ1 ∪σa)∗\ex, (P1 ∪Pa)(σ1 ∪σa)∗) where
x˜ is the variables such that the hole in C′r is in the scope of νx.
Then we have T (νl.C′r) = νl, n˜1.(σ1\ex-,P1-) and T (νl.C′r[Ar]) = νl, n˜1, m˜.((σ1 ∪ σa)∗\ex, (P1 ∪ Pa)(σ1 ∪ σa)∗).
3. Assume Cr = νz.C′r, By induction hypothesis, we have
(a) T (C′r) = νn˜.(σ1\ex-,P1-) for some n˜, σ1,P1;
(b) for any Ar with T (Ar) = νm˜.(σa,Pa), we have T (C′r[Ar]) = νn˜, m˜.((σ1 ∪ σa)∗\ex, (P1 ∪ Pa)(σ1 ∪ σa)∗) and x˜
is the variables such that the hole in C′r is in the scope of νx.
Then we have T (νz.C′r) = νn˜.(σ1\ex,z-,P1-) and T (νz.C′r[Ar]) = νn˜, m˜.((σ1 ∪ σa)∗\ex,z, (P1 ∪ Pa)(σ1 ∪ σa)∗).
4. Assume Cr = C′r | Br, then T (Cr) = T (C′r | Br). By induction hypothesis, we have
(a) T (C′r) = νn˜1.(σ1\ex-,P1-) for some n˜1, σ1,P1;
(b) for any Ar with T (Ar) = νm˜.(σa,Pa), we have T (C′r[Ar]) = νn˜1, m˜.((σ1 ∪σa)∗\ex, (P1 ∪Pa)(σ1 ∪σa)∗) where
x˜ is the variables such that the hole in C′r is in the scope of νx.
Let T (Br) = νn˜2.(σ2,P2). Then T (Cr | Br) = νn˜1, n˜2.((σ1\ex ∪ σ2)∗-, (P1 ∪ P2)(σ1\ex ∪ σ2)∗-). And T (C′r[Ar] |
Br) = νn˜1, n˜2, m˜.(((σ1∪σa)∗\ex∪σ2)∗, ((P1∪Pa)(σ1∪σa)∗∪P2)((σ1∪σa)∗\ex∪σ2)∗). Since the variable restricted
by νx˜ cannot occur in Br and the domains of σ1, σ2, σa are pairwise disjoint and these substitutions are all cycle-free,
we can see that the order of iterating the substitutions σ1, σ2, σa does not matter and we can derive that (σ1\ex∪σ2)∗ =
(σ1∪σ2)∗\ex, ((σ1∪σa)∗\ex∪σ2)∗ = ((σ1∪σa)∗∪σ2)∗\ex, and ((σ1∪σa)∗∪σ2)∗ = ((σ1∪σ2)∗∪σa)∗ = (σ1∪σ2∪σa)∗.
Since x˜ do not occur in P1,P2, we have T (Cr | Br) = νn˜1, n˜2.((σ1 ∪σ2)∗\ex-, (P1 ∪P2)(σ1 ∪σ2)∗-). And T (C′r[Ar] |
Br) = νn˜1, n˜2, m˜.(((σ1 ∪ σa)∗ ∪ σ2)∗\ex, ((P1 ∪ Pa)(σ1 ∪ σa)∗ ∪ P2)((σ1 ∪ σa)∗\ex ∪ σ2)∗) = νn˜1, n˜2, m˜.(((σ1 ∪
σ2)∗ ∪ σa)∗\ex, ((P1 ∪Pa)(σ1 ∪ σ2 ∪ σa)∗ ∪P2(σ1 ∪ σ2 ∪ σa)∗) = νn˜1, n˜2, m˜.(((σ1 ∪ σ2)∗ ∪ σa)∗\ex, ((P1 ∪P2)(σ1 ∪
σ2)∗ ∪ Pa)((σ1 ∪ σ2)∗ ∪ σa)∗).
When Ar is closed, the active substititons in Cr will not be applied to Ar, the proof is similar to the above general case.
Lemma 10. If Ar
α−→ A′r with fv(Ar) ∩ bv(α) = ∅, then T (Ar) α=⇒ B ' T (A′r) for some B.
Proof. Consider the normalized derivation of transition of Ar
α−→ A′r. We only take the case when α = a〈c〉 as an example
here and the other cases are similar. Assume Ar ≡ C[a〈c〉.Pr] a〈c〉−−→ C[Pr] ≡ A′r and T (C) = νn˜.(σ\ex-,P-). By Lemma 8
and Lemma 9, we have that
T (Ar) ' νn˜.(σ\ex, {a〈c〉.Prσ} ∪ P) a〈c〉−−→ νn˜.(σ\ex, {Prσ} ∪ P)
Let T (Pr) = νm˜.(∅,Q) for some m˜,Q. From C[Pr] ≡ A′r, using Lemma 8 and Lemma 9, we have T (A′r) ' T (C[Pr]) =
νn˜, m˜.(σ,Qσ∪P). For a plain process Pr, the function T only pulls the name binders to the top level and split the parallel
composition, thus we can see that T (Ar) ' νn˜.(σ\ex, {a〈c〉.Prσ}∪P) a〈c〉−−→ νn˜.(σ\ex, {Prσ}∪P) =⇒ νn˜, m˜.(σ\ex,Qσ∪
P) = T (C[Pr]) ' T (A′r). That is to say there exist A and A′ such that T (Ar) ' A
a〈c〉
=⇒ A′ ' T (A′r). By Corollary 4,
there exists B such that T (Ar) a〈c〉=⇒ B ' A′ ' T (A′r). This concludes the proof.
Corollary 8. If Ar
α=⇒ A′r with fv(A) ∩ bv(α) = ∅, then T (Ar) α=⇒ B ' T (A′r) for some B.
Proof. Using Corollary 4 and Lemma 10 several times.
Lemma 11. If T (Ar) = νn˜(σ, {Pi}i) then Ar ≡ νn˜.(σ |
∏
i Pi).
Proof. We proceed induction on the definition of T . The interesting cases are Ar | Br and νx.Ar while the other cases
are trivial. For parallel composition Ar | Br, by induction hypothesis, we know Ar ≡ νn˜.(σ1 |
∏
i Pi) and Br ≡
νm˜.(σ2 |
∏
j Qj) where T (Ar) = νn˜.(σ1, {Pi}i) and T (Br) = νm˜.(σ2, {Qj}j). Let σ = (σ1 ∪ σ2)∗. From the
definition of T , we have T (Ar | Br) = νn˜, m˜.(σ,P1σ ∪ P2σ). Note that applying active substitutions until reaching
idempotemce keeps structural equivalence. From structural equivalence, we can deduce that Ar | Br ≡ νn˜.(σ1 |
∏
i Pi) |
νm˜.(σ2 |
∏
j Qj) ≡ νn˜.νm˜.(σ1 |
∏
i Pi | σ2 |
∏
j Qj) ≡ νn˜.νm˜.(σ |
∏
i Piσ |
∏
j Qjσ). The result holds for
parallel composition. For the case T (νx.Ar) = νn˜.(σ, {Pi}i) where T (Ar) = νn˜.(σ ∪ {M/x} , {Pi}i), by induction
hypothesis we have Ar ≡ νn˜.(σ | {M/x} |
∏
i Pi). Since Pi are applied, x will not occur in σ or Pi. Hence we have
νx.Ar ≡ νx.νn˜.(σ | {M/x} |
∏
i Pi) ≡ νn˜.(σ |
∏
i Pi) and T (νx.Ar) = νn˜.(σ, {Pi}i).
Lemma 12. If T (Ar) ' νn˜(σ, {Pi}i) then Ar ≡ νn˜.(σ |
∏
i Pi).
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the number of rewriting steps of '. When the number is zero, it is Lemma 11.
Assume T (Ar) ' νm˜(σ′, {P ′i}i) '1 νn˜(σ, {Pi}i). By induction hypothesis Ar ≡ νm˜.(σ′ |
∏
i P
′
i ). According to
Definition 6, we can easily see that νm˜.(σ′ |∏i P ′i ) ≡ νn˜.(σ |∏i Pi). Hence Ar ≡ νn˜.(σ |∏i Pi).
Lemma 13. If Ar is closed and T (Ar) α−→ A with fv(α) ⊆ dom(T (Ar)). Then there exists a closed A′r such that
Ar
α=⇒ A′r and T (A′r) ' A.
Proof. We take the case for the expansion of replication as the example here. The other cases are similar.
Assume T (Ar) = νn˜.(σ, {Qi}i ∪ {!Pr}) τ−→ νn˜.(σ, {Qi}i ∪ {!Pr, Pr}) = A. By Lemma 12, we have Ar ≡ νn˜.(σ |
!Pr |
∏
iQi). Hence Ar ≡ νn˜.(σ |!Pr |
∏
iQi)
τ−→ νn˜.(σ | Pr |!Pr |
∏
iQi) = A
′
r. Assume T (Pr) = νm˜.(∅,Q)
for some m˜,Q. Since T only pulls out name binders and split parallel compositions for Pr, we can see that T (A′r) =
νn˜, m˜.(σ, {Qi}i ∪ {!Pr} ∪ Q) ' A. Since Ar is closed, we know that T (Ar), A and A′r are also closed.
Corollary 9. If Ar is closed and T (Ar) α=⇒ A with fv(α) ⊆ dom(T (Ar)). Then there exists a closed A′r such that
Ar
α=⇒ A′r and T (A′r) ' A.
Proof. By repeated applications of Lemma 13 and Corollary 4.
Lemma 14. Static equivalence ≈s on pure extended processes is closed under '.
Proof. Since ≈s is symmetric, it is sufficient to prove ≈s' ⊆ ≈s. The proof goes by induction on the length of derivation
sequence for '. When the length is 0, the result holds trivially. For the inductive step, w.l.o.g., we may assume A ≈s A′ '
B '1 C. By the induction hypothesis, we have A ≈s B. Now we show A ≈s C. We can easily check A ≈s C holds for
the cases when the rewriting B '1 C is on restricted names or parallel composition. For the term rewriting case, assume
B = νn˜.(σ {M/z} ,P {M/z}) '1 νn˜.(σ {N/z} ,P {N/z}) = C and M =Σ N . Then for each x ∈ dom(A) we have
σ {M/z} (x) =Σ σ {N/z} (x). Let A = νm˜.(σ′,P ′). Since A ≈s B, for any N1, N2 with name(N1, N2) ∩ {n˜, m˜} = ∅,
N1σ
′ =Σ N2σ′ iff N1σ {M/z} =Σ N2σ {M/z}. Since M =Σ N , N1σ {M/z} =Σ N1σ {N/z} and N2σ {M/z} =Σ
N2σ {N/z}. Thus N1σ′ =Σ N2σ′ iff N1σ {N/z} =Σ N2σ {N/z}. Therefore A ≈s C.
The transformation function ≈s preserves static equivalence.
Lemma 15. Let Ar and Br be two closed extended processes. Then Ar ≈s Br iff T (Ar) ≈s T (Br).
Proof. Let T (Ar) = νn˜1.(σ1,P1) and T (Br) = νn˜2.(σ2,P2). According to the definition of T , we can see that φ(Ar) ≡
νn˜1.σ1. Whenever φ(Ar) ≡ νm˜.σ, we have that νn˜1.σ1 ≡ νm˜.σ. Using Lemma 8, we have νn˜1.σ1 ' νm˜.σ∗.
1. (⇐=) Let M,N be two arbitrary terms with var(M,N) ⊆ dom(Ar) and Mσ =Σ Nσ for some φ(Ar) ≡ νm˜.σ.
Since =Σ is closed under the application of substitutions, we haveMσ∗ =Σ Nσ∗. From νn˜2.σ2 ≈s νn˜1.σ1 ' νm˜.σ∗.
By Lemma 14, we have νn˜2.σ2 ≈s νm˜.σ∗. That is to say Mσ2 =Σ Nσ2. From φ(Br) ≡ νn˜2.σ2, we know Ar ∼ Br.
2. (=⇒) Let M,N be two arbitrary terms. Assume Mσ1 =Σ Nσ1. We need to show Mσ2 =Σ Nσ2. Since νn˜1.σ1 ≡
φ(Ar). By the hypothesis Ar ∼ Br, there exist m˜, σ such that φ(Br) ≡ νm˜.σ and Mσ =Σ Nσ. Since =Σ is closed
under substitution, it holds that Mσ∗ =Σ Nσ∗. From νm˜.σ∗ ' νn˜2.σ2. By Lemma 14 we obtain νm˜.σ∗ ≈s νn˜2.σ2.
Hence Mσ2 =Σ Nσ2. Thus T (Ar) ≈s T (Br).
The following proposition states that transformation T keeps labelled bisimilarity.
Proposition 3. Ar ≈l Br if and only if T (Ar) ≈l T (Br).
Proof. 1. (⇐=) We construct a set R on closed extended processes thus
R = { (Ar, Br) | T (Ar) ' ≈l' T (Br) }.
We show R ⊆≈l. Suppose T (Ar) ' C ≈l D ' T (Br). In combination with Lemma 15 and Lemma 14 we obtain
the static equivalence part Ar ≈s Br immediately. We are left to show the agreement between transitions. Suppose
Ar
α−→ A′r with fv(α) ⊆ dom(Ar). Clearly Ar, A′r, C,D are all closed. From Lemma 10 and Corollary 3, there exists
C ′ such that C α=⇒ C ′ ' T (A′r), where C ′ is closed because C is closed and fv(α) ⊆ dom(C) = dom(Ar). From
D ≈l C, there exists D′ such that D bα=⇒ D′ ≈l C ′. By Corollary 4 and Corollary 9 we can deduce that there exists a
closed B′r such that Br
bα=⇒ B′r and T (B′r) ' D′. Hence (A′r, B′r) ∈ R.
2. (=⇒) This direction is proved by constructing a set S on closed processes thus
S = { (A,B) | A ' T (Ar), Ar ≈l Br, T (Br) ' B }.
We show S ⊆≈l. First, A ≈s B follows from Lemma 15 and Lemma 14. Suppose A α−→ A′. By Corollary 3 we have
T (Ar) α=⇒ A1 ' A′. By Lemma 13 we have Ar α−→ A′r and T (A′r) ' A1 ' A′. Since Ar ≈l Br, there is some B′r
such that Br
α=⇒ B′r ≈l A′r. By Corollary 8 and Corollary 4 we have B α=⇒ B′ ' T (B′r). Hence (A′, B′) ∈ S.
Now we start to prove that transformation T keeps observational equivalence. Recall that on closed pure extended
processes, the observational equivalence≈e is defined exactly the same as in Definition 1 except that the evaluation context
is pure, that is, the context does not contain any cell name.
Lemma 16. Assume two closed pure extended processes A,B. If A ≈e B then A\ez ≈e B\ez for any variables z˜ ⊆
dom(A).
Proof. We construct a setR as follows
R = { (A\ez, B\ez) | A ≈e B, z˜ ⊆ dom(A) }
and we will prove that R ⊆≈ . For the part related to ⇓a and =⇒, we can easily see that removing or adding any active
substitutions does not affect ⇓a or =⇒. For any evaluation context C, we can safely assume that fv(C) ∩ z˜ = ∅. Otherwise
we can choose fresh variables x˜ and let % = {x˜/z˜} and have A\ez = %(A)\ex, B\ez = %(B)\ex, %(A) ≈e %(B). Thus we have
C[A\ez] = C[A]\ez , C[B\ez] = C[B]\ez and C[A] ≈e C[B]. Finally (C[A\ez], C[B\ez]) ∈ R.
Lemma 17. If A ' B with A,B are closed pure extended processes. Then C[A]\ez ' C[B]\ez for any closing pure evalua-
tion context C and z˜ ⊆ dom(A,B).
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the length of proof sequence for'. When the length is 0, the result holds trivially. For
the inductive step, w.l.o.g., we assumeA ' D '1 B. As stated before, we can safely assume thatD is closed. By the induc-
tion hypothesis, we have C[A]\ez ' C[D]\ez . Now we will show C[D]\ez ' C[B]\ez . If the rewritingD '1 B is about restricted
names or parallel composition, the conclusion clearly holds. Assume the rewriting is D = νm˜.(σ {M/x} ,P {M/x}) '
νm˜.(σ {N/x} ,P {N/x}) = B with M =Σ N . Let C = νn˜.(σ′,P ′). We can safely assume that x is fresh (oth-
erwise we can use α-conversion). Then C[D]\ez = νn˜.νm˜.(σ′σ {M/x} ∪ σ\ez {M/x} ,P {M/x} ∪ P ′σ {M/x}) '
νn˜.νm˜.(σ′σ {N/x} ∪ σ\ez {N/x} ,P {N/x} ∪ P ′σ {N/x}) = C[B]\ez . By transition, we get C[A]\ez ' C[B]\ez .
Proposition 4. Ar ≈ Br implies T (Ar) ≈e T (Br).
Proof.
S = { (A,B) | A ' T (Ar), Ar ≈ Br, T (Br) ' B }
1. First we show that A ⇓a implies B ⇓a. By Corollary 4 and Corollary 9, we can see that Ar ⇓a. From Ar ≈ Br, we
have Br ⇓a. Then from Corollary 9 and Corollary 4, we have that B ⇓a.
2. Assume A =⇒ A′ then we will show that there exists B′ such that B =⇒ B′ and (A′, B′) ∈ S . By Corollary 4 and
Corollary 9, we have Ar =⇒ A′r with T (A′r) ' A′. From Ar ≈ Br, there exists B′r such that Br =⇒ B′r ≈ A′r. By
Corollary 8 and Corollary 4, we know that there exists B′ such that B =⇒ B′ ' T (B′r). Hence (A′, B′) ∈ S.
3. For any C we need to show that (C[A], C[B]) ∈ S . Assume C = νl˜.(σ, {Pi}i). Let Cr = νl˜.(σ |
∏
i Pi | [·]). Then
we can easily see that T (Cr[Ar]) = C[T (Ar)] and T (Cr[Br]) = C[T (Br)]. Since A ' T (Ar) and B ' T (Br),
by Lemma 17, we have C[A] ' C[T (Ar)] = T (Cr[Ar]) and C[B] ' C[T (Br)] = T (Cr[Br]). Since ≈ is closed by
evaluation context, namely Cr[Ar] ≈ Cr[Br], we know that (C[A], C[B]) ∈ S.
Proposition 5. For two closed extended processes Ar and Br in applied pi calculus [3], T (Ar) ≈e T (Br) implies Ar ≈
Br.
Proof. We construct the following set
R = { (Ar, Br) | T (Ar) '≈e' T (Br) }.
and we will show thatR ⊆≈. Assume T (Ar) ' A ≈e B ' T (Br).
1. First we prove that Ar ⇓a implies Br ⇓a. By Corollary 8 and Corollary 4, we know that A ⇓a. Since A ≈e B, we have
B ⇓a. By Corollary 4 and Corollary 9 we have that Br ⇓a.
2. Assume Ar =⇒ A′r, we need to show there exists B′r such that Br =⇒ B′r and (A′r, B′r) ∈ R. By Corollary 8 and
Corollary 4, we know A =⇒ A′ such that T (A′r) ' A′. Since A ≈e B, we have B =⇒ B′ ≈e A′. By Corollary 4 and
Corollary 9, there exists B′r such that Br =⇒ B′r and T (B′r) ' B′. Thus (A′r, B′r) ∈ R.
3. For any evaluation context Cr, in case the bound names are not pairwise distinct or different from the free ones, we
can use α-conversion to Cr[Ar] = C′r[%(Ar)], Cr[Br] = C′r[%(Br)]. Then we will have a new sequence T (%(Ar)) =
%(T (Ar)) ' %(A) ≈e %(B) ' %(T (Br)) = T (%(Br)). Hence we assume that the bound names of Cr are not pairwise
distinct or different from the free ones. Assume T (Ar) = νm˜1.(σ1,P1) and T (Br) = νm˜2.(σ2,P2). By Lemma 9, we
have T (Cr) = νl˜1, l˜2.(σ,P), T (Cr[Ar]) = νl˜1, l˜2, m˜1.(σσ1 ∪ σ1\ex,Pσ1 ∪ P1) and T (Cr[Br]) = νl˜1, l˜2, m˜2.(σσ2 ∪
σ2\ex,Pσ1 ∪ P2). Let C = νl˜1, l˜2.(σ,P). Hence T (Cr[Ar]) = C[T (Ar)]\ex and T (Cr[Br]) = C[T (Br)]\ex. Since
C[T (Ar)] ≈e C[T (Br)], by Lemma 16, we have C[T (Ar)]\ex ≈e C[T (Br)]\ex. Hence (Cr[Ar], Cr[Br]) ∈ R.
Theorem 3. For two closed extended processes Ar and Br in applied pi calculus [3],
1. Ar and Br are labelled bisimilar iff T (Ar) ≈l T (Br).
2. Ar and Br are observationally equivalent iff T (Ar) ≈e T (Br);
Proof. This is a direct corollary of Proposition 3, Proposition 4 and Proposition 5.
Corollary 1. Observational equivalence coincides with labelled bisimilarity in applied pi calculus.
Proof. This is a direct corollary of Theorem 1, Theorem 2 and Theorem 3:
Ar and Br are observationally equivalent
iff T (Ar) ≈e T (Br) by Theorem 3 (2)
iff T (Ar) ≈ T (Br) by Theorem 2 and bT (Ar)c = T (Ar) and bT (Br)c = T (Br)
iff T (Ar) ≈l T (Br) by Theorem 1
iff Ar and Br are labelled bisimilar by Theorem 3 (1)
D Proofs for Theorem 4
For two extended processes Ai = νn˜i.(σi, Si,Pi)(i = 1, 2) such that dom(σ1) = dom(σ2) and fs(A1) = fs(A2) and
locks(A1) = locks(A2), we write esc(A1, A2) for the extensible state cells of A1, A2, that is
esc(A1, A2) = { s | s ∈ fs(A1) \ locks(A1),@x ∈ dom(σ1) s.t. S1(s) = xσ1 and S2(s) = xσ2 }
Informally, esc(A1, A2) is a chosen subset of unlocked public state cells of A1, A2 such that the values of those cells
haven’t been extended into substitutions of A1, A2.
Lemma 18. AssumeA1 ≈l A2 whereAi = νn˜i.(σi, Si,Pi) for i = 1, 2. Let {sk}k∈I = esc(A1, A2) and
{
sk 7→M ik
}
k∈I ⊆
Si for some termsM ik. Select fresh variables {zk}k∈I , then νn˜1.(σ1∪
{
M1k/zk
}
k∈I , S1,P1) ≈l νn˜2.(σ2∪
{
M2k/zk
}
k∈I , S2,P2).
Proof. We construct the following set
R = { (νn˜1.(σ1 ∪
{
M1k/zk
}
k∈I , S1,P1), νn˜2.(σ2 ∪
{
M2k/zk
}
k∈I , S2,P2)) |
A1 ≈l A2 where Ai = νn˜i.(σi, Si,Pi) for i = 1, 2, {sk}k∈I = esc(A1, A2),{
sk 7→M ik
}
k∈I ⊆ Si for i = 1, 2, {zk}k∈I are fresh variables }
⋃
≈l
We will prove that R ⊆≈l. Let Bi = νn˜i.(σi ∪
{
M ik/zk
}
k∈I , Si,Pi) for i = 1, 2. According to the definition
of extensible state cells, we can easily see that esc(B1, B2) = esc(A1, A2). Hence we do not need to extend B1, B2
when comparing them for labelled bisimilarity. In other words, B1, B2 are both extensions of A1, A2 and B1, B2. Since
A1 ≈l A2, we have B1 ≈s B2.
Now we proceed to check the behaviour equivalence between B1 and B2.
1. AssumeB1
s:=N−−−→ τ(s)−−→ B′1 with var(N) ⊆ dom(B1) and s public and unlocked. SinceA1 ≈l A2 and their extensions
are B1, B2, we know there exists B′2 such that B2
s:=N−−−→τ(s)=⇒ B′2 ≈l B′1. According to the construction ofR, we know
(B′1, B
′
2) ∈ R.
2. Assume B1
α−→ B′1 with fv(α) ⊆ dom(A1) and bnv(α) ∩ fnv(B2) = ∅. Since A1 ≈l A2 and their extensions
are B1, B2, we know there exists B′2 such that B2
bα=⇒ B′2 ≈l B′1. According to the construction of R, we know
(B′1, B
′
2) ∈ R.
Theorem 7. If A ≈l B then A ≈ B.
Proof. We prove that ≈l is a congruence. We construct the following set:
R = { (C[A1]\ex, C[A2]\ex) | A1 ≈l A2, a closing evaluation context C, x˜ ⊆ dom(A1) }
and prove thatR ⊆≈l.
Assume (C[A1]\ex, C[A2]\ex) ∈ R because of A1 ≈l A2 where C = νn˜.(σ-, S-,P-) and Ai = νn˜i.(σi, Si,Pi) with
i = 1, 2. Assume the extensible state cells esc(C[A1]\ex, C[A2]\ex) = {rk}k∈Ir ∪{sk}k∈Is where {rk}k∈Ir ⊆ dom(S) and{sk}k∈Is ⊆ dom(Si). Assume esc(A1, A2) \ esc(C[A1]\ex, C[A2]\ex) = {tk}k∈It . Intuitively, {tk}k∈It are the extensible
state cells for A1, A2 but become inextensible because of the application of context C.
Select pairwise-distinct fresh variables {zrk}k∈Ir , {zsk}k∈Is , {ztk}k∈It and let σr = {S(rk)/zrk}k∈Ir and σis =
{Si(sk)/zsk}k∈Is and σit = {Si(tk)/ztk}k∈It . Let
ϕi = σi ∪ σis ∪ σit
ϕei = σσi ∪ σrσi ∪ σi\ex ∪ σis
Then we extend process Ai by σis and σ
i
t for i = 1, 2 to
Bi = νn˜, n˜i.(ϕi, Si,Pi)
Since A1 ≈l A2, using Lemma 18, we get B1 ≈l B2. Also we extend process C[Ai]\ex with σrσi ∪ σis for i = 1, 2 to
Di = νn˜, n˜i.(ϕei , Sσi ∪ Si,Pσi ∪ Pi)
Comparing Bi with Di, we can see that C[Bi]\ex,ezt = Di for i = 1, 2.
We first prove the static equivalence D1 ≈s D2. Assume terms N1, N2 with var(N1, N2) ⊆ dom(ϕe1) and N1ϕe1 =Σ
N2ϕ
e
1, we will show that N1ϕ
e
2 =Σ N2ϕ
e
2. We can see that Nkϕ
e
i = Nk(σσi∪σrσi∪σi\ex∪σis) = (Nk(σ∪σr))(σi∪σis)
for k = 1, 2 and i = 1, 2. Since C closes Ai, we can see that var(Nk(σ ∪ σr)) ⊆ dom(ϕi) for k = 1, 2. Thus we
have Nkϕei = (Nk(σ ∪ σr))ϕi. Then we have (N1(σ ∪ σr))ϕ1 =Σ (N2(σ ∪ σr))ϕ1. From B1 ≈s B2, we know that
(N1(σ ∪ σr))ϕ2 =Σ (N2(σ ∪ σr))ϕ2. From Nkϕei = (Nk(σ ∪ σr))ϕi, we know that N1ϕe2 =Σ N2ϕe2. Hence D1 ≈s D2.
Now we proceed to prove the behaviour equivalence.
1. Assume D1
s:=N−−−→ τ(s)−−→ D′1 with var(N) ⊆ dom(D1). We only detail the proof for the case that s is an unlocked
public cell in D1. The analysis for the case when s is locked or bounded is similar. Cell name s comes either from
context, i.e. s ∈ dom(S), or from process A1, i.e. s ∈ dom(S1).
(a) Assume S = S′ ∪ {s 7→M}.Then
D1 = νn˜, n˜1.(ϕe1, S
′σ1 ∪ {s 7→Mσ1} ∪ S1,Pσ1 ∪ P1)
s:=N−−−→ νn˜, n˜1.(ϕe1, S′σ1 ∪ {s 7→ Nϕe1} ∪ S1,Pσ1 ∪ P1)
τ(s)−−→ D′1
i. ifP = P ′∪{(lock s.P, L)}, thenD′1 = νn˜, n˜1.(ϕe1, S′σ1∪{s 7→ Nϕe1}∪S1,P ′σ1∪{(Pσ1, L ∪ {s})}∪P1).
We construct a new evaluation context C′ = νn˜.(σ∪σr-, S′∪{s 7→ N(σ ∪ σr)} -,P ′∪{(P,L ∪ {s})} -). Since
var(N) ⊆ dom(ϕe1), we have var(N(σ∪σr)) ⊆ dom(σi, σis). We can see thatNϕei = (N(σ∪σr))(σi∪σis)
for i = 1, 2. We can verify that D′1 = C′[B1]\ex,ezt and
D2 = νn˜, n˜2.(ϕe2, S
′σ2 ∪ {s 7→Mσ2} ∪ S2,Pσ2 ∪ P2)
s:=N−−−→ νn˜, n˜2.(ϕe2, S′σ2 ∪ {s 7→ Nϕe2} ∪ S2,Pσ2 ∪ P2)
τ(s)−−→ D′2 = C′[B2]\ex,ezt
Thus we have (D′1, D
′
2) ∈ R.
ii. ifP = P ′∪{(read s as y.P, L)}, thenD′1 = νn˜, n˜1.(ϕe1, S′σ1∪{s 7→ Nϕe1}∪S1,P ′σ1∪{((Pσ1) {Nϕe1/y} , L)}∪
P1). Let C′ = νn˜.(σ ∪ σr-, S′ ∪ {s 7→ N(σ ∪ σr)} -,P ′ ∪ {(P {N(σ ∪ σr)/y} , L)} -). The rest of analysis
is similar to case i.
iii. if P = P ′ ∪ {(s := N ′.P, L)}, then D′1 = νn˜, n˜1.(ϕe1, S′σ1 ∪ {s 7→ N ′σ1} ∪ S1,P ′σ1 ∪ {(Pσ1, L)} ∪ P1).
Let C′ = νn˜.(σ ∪ σr-, S′ ∪ {s 7→ N ′} -,P ′ ∪ {(P,L)} -). The rest of analysis is similar to case i.
(b) Assume Si = S′i ∪ {s 7→Mi} with i = 1, 2. Then
D1 = νn˜, n˜1.(ϕe1, Sσ1 ∪ S′1 ∪ {s 7→M1} ,Pσ1 ∪ P1)
s:=N−−−→ D′1 = νn˜, n˜1.(ϕe1, Sσ1 ∪ S′1 ∪ {s 7→ Nϕe1} ,Pσ1 ∪ P1)
τ(s)−−→ D′′1 = νn˜, n˜1.(ϕe1, Sσ1 ∪ S′1 ∪ {s 7→ N1} ,Pσ1 ∪ P ′1)
The transition D′1
τ(s)−−→ D′′1 operates on the cell s which has nothing to do with the context part. So we can have
that
B1 = νn˜, n˜1.(ϕ1, S′1 ∪ {s 7→M1} ,P1)
s:=N(σ∪σr)−−−−−−−−→ C ′1 = νn˜, n˜1.(ϕ1, S′1 ∪ {s 7→ Nϕe1} ,P1)
since (N(σ ∪ σr))ϕ1 = Nϕe1
τ(s)−−→ C ′′1 = νn˜, n˜1.(ϕ1, S′1 ∪ {s 7→M ′1} ,P ′1)
Since A1 ≈l A2, there exists C ′′2 such that
B2 = νn˜2.(ϕ2, S′2 ∪ {s 7→M2} ,P2)
s:=N(σ∪σr)−−−−−−−−→ C ′2 = νn˜2.(ϕ2, S′2 ∪ {s 7→ Nϕe2} ,P2)
since (N(σ ∪ σr))ϕ2 = Nϕe2
τ(s)
=⇒ C ′′2 = νn˜′.(ϕ2, S′′1 ,P ′2)
and C ′′1 ≈l C ′′2 . Applying the context C and removing variables x˜, z˜t,
D2 = C[B2]\ex,ezt =νn˜, n˜2.(ϕe2, Siσi ∪ S′2 ∪ {s 7→M2} ,Pσ1 ∪ P2)
s:=N−−−→ C[C ′2]\ex,ezt = νn˜, n˜2.(ϕe2, Siσi ∪ S′2 ∪ {s 7→ Nϕe2} ,Pσ1 ∪ P2)
τ(s)
=⇒ D′′2 = C[C ′′2 ]\ex,ezt = νn˜, νn˜′.(ϕe2, Siσi ∪ S′′1 ,Pσ1 ∪ P ′′1 )
Thus we have (D′′1 , D
′′
2 ) ∈ R.
2. Assume D1
a(N)−−−→ D′1 with var(N) ⊆ dom(D1). The input action comes either from context part or from the process
part.
(a) Assume P = P ′ ∪ {(a(x).P, L)}.
D1 = νn˜, n˜1.(ϕe1, Sσ1 ∪ S1,P ′σ1 ∪ {(a(x).Pσ1, L)} ∪ P1)
a(N)−−−−→ D′1 = νn˜, n˜1.(ϕe1, Sσ1 ∪ S1,P ′σ1 ∪ {(Pσ1 {Nϕe1/x} , L)} ∪ P1)
We construct a new evaluation context C′ = νn˜.(σ∪σr-, S-,P ′ ∪{(P {N(σ ∪ σr)/x} , L)} -). We can verify that
C′[B1]\ex,ezt = D′1 and D2 a(N)−−−−→ D′2 = C′[B2]\ex,ezt . Thus we have (D′1, D′2) ∈ R.
(b) Assume P1 = P ′1 ∪ {(a(x).P1, L)}
D1 = νn˜, n˜1.(ϕe1, Sσ1 ∪ S1,Pσ1 ∪ P ′1 ∪ {(a(x).P1, L)})
a(N)−−−→ D′1 = νn˜, n˜1.(ϕe1, Sσ1 ∪ S1,Pσ1 ∪ P ′1 ∪ {(P1 {Nϕe1/x} , L)})
And we have the input from B1:
B1 = νn˜1.(ϕ1, S1,P ′1 ∪ {(a(x).P1, L1)})
a(N(σ∪σr))−−−−−−−−→ C1 = νn˜1.(ϕ1, S1,P ′1 ∪ {(P1 {Nϕe1/x} , L1)})
since (N(σ ∪ σr)ϕ1 = Nϕe1
Since A1 ≈l A2, for the extension B2, we should have
B2 = νn˜2.(ϕ2, S2,P2)
=⇒ C3 = νn˜′2.(ϕ2, S′2,P ′2 ∪ {(a(x).P2, L2)})
a(N(σ∪σr))−−−−−−−−→ C4 = νn˜′2, m˜.(ϕ2, S′2,P ′2 ∪ {(P c2 {Nϕe2/x} , L2)})
since (N(σ ∪ σr)ϕ2 = Nϕe2
=⇒ C2 = νn˜′′2 .(ϕ2, S′′2 ,P ′′2 )
Applying context C to the transitions B2 =⇒ C3 and C4 =⇒ C2 and remove the variables x˜, z˜t, we will get
D2 = C[B2]\ex,ezt = νn˜, n˜2.(ϕe2, Sσ2 ∪ S2,Pσ2 ∪ P2)
=⇒ C[C3]\ex,ezt = νn˜, n˜′2.(ϕe2, Sσ2 ∪ S′2,Pσ2 ∪ P ′2 ∪ {(a(x).P2, L2)})
a(N)−−−→ C[C4]\ex,ezt = νn˜, n˜′2.(ϕe2, Sσ2 ∪ S′2,Pσ2 ∪ P ′2 ∪ {(P2 {Nϕe2/x} , L2)})
=⇒ D′2 = C[C2]\ex,ezt = νn˜, n˜′′2 , m˜.(ϕe2, Sσ2 ∪ S′′2 ,Pσ2 ∪ P ′′2 )
Thus we have (D′1, D
′
2) ∈ R.
3. Assume D1
νy.a〈y〉−−−−−→ D′1. The output action comes either from context part or from the process part.
(a) when the output comes from the context, assume P = P ′ ∪ {(a〈N〉.P, L)}.
D1 = νn˜, n˜1.(ϕe1, Sσ1 ∪ S1,P ′σ1 ∪ {(a〈Nσ1〉.Pσ1, L)} ∪ P1)
νy.a〈y〉−−−−−→ D′1 = νn˜, n˜1.(ϕe1 ∪ {Nσ1/y} , Sσ1 ∪ S1,P ′σ1 ∪ {(Pσ1, L)} ∪ P1)
We construct a new evaluation context C′ = νn˜.(σ ∪ σr ∪ {N/y} -, S-,P ′ ∪ {(P,L)} -). We can verify that
C′[B1]\ex,ezt = D′1 and D2 νy.a〈y〉−−−−−→ D′2 = C′[B2]\ex,ezt . Thus we have (D′1, D′2) ∈ R.
(b) when the output comes from the process, assume P1 = P ′1 ∪ {(a〈N1〉.P1, L1)}
D1 = νn˜, n˜1.(ϕe1, Sσ1 ∪ S1,Pσ1 ∪ P ′1 ∪ {(a〈N1〉.P1, L)})
νy.a〈y〉−−−−−→ D′1 = νn˜, n˜1.(ϕe1 ∪ {N1/y} , Sσ1 ∪ S1,Pσ1 ∪ P ′1 ∪ {(P1, L1)})
And we have the output from B1:
B1 = νn˜1.(ϕ1, S1,P ′1 ∪ {(a〈N1〉.P1, L1)})
νy.a〈y〉−−−−−→ C1 = νn˜1.(ϕ1 ∪ {N1/y} , S1,P ′1 ∪ {(P1, L1)})
Since A1 ≈l A2, for the extension B2, we should have
B2 = νn˜2.(ϕ2, S2,P2)
=⇒ C3 = νn˜′2.(ϕ2, S′2,P ′2 ∪ {(a〈N2〉.P2, L2)})
νy.a〈y〉−−−−−→ C4 = νn˜′2.(ϕ2 ∪ {N2/y} , S′2,P ′2 ∪ {(P2, L2)})
=⇒ C2 = νn˜′′2 .(ϕ2 ∪ {N2/y} , S′′2 ,P ′′2 )
Applying context C to the transitions B2 =⇒ C3 and C4 =⇒ C2 and remove the variables x˜, z˜t, we will get
D2 = C[B2]\ex,ezt = νn˜, n˜2.(ϕe2, Sσ2 ∪ S2,Pσ2 ∪ P2)
=⇒ C[C3]\ex,ezt = νn˜, n˜′2.(ϕe2, Sσ2 ∪ S′2,Pσ2 ∪ P ′2 ∪ {(a〈N2〉.P2, L2)})
νy.a〈y〉−−−−−→ C[C4]\ex,ezt = νn˜, n˜′2.(ϕe2 ∪ {N2/y} , Sσ2 ∪ S′2,Pσ2 ∪ P ′2 ∪ {(P2, L2)})
=⇒ D′2 = C[C2]\ex,ezt = νn˜, n˜′′2 .(ϕe2 ∪ {N2/y} , Sσ2 ∪ S′′2 ,Pσ2 ∪ P ′′2 )
Thus we have (D′1, D
′
2) ∈ R.
(c) The analysis for the other cases when α is a〈c〉 or νc.a〈c〉 is similar.
Notations:
1. Recall that given S = S′ ∪ {s 7→M}, we write S(s) for term M .
2. We write unlocks(A) for the set fs(A) \ locks(A), namely the unlocked public state cells.
3. Although A ⇓a is only defined for output action, we can easily test the existence of an input action b(x) by using
evaluation context C = (-, -,{(e, ∅), (b.e)} -) where e is fresh. It is clear that
A can perform an input on channel b if and only if there exists B such that C[A] =⇒ B and B 6⇓e
Hence in the following proof, for notational convenience, we use the traditional notationA ⇓b whenA
=⇒ νn˜.(σ, S,P∪
(b〈M〉.P, L)) with b /∈ n˜, and use A ⇓b when A =⇒ νn˜.(σ, S,P ∪ (b(x).P, L)) with b /∈ n˜.
4. We write A 6⇓γ1··· ,γi,···γn if A 6⇓γ1 · · · , A 6⇓γi , · · ·A 6⇓γn where γi is either ai or ai for some channel name ai.
Lemma 19. Assume A τ−−→ t:=N−−−→ A′ with t ∈ unlocks(A), then A t:=N−−−→ τ−−→ A′.
Proof. Since t is an unlocked public state cell in A, we can see that τ−→ defined in Figure 1 is irrelevant to t. τ−→ is only
related to locked or restricted cells in A. So the conclusion holds obviously.
Corollary 10. Assume A =⇒ t:=N−−−→ A′ with t ∈ unlocks(A), then A t:=N−−−→=⇒ A′.
Proof. Recall that =⇒ is a reflexive and transitive closure of τ−→. We can get this corollary by using Lemma 19 several
times.
Theorem 8. If A ≈ B, then A ≈l B.
Proof. We define a relationR as follows:
R = { (A1, A2) | Ai = νn˜i.(σi, Si,Pi) for i = 1, 2,
there exist pairwise-distinct channel names a˜, b˜, c˜, r˜ead , w˜rite, t˜ag such that Â1 ≈ Â2 }
where
Âi = νc˜, n˜i.
(
σi\W , Si,
Pi ∪ {(aw〈w〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈Si(s)〉, ∅), (tags, ∅), (writes(x). s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈U
)
(2)
with i = 1, 2 and
– W ⊆ dom(A1) and U ⊆ fs(A1) \ locks(A1);
– a˜, b˜, r˜ead , w˜rite, t˜ag are pairwise-distinct channel names and are different from fn(A1, A2, c˜, n˜1, n˜2);
– c˜ ∩ (n˜1 ∪ n˜2) = ∅;
– a˜ = {aw}w∈W and b˜ = {bj}j∈J and c˜ = {cj}j∈J ;
– r˜ead = {reads}s∈U and w˜rite = {writes}s∈U and t˜ag = {tags}s∈U .
The contexts C1, C2 are used to lock the unlocked public state cells while leaving an interface for “reading”(i.e. reads),
and “writing”(i.e. writes) the contents of the cells. The channel name tags is used to mark the moment when the attacker
has already changed the value of cell s and before cell s is unlocked. As before, since the object of input tags(x) is not
important, we omit it and write tags for simplicity.
We show thatR satisfies all the conditions of Definition 5. AssumeA1 R A2 because of Â1 ≈ Â2 whereA1, A2, Â1, Â2
are defined in above Equation (2). According to Definition 5, first of all, we should extend the extended processes A1 and
A2. Let
esc(A1, A2) = U1 ∪ U2
with U1 ⊆ U and U2∩U = ∅. Selecting fresh variables vs for each s ∈ U1∪U2, then we shall do the following extensions:
Bi = νn˜i.(ϕi, Si,Pi)
ϕi = σi ∪ {Si(s)/vs}s∈U1∪U2
for i = 1, 2.
We shall prove that B1 ≈s B2, and if B1 α−→ B′1 (resp. B1 s:=N−−−→
τ(s)−−→ B′1) then there exists B′2 such that B2 bα=⇒ B′2
(resp. B2
s:=N−−−→τ(s)=⇒ B′2) and (B′1, B′2) ∈ R.
1. First we need to prove the static equivalence B1 ≈s B2 . Assume two terms M,N with var(M,N) ⊆ dom(B1)
and Mϕ1 =Σ Nϕ1. We shall prove that Mϕ2 =Σ Nϕ2. We can safely assume that name(M,N) ∩ (n˜1, n˜2) = ∅,
otherwise we can use α-equivalence to change n˜1, n˜2. We construct the following evaluation context C:
C = (-, -, {(e, ∅), (P, V )} -)
P = aw1(xw1) · · · awk(xwk). reads1(zs1) · · · readsn(zsn). read sn+1 as zsn+1 · · · read sn+l as zsn+l .ifMρ = Nρ then e
where {w1, · · · , wk} = W , and {s1, · · · , sn} = U1, and {sn+1, · · · , sn+l} = U2, and V := unlocks(A1) \ U and
ρ = {xw/w}w∈W ∪ {zs/vs}s∈U1∪U2 and e is a fresh channel name.
Apply C to Â1 and then we can do the following transitions:
C[Â1] = νc˜, n˜1.
σ1\W , S1,
P1 ∪ {(aw〈wσ1〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S1(s)〉, ∅), (tags, ∅), (writes(x). s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈U
∪ {(e, ∅), (Pσ1\W , V )}

=⇒ νc˜, n˜1.
(
σ1\W , S1,
P1 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J ∪
{
(tags, ∅), (writes(x). s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})
}
s∈U
∪ {(e, ∅), (if ((Mρ)σ1\W )ρ′ = ((Nρ)σ1\W )ρ′ then e, V )}
)
=⇒ D1 :=
νc˜, n˜1.
(
σ1\W , S1,P1 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J ∪
{
(tags, ∅), (writes(x). s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})
}
s∈U ∪ {(0, V )}
)
where ρ′ = {wσ1/xw}w∈W∪{S1(s)/zs}s∈U1∪U2 . The last step is because ((Mρ)σ1\W )ρ′ =Mϕ1 and ((Nρ)σ1\W )ρ′ =
Nϕ1 and Mϕ1 =Σ Nϕ1. We can see that C[Â1] ⇓aw,bj ,reads,writes,e with w ∈ W, j ∈ J, s ∈ U , while D1 ⇓bj ,writes
with j ∈ J, s ∈ U but D1 6⇓aw,reads,e for any w ∈ W, s ∈ U . Since Â1 ≈ Â2 and ≈ is closed by application of
evaluation context, we have C[Â1] ≈ C[Â2]. Hence there should exist D2 such that C[Â2] =⇒ D2 ≈ D1. Thus we
should have D2 ⇓bj ,writes with j ∈ J, s ∈ U and D2 6⇓aw,reads,e for any w ∈W, s ∈ U . The only possibility for D2 is
that
C[Â2] =⇒νc˜, n˜′2.
(
σ2\W , S
′
2,
P ′2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J ∪
{
(tags, ∅), (writes(x). s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})
}
s∈U
∪ {(e, ∅), (if ((Mρ)σ2\W )ρ′′ = ((Nρ)σ2\W )ρ′′ then e, V )}
)
=⇒D2 =
νc˜, n˜′′2 .
(
σ2\W , S
′′
2 ,P ′′2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J ∪
{
(tags, ∅), (writes(x). s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})
}
s∈U ∪ {(0, V )}
)
where ρ′′ = {wσ2/xw}w∈W ∪ {S2(s)/zs}s∈U1∪U2 . We must have ((Mρ)σ2\W )ρ′′ =Σ ((Nρ)σ2\W )ρ′′, otherwise
we wouldn’t be able to consume e. Similarly we know that ((Mρ)σ2\W )ρ′′ = Mϕ2 and ((Nρ)σ2\W )ρ′′ = Nϕ2.
Hence Mϕ2 =Σ Nϕ2.
2. Now we proceed to prove the behavioural equivalence ofB1 andB2 . Without loss of generality, we assume B1
α−→
B′1 (resp. B1
s:=N−−−→ τ(s)−−→ B′1) and prove that there exists B′2 such that B2 bα=⇒ B′2 (resp. B2 s:=N−−−→τ(s)=⇒ B′2) and
(B′1, B
′
2) ∈ R.
Before we start to analyse the transitions, we need to preprocess Â1 and Â2. Recalling thatB1 andB2 are the extensions
of A1 and A2, correspondingly, we need to “extend” Â1 and Â2 by the following evaluation context Cext :
Cext =
-, -,
{
(es, ∅) ,
(
reads(z).
(
reads〈z〉 | es.avs〈z〉
)
, ∅)}
s∈U1
∪
{
(es, ∅) ,
(
ds(z).
(
reads〈z〉 | es.avs〈z〉
)
, ∅) , (tags, ∅) ,(
read s as y. ds〈y〉.writes(x). s := x. tags.unlock s, {s}
)}
s∈U2
∪ {(ds(z).reads〈z〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅) , (read s as y. ds〈y〉.writes(x). s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈U3
-

where U3 := unlocks(A1) \ (U ∪ U2), and {avs}s∈U1∪U2 and {ds, tags}s∈U2∪U3 and {es}s∈unlocks(A1) are fresh
pairwise-distinct channel names. Intuitively, the context Cext generates “substitutions”(i.e. avs〈z〉) for the values of
state cells s ∈ U1 ∪ U2 and locks all the unlocked public state cells. The use of (es, ∅) for s ∈ U1 ∪ U2 is to make
sure the parallel composition
{
(reads〈z〉 | es.avs〈z〉, ∅)
}
will be split into
{
(reads〈z〉, ∅), (avs〈z〉, ∅)
}
as a result of
the communication between es and es.
Since ≈ is closed under the application of evaluation contexts, we have Cext [Â1] ≈ Cext [Â2]. Then we can have the
following transitions:
Cext [Â1]
= νc˜, n˜1.

σ1\W , S1,
P1 ∪ {(aw〈wσ1〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S1(s)〉, ∅), (tags, ∅), (writes(x). s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈U
∪ {(es, ∅) , (reads(z). (reads〈z〉 | es.avs〈z〉) , ∅)}s∈U1
∪
{
(es, ∅) ,
(
ds(z).
(
reads〈z〉 | es.avs〈z〉
)
, ∅) , (tags, ∅) ,(
read s as y. ds〈y〉.writes(x). s := x. tags.unlock s, {s}
)}
s∈U2
∪ {(ds(z).reads〈z〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅) , (read s as y. ds〈y〉.writes(x). s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈U3

= νc˜, n˜1.

σ1\W , S1,
P1 ∪ {(aw〈wσ1〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S1(s)〉, ∅), (tags, ∅), (writes(x). s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈U\U1
∪
{(
reads〈S1(s)〉, ∅), (tags, ∅), (writes(x). s := x. tags.unlock s, {s}
)
,
(es, ∅) ,
(
reads(z).
(
reads〈z〉 | es.avs〈z〉
)
, ∅)
}
s∈U1
∪
{
(es, ∅) ,
(
ds(z).
(
reads〈z〉 | es.avs〈z〉
)
, ∅) , (tags, ∅) ,(
read s as y. ds〈y〉.writes(x). s := x. tags.unlock s, {s}
)}
s∈U2
∪ {(ds(z).reads〈z〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅) , (read s as y. ds〈y〉.writes(x). s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈U3

=⇒ D1 := νc˜, n˜1.
(
σ1\W , S1,
P1 ∪ {(aw〈wσ1〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S1(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S1(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅) , (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
)
We can see that D1 ⇓aw,aws ,bj ,readt,writet,tagt for w ∈ W, j ∈ J, s ∈ U1 ∪ U2, t ∈ unlocks(A1), while D1 6⇓es,dt
for s ∈ U1 ∪ U2, t ∈ U3. Since Cext [Â1] ≈ Cext [Â2], there exists D2 such that Cext [Â2] =⇒ D2 ≈ D1. The only
possibility for D2 is that:
Cext [Â2] =⇒
D2 := νc˜, n˜′2.
(
σ2\W , S
′
2,
P ′2 ∪ {(aw〈wσ2〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S2(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S2(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅) , (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
)
for some S′2,P ′2. Since reads,writes, es, tags in Cext are fresh names, they will not interact with Â2. Moreover all
the unlocked public state cells in Â2 are locked by Cext , hence the values of these cells won’t be changed during the
transitions. Thus, we can deduce that
B2 =⇒ E := νn˜′2.(σ2\W , S′2,P ′2)
From B1 = νn˜1.(ϕ1, S1,P1) and E = νn˜′2.(ϕ2, S′2,P ′2) and D1 ≈ D2, we can verify that (B1, E) ∈ R.
Now we are ready to analyse each possible transition from B1.
(a) Assume
B1 = νn˜1. (ϕ1, S1,P1) τ−→ B′1 := νn˜′1. (ϕ1, S′1,P ′1)
This internal transition can only involve n˜1, S1,P1, thus we can get the following transition from D1:
D1 = νc˜, n˜1.
(
σ1\W , S1,
P1 ∪ {(aw〈wσ1〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S1(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S1(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅) , (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
)
τ−−→ D′1 :=
νc˜, n˜′1.
(
σ1\W , S
′
1,
P ′1 ∪ {(aw〈wσ1〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S1(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S1(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅) , (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
)
We can see that D′1 ⇓aw,avt ,bj ,reads,tags,writes for w ∈W, t ∈ U1 ∪ U2, j ∈ J, s ∈ unlocks(A1). From D1 ≈ D2,
there should exist D′2 such that D2 =⇒ D′2 ≈ D′1. The only possibility for D′2 is that
D2 = νc˜, n˜′2.
(
σ2\W , S
′
2,
P ′2 ∪ {(aw〈wσ2〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S2(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S2(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅) , (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
)
=⇒ D′2 :=
νc˜, n˜′′2 .
(
σ2\W , S
′′
2 ,
P ′′2 ∪ {(aw〈wσ2〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S2(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S2(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅) , (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
)
The transitions D2 =⇒ D′2 can only involve n˜′2, S′2,P ′2. Thus we can see that
E = νn˜′2.(ϕ2, S
′
2,P ′2) =⇒ B′2 := νn˜′′2 .(ϕ2, S′′2 ,P ′′2 )
SinceB2 =⇒ E and E =⇒ B′2, we haveB2 =⇒ B′2. Comparing the construction ofD′1 (resp.D′2) withB′1 (resp.
B′2), we can see that (B
′
1, B
′
2) ∈ R.
(b) Assume
B1 = νn˜1. (ϕ1, T1 ∪ {t 7→M1} ,P1) t:=N−−−→ νn˜1. (ϕ1, T1 ∪ {t 7→ Nϕ1} ,P1)
τ(t)−−→ B′1 := νn˜1. (ϕ1, T1 ∪ {t 7→M ′1} ,P ′1)
where t /∈ n˜1 ∪ locks(P1) and S1 = T1 ∪ {t 7→M1} and var(N) ⊆ dom(B1).
We need to show that there exists B′2 such that B2
t:=N−−−→ τ(t)=⇒ B′2 and (B′1, B′2) ∈ R. The idea is to find a B′2 from
E such that E t:=N−−−→ τ(t)=⇒ B′2 and then use Corollary 10 and B2 =⇒ E to get B2 t:=N−−−→=⇒
τ(t)
=⇒ B′2.
We construct an evaluation context Ct:
Ct =
(
-, -,
{(
n∏
i=1
ei, ∅
)
,
(
aw1(x1). · · · .awn(xn).read t(x).writet〈Nρ〉.
(
n∏
i=1
ei.awi〈xi〉
)
, ∅
)}
-
)
where e1 · · · en are pairwise distinct fresh channel names, {w1, · · · , wn} =W∪{vs}s∈U1∪U2 and ρ = {x1/w1, · · · , xn/wn}.
Applying Ct to D1, we can get the following transitions:
Ct[D1] =
νc˜, n˜1.
σ1\W , T1 ∪ {t 7→M1} ,
P1 ∪ {(aw〈wσ1〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S1(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S1(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
∪
{(
n∏
i=1
ei, ∅
)
,
(
aw1(x1). · · · .awn(xn).read t(x).writet〈Nρ〉.
(
n∏
i=1
ei.awi〈xi〉
)
, ∅
)}

=⇒ D′1 :=
νc˜, n˜1.
σ1\W , T1 ∪ {t 7→ Nϕ1} ,
P1 ∪ {(aw〈wσ1〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S1(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S1(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s6=ts∈unlocks(A1)
∪ {(unlock t, {t})}

τ(t)−−→
νc˜, n˜1.
σ1\W , T1 ∪ {t 7→ Nϕ1} ,P1 ∪ {(aw〈wσ1〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S1(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S1(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s6=ts∈unlocks(A1)

τ(t)−−→ D′′1 :=
νc˜, n˜1.
σ1\W , T1 ∪ {t 7→M ′1} ,P ′1 ∪ {(aw〈wσ1〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S1(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S1(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s6=ts∈unlocks(A1)

In the above transitions, all the public state cells in D1 are locked. We can see that D′1 6⇓e1,··· ,en,tagt . We apply
Ct to D2. From Ct[D1] ≈ Ct[D2], there should exist D′2 such that Ct[D2] =⇒ D′2 =⇒ D′′2 and D′2 ≈ D′1 and
D′′2 ≈ D′′1 . Let S′2 = T2 ∪ {t 7→M2}. The only possibility for D′2 and D′′2 is that:
Ct[D2] = νc˜, n˜′2.σ2\W , T2 ∪ {t 7→M2} ,
P ′2 ∪ {(aw〈wσ2〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S2(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S2(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
∪
{(
n∏
i=1
ei, ∅
)
,
(
aw1(x1). · · · .awn(xn).read t(x).writet〈Nρ〉.
(
n∏
i=1
ei.awi〈xi〉
)
, ∅
)}

=⇒ D′2 := νc˜, n˜′′2 .σ2\W , T ′2 ∪ {t 7→ Nϕ2} ,
P ′′2 ∪ {(aw〈wσ2〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S2(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S2(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅) , (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s6=ts∈unlocks(A1)
∪ {(unlock t, {t})}

τ(t)−−→ νc˜, n˜′′2 .σ2\W , T ′2 ∪ {t 7→ Nϕ2} ,P ′′2 ∪ {(aw〈wσ2〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S2(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S2(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅) , (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s6=ts∈unlocks(A1)

τ(t)
=⇒ D′′2 :=
νc˜, n˜′′′2 .
σ2\W , S′′2 ,P ′′′2 ∪ {(aw〈wσ2〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S2(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S2(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅) , (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s6=ts∈unlocks(A1)

We can see that
E =⇒ t:=N−−−→=⇒ νn˜′′2 . (ϕ2, T ′2 ∪ {t 7→ Nϕ2} ,P ′′2 )
τ(t)
=⇒ B′2 := νn˜′′′2 . (ϕ2, S′′2 ,P ′′′2 )
From B2 =⇒ E, we have B2 =⇒ t:=N−−−→=⇒ τ(t)=⇒ B′2. Using Corollary 10, we know that B2 t:=N−−−→
τ(t)
=⇒ B′2.
Comparing the constructions of B′1 (resp. B
′
2) with D
′′
1 (resp. D
′′
2 ), we know that (B
′
1, B
′
2) ∈ R.
(c) Assume B1 = νn˜1, r.(ϕ1, T1 ∪ {r 7→M} ,Q1 ∪ {(open r.P, L)}) τ(r)−−→ B′1 := νn˜1.(σ, S ∪ {r 7→M} ,P ∪
{(P,L)}) if r /∈ n˜1.
We can get the following transition from D1:
D1 =
νc˜, n˜1, r.
σ1\W , T1 ∪ {r 7→M} ,
Q1 ∪ {(open r.P, L)}
∪ {(aw〈wσ1〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S1(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S1(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅) , (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)

τ(r)−−−→D′1 :=
νc˜, n˜1.
σ1\W , T1 ∪ {r 7→M} ,
Q1 ∪ {(P,L)}
∪ {(aw〈wσ1〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S1(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S1(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅) , (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)

We can see that D′1 ⇓aw,avt ,bj ,reads,tags,writes for w ∈ W, t ∈ U1 ∪ U2, j ∈ J, s ∈ unlocks(A1). We can also see
that fs(D′1) = fs(D1) ∪ {r}. From D1 ≈ D2, there should exist D′2 such that D2 =⇒ D′2 ≈ D′1 which requires
fs(D′2) = fs(D2) ∪ {r}. The only possibility for D′2 is that
D2 = νc˜, n˜′2.
(
σ2\W , S
′
2,
P ′2 ∪ {(aw〈wσ2〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S2(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S2(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅) , (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
)
τ(r)
=⇒ D′2 :=
νc˜, n˜′′2 .
(
σ2\W , S
′′
2 ,
P ′′2 ∪ {(aw〈wσ2〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S2(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S2(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅) , (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
)
The transitions D2 =⇒ D′2 can only involve n˜′2, S′2,P ′2. Thus we can see that
E = νn˜′2.(ϕ2, S
′
2,P ′2)
τ(r)
=⇒ B′2 := νn˜′′2 .(ϕ2, S′′2 ,P ′′2 )
Since lock (D′1) = lock (D
′
2) and fs(D
′
2) = fs(D2) ∪ {r} and all the unlocked public state cells in A1 are
locked in both D2 and D′2, we can see that lock (B
′
1) = lock (B
′
2) and fs(B
′
2) = fs(E) ∪ {r} = fs(B′1). Since
B2 =⇒ E and E =⇒ B′2, we have B2 =⇒ B′2. Comparing the construction of D′1 (resp. D′2) with B′1 (resp. B′2),
we can see that (B′1, B
′
2) ∈ R.
(d) AssumeB1 = νn˜1.(ϕ1, T1∪{r 7→M} ,Q1∪{(unlock r.P, L ∪ {r})}) τ(r)−−→ B′1 := νn˜1.(σ, S∪{r 7→M} ,P∪
{(P,L)}) if r /∈ n˜1 ∪ lock (Q1) ∪ L. The analysis is similar as above case.
(e) Assume B1 = νn˜1.(ϕ1, S1,Q1 ∪ {(a(x).P1, L1)}) a(M)−−−−→ B′1 := νn˜1.(ϕ1, S1,Q1 ∪ {(P1 {Mϕ1/x} , L1)})
with name(a,M) ∩ n˜1 = ∅ and var(M) ⊆ dom(ϕ1) and P1 = Q1 ∪ {(a(x).P1, L1)}.
i. when a 6∈ c˜, we construct an evaluation context C:
C =
(
-, -,
{(
n∏
i=1
ei, ∅
)
,
(
aw1(x1). · · · .awn(xn).a〈Mρ〉.
(
n∏
i=1
ei.awi〈xi〉
)
, ∅
)}
-
)
where e1 · · · en are pairwise distinct fresh channel names, {w1, · · · , wn} = W ∪ {vs}s∈U1∪U2 and ρ ={x1/w1, · · · , xn/wn}. Applying C to D1, we can get the following transitions:
C[D1] = νc˜, n˜1.

σ1\W , S1,
Q1 ∪ {(a(x).P1, L1)}
∪ {(aw〈wσ1〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S1(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S1(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
∪
{(
n∏
i=1
ei, ∅
)
,
(
aw1(x1). · · · .awn(xn).a〈Mρ〉.
(
n∏
i=1
ei.awi〈xi〉
)
, ∅
)}

=⇒ νc˜, n˜1.

σ1\W , S1,
Q1 ∪ {(a(x).P1, L1)}
∪ {(bj〈cj〉, ∅)}j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S1(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
∪
{(
n∏
i=1
ei, ∅
)
,
(
a〈Mϕ1〉.
(
n∏
i=1
ei.awi〈wiϕ1〉
)
, ∅
)}

=⇒ D′1 :=
νc˜, n˜1.
σ1\W , S1,
Q1 ∪ {(P1 {Mϕ1/x} , L1)}
∪ {(aw〈wσ1〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S1(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S1(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)

Then we apply C to D2, and from C[D1] ≈ C[D2]. There should exist D′2 such that C[D2] =⇒ D′2 and
D′2 ≈ D′1. Since D′1 ⇓aw,avs ,bj ,readt,tagt,writet for w ∈ W, s ∈ U1 ∪ U2, j ∈ J, t ∈ unlocks(A1) and D
′
1 6⇓ei
for i = 1, · · · , n, the only possiblity for D′2 is that
C[D2] = νc˜, n˜′2.
σ2\W , S′2,
P ′2 ∪ {(aw〈wσ2〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S2(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S2(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
∪
{(
n∏
i=1
ei, ∅
)
,
(
aw1(x1). · · · .awn(xn).a〈Mρ〉.
(
n∏
i=1
ei.awi〈xi〉
)
, ∅
)}

=⇒ νc˜, n˜′′2 .
σ2\W , S′′2 ,
P ′′2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S2(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
∪
{(
n∏
i=1
ei, ∅
)
,
(
a〈Mϕ2〉.
(
n∏
i=1
ei.awi〈wiϕ2〉
)
, ∅
)}

=⇒ D′2 :=
νc˜, n˜′′′2 .
(
σ2\W , S
′′′
2 ,
P ′′′2 ∪ {(aw〈wσ2〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S2(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S2(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
)
In the transitions C[D2] =⇒ D′2, there is no operations on public state cells in unlocks(A1) because these cells
are all locked. So we can deduce that
E = νn˜′2. (ϕ2, S
′
2,P ′2) =⇒ νn˜′′2 . (ϕ2, S′′2 ,P ′′2 )
a(M)
=⇒ B′2 := νn˜′′′2 . (ϕ2, S′′′2 ,P ′′′2 )
From D′′1 ≈ D′′2 , we have that (B′1, B′2) ∈ R.
ii. when a = ck for some k ∈ J , we construct an evaluation context C:
C =
(
-, -,
{(
n∏
i=1
ei, ∅
)
,
(
aw1(x1). · · · .awn(xn).bk(u).u〈Mρ〉.
(
bk〈u〉 |
n∏
i=1
ei.awi〈xi〉
)
, ∅
)}
-
)
where e1 · · · en are pairwise distinct fresh channel names, {w1, · · · , wn} = W ∪ {vs}s∈U1∪U2 and ρ ={x1/w1, · · · , xn/wn}.
(f) Assume
B1 = νn˜1.(ϕ1, S1,Q1 ∪ {(a(x).P1, L1)}) a(d)−−−→ B′1 := νn˜1.(ϕ1, S1,Q1 ∪ {(P1 {d/x} , L1)})
with a, d /∈ n˜1 = ∅ and P1 = Q1 ∪ {(a(x).P1, L1)}.
i. when a, d 6∈ c˜, we construct an evaluation context C:
C = (-, -, {(e, ∅) , (a〈d〉.e, ∅)} -)
where e is a fresh channel name.
Applying C to D1, we can get the following transitions:
C[D1] = νc˜, n˜1.
σ1\W , S1,
Q1 ∪ {(a(x).P1, L1)}
∪ {(aw〈wσ1〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S1(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S1(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
∪ {(e, ∅) , (a〈d〉.e, ∅)}

=⇒ D′1 :=
νc˜, n˜1.
σ1\W , S1,
Q1 ∪ {(P1 {d/x} , L1)}
∪ {(aw〈wσ1〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S1(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S1(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)

Then we apply C to D2, and from C[D1] ≈ C[D2]. There should exist D′2 such that C[D2] =⇒ D′2 and
D′2 ≈ D′1. Since D′1 ⇓aw,avs ,bj ,readt,tagt,writet for w ∈ W, s ∈ U1 ∪ U2, j ∈ J, t ∈ unlocks(A1) and D
′
1 6⇓e,
the only possiblity for D′2 is that
C[D2] = νc˜, n˜′2.
σ2\W , S′2,
P ′2 ∪ {(aw〈wσ1〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S2(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S2(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
∪ {(e, ∅) , (a〈d〉.e, ∅)}

=⇒ D′2 :=
νc˜, n˜′′2 .
(
σ2\W , S
′′
2 ,
P ′′2 ∪ {(aw〈wσ1〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S1(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S2(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
)
In the transitions C[D2] =⇒ D′2, there is no operations on public state cells in unlocks(A1) because these cells
are all locked. So we can deduce that
E = νn˜′2. (ϕ2, S
′
2,P ′2)
a(d)
=⇒ B′2 := νn˜′′2 . (ϕ2, S′′2 ,P ′′2 )
From B2 =⇒ E, we have B2 a(d)=⇒ B′2. From D′′1 ≈ D′′2 , we have that (B′1, B′2) ∈ R.
ii. when a = ck for some k ∈ J and d /∈ c˜, we construct an evaluation context C:
C = (-, -,{(e, ∅) , (bk(u).u〈d〉.e.bk〈u〉, ∅)} -)
where e is a fresh channel name.
iii. when a /∈ c˜ and d = ck for some k ∈ J , we construct an evaluation context C:
C = (-, -,{(e, ∅) , (bk(u).a〈u〉.e.bk〈u〉, ∅)} -)
where e is a fresh channel name.
iv. when a = d = ck for some k ∈ J , we construct an evaluation context C:
C = (-, -,{(e, ∅) , (bk(u).u〈u〉.e.bk〈u〉, ∅)} -)
where e is a fresh channel name.
v. when a = ck and d = cm for some k,m ∈ J and k 6= m, we construct an evaluation context C:
C = (-, -,{(e, ∅) , (bk(u).bm(v).u〈v〉.(e.bk〈u〉 | bm〈v〉), ∅)} -)
where e is a fresh channel name.
(g) Assume B1 = νn˜1.(ϕ1, S1,Q1 ∪ {(a〈d〉.P1, L1)}) a〈d〉−−−→ B′1 := νn˜1.(ϕ1, S1,Q1 ∪ {(P1, L1)}) with a, d /∈ n˜1
and P1 = Q1 ∪ {(a〈d〉.P1, L1)}.
i. when a, d 6∈ c˜, we construct an evaluation context C:
C = (-, -, {(e, ∅) , (a(x).if x = d then e, ∅)} -)
where e is a fresh channel name.
Applying C to D1, we can get the following transitions:
C[D1] = νc˜, n˜1.
σ1\W , S1,
Q1 ∪ {(a〈d〉.P1, L1)}
∪ {(aw〈wσ1〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S1(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S1(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
∪ {(e, ∅) , (a(x).if x = d then e, ∅)}

=⇒ D′1 :=
νc˜, n˜1.
σ1\W , S1,
Q1 ∪ {(P1, L1)}
∪ {(aw〈wσ1〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S1(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S1(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)

Then we apply C to D2. Since C[D1] ≈ C[D2], there should exsits D′2 such that C[D2] =⇒ D′2 ≈ D′1.
From D′1 ⇓aw,avs ,bj ,readt,tagt,writet for w ∈ W, s ∈ U1 ∪ U2, j ∈ J, t ∈ unlocks(A1) and D
′
1 6⇓e, the only
possibility of D′2 is that:
C[D2] = νc˜, n˜′2.
σ2\W , S′2,
P ′2 ∪ {(aw〈wσ2〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S2(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S2(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
∪ {(e, ∅) , (a(x).if x = d then e, ∅)}

=⇒ D′2 :=
νc˜, n˜′′2 .
(
σ2\W , S
′′
2 ,
Q′′2 ∪ {(aw〈wσ2〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S2(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S2(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
)
In the transitions C[D2] =⇒ D′2, there is no operations on public state cells in unlocks(A1) because these cells
are all locked. So we can deduce that
E = νn˜′2. (ϕ2, S
′
2,P ′2)
a〈d〉
=⇒ B′2 := νn˜′′2 . (ϕ2, S′′2 ,P ′′2 )
From B2 =⇒ E, we have B2 a〈d〉=⇒ B′2. From D′′1 ≈ D′′2 , we have that (B′1, B′2) ∈ R.
ii. when a = ck for some k ∈ J and d /∈ c˜, we construct an evaluation context C:
C = (-, -,{(e, ∅) , (bk(u).u(x).if x = d then e.bk〈u〉, ∅)} -)
where e is a fresh channel name.
iii. when a /∈ c˜ and d = ck for some k ∈ J , we construct an evaluation context C:
C = (-, -,{(e, ∅) , (bk(u).a(x).if x = u then e.bk〈u〉, ∅)} -)
where e is a fresh channel name.
iv. when a = d = ck for some k ∈ J , we construct an evaluation context C:
C = (-, -,{(e, ∅) , (bk(u).u(x).if x = u then e.bk〈u〉, ∅)} -)
where e is a fresh channel name.
v. when a = ck and d = cm for some k,m ∈ J and k 6= m, we construct an evaluation context C:
C = (-, -,{(e, ∅) , (bk(u).bm(v).u(x).if x = v then (bk〈u〉 | e.bm〈v〉) , ∅)} -)
where e is a fresh channel name.
(h) Assume B1 = νn˜′1, d.(ϕ1, S1,Q1 ∪ {(a〈d〉.P1, L1)})
νd.a〈d〉−−−−−→ B′1 := νn˜′1.(ϕ1, S1,Q1 ∪ {(P1, L1)}) with a, d /∈
n˜′1 and P1 = Q1 ∪ {(a〈d〉.P1, L1)}.
i. when a 6∈ c˜, we construct an evaluation context C:
C = (-, -,{(e, ∅) , (a(x).if x ∈ fn(B1, B2) then 0 else e.bm〈x〉, ∅)} -)
where e, bm are different fresh channel names.
Applying C to D1, we can get the following transitions:
C[D1] = νc˜, n˜′1, d.
σ1\W , S1,
Q1 ∪ {(a〈d〉.P1, L1)}
∪ {(aw〈wσ1〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S1(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2
∪ {(reads〈S1(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
∪ {(e, ∅) , (a(x).if x ∈ fn(B1, B2) then 0 else e.bm〈x〉, ∅)}

=⇒ D′1 :=
νc˜, n˜′1, d.
σ1\W , S1,
Q1 ∪ {(P1, L1)}
∪ {(aw〈wσ1〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S1(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S1(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
∪ {(bm〈d〉, ∅)}

Then we apply C to D2. Since C[D1] ≈ C[D2], there should exsits D′2 such that C[D2] =⇒ D′2 ≈ D′1.
From D′1 ⇓aw,avs ,bj ,bm,readt,tagt,writet for w ∈W, s ∈ U1 ∪ U2, j ∈ J, t ∈ unlocks(A1) and D
′
1 6⇓e, the only
possibility of D′2 is that:
C[D2] = νc˜, n˜′2.
σ2\W , S′2,
P ′2 ∪ {(aw〈wσ2〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S2(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S2(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
∪ {(e, ∅) , (a(x).if x ∈ fn(B1, B2) then 0 else e.bm〈x〉, ∅)}

=⇒ D′2 :=
νc˜, n˜′′2 , d.
σ2\W , S′′2 ,
P ′′2 ∪ {(aw〈wσ2〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S2(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S2(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
∪ {(bm〈d〉, ∅)}

In the transitions C[D2] =⇒ D′2, there is no operations on public state cells in unlocks(A1) because these cells
are all locked. So we can deduce that
E = νn˜′2. (ϕ2, S
′
2,P ′2)
νd.a〈d〉
=⇒ B′2 := νn˜′′2 . (ϕ2, S′′2 ,P ′′2 )
From B2 =⇒ E, we have B2 νd.a〈d〉=⇒ B′2. From D′′1 ≈ D′′2 , we have that (B′1, B′2) ∈ R.
ii. when a = ck for some k ∈ J and d /∈ c˜, we construct an evaluation context C:
C = (-, -,{(e, ∅) , (bk(u).u(x).if x ∈ fn(B1, B2) then 0 else (e.bk〈u〉 | bm〈x〉), ∅)} -)
where e, bm are different fresh channel names.
(i) Assume B1 = νn˜1.(ϕ1, S1,Q1 ∪ {(a〈M1〉.P1, L1)}) νx.a〈x〉−−−−−→ νn˜1.(ϕ1 ∪ {M1/x} , S1,P ∪ {(P1, L1)}) with
a 6∈ n˜1 and M1 is of base sort and x is fresh.
i. when a 6∈ c˜, selecting a fresh channel name ax, we construct an evaluation context C:
C = (-, -, {(e, ∅) , (a(z).e.ax〈z〉, ∅)} -)
where e is a fresh channel name.
Applying C to D1, we can get the following transitions:
C[D1] = νc˜, n˜1.
σ1\W , S1,
Q1 ∪ {(a〈M1〉.P1, L1)}
∪ {(aw〈wσ1〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S1(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2
∪ {(reads〈S1(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
∪ {(e, ∅) , (a(z).e.ax〈z〉, ∅)}

=⇒ D′1 :=
νc˜, n˜1.
σ1\W , S1,
Q1 ∪ {(P1, L1)}
∪ {(aw〈wσ1〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S1(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S1(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
∪ {(ax〈M1〉, ∅)}

Then we apply C to D2. Since C[D1] ≈ C[D2], there should exsits D′2 such that C[D2] =⇒ D′2 ≈ D′1.
From D′1 ⇓aw,avs ,ax,bj ,bm,readt,tagt,writet for w ∈ W, s ∈ U1 ∪ U2, j ∈ J, t ∈ unlocks(A1) and D
′
1 6⇓e, the
only possibility of D′2 is that:
C[D2] = νc˜, n˜′2.
σ2\W , S′2,
P ′2 ∪ {(aw〈wσ2〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S2(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S2(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
∪ {(e, ∅) , (a(z).e.ax〈z〉, ∅)}

=⇒ D′2 :=
νc˜, n˜′′2 .
σ2\W , S′′2 ,
P ′′2 ∪ {(aw〈wσ2〉, ∅)}w∈W ∪ {(avs〈S2(s)〉, ∅)}s∈U1∪U2 ∪
{
(bj〈cj〉, ∅)
}
j∈J
∪ {(reads〈S2(s)〉, ∅) , (tags, ∅), (writes(x).s := x. tags.unlock s, {s})}s∈unlocks(A1)
∪ {(ax〈M2〉, ∅)}

In the transitions C[D2] =⇒ D′2, there is no operations on public state cells in unlocks(A1) because these cells
are all locked. So we can deduce that
E = νn˜′2. (ϕ2, S
′
2,P ′2)
νx.a〈x〉
=⇒ B′2 := νn˜′′2 . (ϕ2 ∪ {M2/x} , S′′2 ,P ′′2 )
From B2 =⇒ E, we have B2 νx.a〈x〉=⇒ B′2. From D′′1 ≈ D′′2 , we have that (B′1, B′2) ∈ R.
ii. when a = ck for some k ∈ J , selecting a fresh channel name ax, we construct an evaluation context C:
C = (-, -, {(e, ∅) , (bk(u).u(z).e.ax〈z〉, ∅)} -)
where e is a fresh channel name.
Theorem 4. A ≈ B iff A ≈l B.
Proof. Using Theorem 7 and Theorem 8.
